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Averting Civilian Casualties vs.
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Ziv Bohrer*
Mark Osiel**

ABSTRACT

To what lengths may a state go to protect its soldiers in
war? May it design its military operations to further that goal if
this -significantly increases civilian casualties? International
law currently offers no clear answers. Because recent wars have
seen many states prioritize soldier safety over avoiding civilian
casualties, spirited debate has arisen over the legal defensibility
of this practice. This debate currently focuses on an ethics code
proposed by two influential Israeli thinkers and allegedly
embodied in Israel's conduct of its 2008-2009 Gaza war with
Hamas. This Article shows that current discussion fails to
appreciate how judgments about proportionality in the use of
military force necessarily differ at the tactical, operational, and
strategic levels of warfare. It illustrates this with empirical
material from recent armed conflicts. If internationallaw is to
address war's inescapable moral complexities, it must be
interpreted to reflect the variation in the kind of decisions that
soldiers confront at distinct organizational echelons. This
approach largely resolves one of the most vexing conundrums
that has perennially bedeviled the law of war.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Consider three questions arising from the following circumstance
of armed conflict:
Border skirmishes have been occurring for some time between a
state and one of its military adversaries. In these encounters, that
adversary regularly attacks small units of the state's soldiers who are
patrolling the shared border. The enemy also plants roadside bombs
within the state's territory, near its military bases, to kill its soldiers.
After one of these bombs causes extensive casualties, the state finally
responds, opening a large-scale military campaign, intended to deter
the enemy from continuing these practices. The state directs its
response against enemy military forces and installations; these are
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"military objectives," hence lawfully subject to being targeted.' Even
so, this response will likely produce greater harm to civilians, though
unintentional, than the enemy's intentional actions have caused the
state and its troops. To what extent does international law limit the
state's response in light of these facts?
Second, during the ensuing conflict, the enemy captures one of
the state's soldiers. Her company knows that she is being held in a
nearby house also containing an elderly civilian couple unable to
escape the combat. Does international law allow the company to
rescue its fellow soldier, even if it is probable that the couple will die
in the crossfire?
Third, in the same war, the state orders a division commander to
capture a town that houses both civilians and enemy combatants. The
commander can either ask for aerial support to bombard the town,
seeking to target only enemy locations (insofar as these can be
identified), or alternatively deploy ground units to take the town
house by house. The first option minimizes the risk that soldiers will
be harmed, but imposes much greater danger to civilian residents.
May the division commander, consistently with international law, call
for aerial support?
These three scenarios respectively arise at the strategic, tactical,
and operational levels of decision making. They all pose the same
essential question: to what extent may a state take protection of its
soldiers (hereinafter force protection) into account when determining
the proportionality 2 of contemplated military action? The question
bears on both the legality and morality of that action.
Military concern with force protection has increased as Western
publics have grown averse to suffering military casualties, even as
most people recognize that force protection often comes at the price of
increased civilian harm.3 That harm is itself the object of increasing
preoccupation
in many
quarters.
International
rules on
proportionality are being reassessed and reinterpreted in light of
these vexing new realities. A recent code of military ethics, proposed
by two prominent Israeli commentators (a leading philosopher and a
distinguished army general), explicitly provides that protecting
soldiers' lives should always receive priority over safeguarding

1.
1 Jean-Marie
Henckaerts
& Louise Doswald-Beck,
Customary
International Humanitarian Law: Rules 29-32 (Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross ed., 2005)
(defining military objectives).
2.
Proportionalityis a colloquial expression, and it is not the accurate legal
term used in the relevant jus in bello and jus ad bellum norms; the accurate
terminology will be presented infra Part II.
3.
See, e.g., Lawrence Freedman, Using Force for Peace in an Age of Terror,in
LEASHING THE DOGS OF WAR: CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN A DIVIDED WORLD 245, 249,
256 (Chester A. Crocker et al. eds., 2007) (describing fundamental changes in post-Cold
War Western military intervention and the resulting increase in importance of force
protection, despite cost of civilian casualties).
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foreign civilians, when these goals collide.4 Some have accused the
Israel Defense Forces (IDF) of unofficially adopting this code and
thereby causing disproportionate harm to Palestinian civilians during
the 2008-2009 Cast Lead operation in Gaza. The code's alleged
overvaluation of force protection was blamed for the operation's high
lethality to innocent Palestinians. 5
The vexing questions these circumstances present are by no
means unique to Israel, even if that country confronts them more
acutely than do most other states. Many wars are today fought in
heavily populated areas, where enemies of Western armies
deliberately intersperse their fighters among civilians in order to
capitalize on the aversion of Western democracies both to harming
civilians and to incurring losses among their own troops, losses that
door-to-door combat (in seeking to minimize civilian casualties) will
inevitably multiply. 6
The resulting predicament has prompted domestic outcry in
several countries, as their troops suffer many casualties in ground
operations, notably in Afghanistan. NATO policy there shifted in
2009 from heavy reliance on close air support to counterinsurgency,

4.
See Asa Kasher & Amos Yadlin, Military Ethics of Fighting Terror: An
Israeli Perspective, 4 J. MIL. ETHICS 3, 14-21 (2005) (arguing that protecting the lives
of the state's citizens, noncombatants under its effective control, and its combatants
takes priority over protecting the lives of noncombatants not under the state's effective
control); see also infra notes 17-24 and accompanying text.
5.
Muhammad Ali Khalidi, "The Most Moral Army in the World": The New
"Ethical Code" of the Israeli Military and the War on Gaza, 39 J. PALESTINE STUD. 6,
15 (2010); see also Avery Plaw, Upholding the Principle of Distinction in CounterTerrorist Operations: A Dialogue, 9 J. MIL. ETHICS 3, 4-5 (2010) ("Nonetheless, it is
highly plausible that the kinds of argument advanced by Kasher and Yadlin have
influenced Israeli combat practices, and in at least some cases those practices have
affected the numbers of combat casualties and civilian casualties in particular.");
Avishai Margalit & Michael Walzer, This Is Not the Way To Manage a Just War,
HAARETZ (Apr. 8, 2009, 2:44 AM), http://www.haaretz.co.illopinions/1.1254834 (Isr.)
[hereinafter Margalit & Walzer, Not the Way] (stating that "[i]n order to understand
the disputed code of conduct of the IDF during the last operation in Gaza one should
read the article of Asa Kasher and Amos Yadlin" (Ziv Bohrer trans.)). In the English
version of their article, Margalit and Walzer were less decisive with regard to this
issue. See Avishai Margalit & Michael Walzer, Israel: Civilians and Combatants, 56
N.Y. REV. BOOKS 21, 22 (2009) [hereinafter Margalit & Walzer, Israel] (declining to join
the debate about whether the IDF actually follows Kasher and Yadlin's guidelines); see
also Daniel Statman, Morality in War and 'Cast Lead,' 38 TCHELET 3, 5-7 (2010) (Isr.).
6.
For claims regarding the universal significance and applicability of this
debate by the main scholars, who will be discussed in this Article, see Kasher & Yadlin,
supra note 4, at 60-61 ("[T]he principles are suggested as universal and should be
evaluated and applied as such."); Margalit & Walzer, Israel, supra note 5 (responding
to Kasher and Yadlin's article "Assassination and Preventive Killing" and stating that
"[t]here is nothing ... unique to Israel," as it is a dilemma faced by soldiers in many
armed conflicts-such as in Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, and Gaza); David Luban, Risk
Taking and Force Protection 5-6 (Georgetown Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research
Paper No. 11-72, 2011) (asking if soldiers should make themselves more vulnerable in
combat to reduce civilian casualties, while using as examples the actions of several
different states).
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aiming to win "hearts and minds" through patient, day-to-day
interaction with locals. 7 This policy change caused an increase in
military casualties, 8 however, which generated effective domestic
pressure for withdrawal.9 Public disaffection with soldier casualties
also prompted renewed reliance on air power and, with it, an increase
in civilian casualties.10
This Article seeks to advance the heated current discussion of
whether force protection may, consistently with international law and
emergent global mores, legitimately influence deliberations about
proportionality in the use of military force. Part I describes three
leading positions in current debate. First is that of Asa Kasher and

7.
See A. Walter Dorn, Warfighting, Counterinsurgencyand Peacekeeping in.
Afghanistan: Three Strategies Examined in the Light of Just War Theory, in WAR,
HUMAN DIGNITY AND NATION BUILDING: THEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON CANADA'S
ROLE IN AFGHANISTAN 16, 25-26 (Gary D. Badcock & Darren C. Marks eds., 2011)

(discussing the International Security Assistance Force's shift to classic
counterinsurgency in Afghanistan in 2009).
See Marc W. Herold, The Obama/Pentagon War Narrative, the Real War
8.
and Where Afghan Civilian Deaths Do Matter, 5 REVISTAS PAZ Y CONFLICTOS 44, 45,

52-53 (2012) (describing the correlation between increased American military
casualties and decreased Afghan civilian deaths due to that policy change).
9.
See THE AFG. STUDY GRP., A NEW WAY FORWARD: RETHINKING U.S.
STRATEGY IN AFGHANISTAN 1 (2010) (stating that because the allies' 2010 offensives
were unsuccessful, "U.S. and allied casualties reached an all-time high in July [2010],
and several NATO allies have announced plans to withdraw"); Dorn, supra note 7, at
57 (noting the pessimistic outlook held by commanders in Afghanistan); Herold, supra
note 8, at 65 ("The American war in Afghanistan will end after NATO country
militaries withdraw. This process [already] began with the [withdrawal of several
allies].... In the end, bodies tell the story, America's lost war in Afghanistan will
cease, cut by the scissors of Afghan bodies and mounting U.S. military bodies."
(emphasis omitted) (footnotes omitted)); Canada To Pull Troops Out of Afghanistan by
2011, PRESSTV (Oct. 10, 2009), http://www.presstv.ir/detail.aspx?id=108284&sectionid=
351020701 ("[Tlhe mounting number of Western soldiers coming home in body bags
has sent support for the war plummeting in Europe, Canada, and the United States.");
see also Steven Erlanger & Alissa J. Rubin, France Weighs Pullout After 4 of Its
Soldiers Are Killed, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/
21/world/europe/sarkozy-weighs-afghan-withdrawal-after-4-french-troops-killed.html?
pagewanted=all (discussing France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom).
10.
For the dissatisfaction of American soldiers with these rules of engagements,
see Jason Motlagh, Petraeus Toughens Afghan Rules of Engagement, TIME WORLD (Aug.
6, 2010), http://www.time.com/time/worldlarticle/0,8599,2008863,00.html (noting that
soldiers worry that strict rules of engagement place them in greater danger); Eric
Schmitt, Allies Restrict Airstrikes on Taliban in Civilian Homes, N.Y. TIMES (June 10,
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/11/worldlasia/allies-restrict-airstrikes-againsttaliban-in-homes.html (discussing soldiers' complaints with restrictive rules of
engagement). These sources state that when General David Petraeus replaced General
Stanley McChrystal, he further restricted the rules of engagement. Yet, data seem to
indicate otherwise. See, e.g., Herold, supra note 8, at 45 ("Since Gen. David Petraeus
took command. . . in late June 2010, coalition aircraft have flown . . . 50% more [attack

sorties] than they did during the same period in 2009. Not surprisingly, civilian
casualties are on the rise. .. ." (quoting Spencer Ackerman, Spin War Shift: Military
Now Bragging About Afghan Air Strikes, WIRED (Sept. 1, 2010, 11:45 AM),
http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2010/09/nato-brags-on-air-strikes-hits-talibanscivilian-casualties/ (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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Amos Yadlin, authors of the controversial recent code prioritizing
force protection over safeguarding civilians. That stance then receives
trenchant criticism from Avishai Margalit and Michael Walzer, who
contend that, when assessing proportionality, the lives of foreign
civilians must virtually always receive priority over one's soldiers. A
third standpoint is that of David Luban, also vehemently opposed to
the Kasher and Yadlin approach to proportionality, but on somewhat
different grounds. Namely, unlike Margalit and Walzer, Luban is
ready to acknowledge possible bases for giving value to soldiers' lives.
Yet, he argues that in practice force protection must generally give
way when this goal clashes with that of protecting civilians.
Part II assesses current international law, which distinguishes
between two forms of proportionality. The first is jus ad bellum
proportionality, governing the decision to resort to force in the first
instance and determining what overall measure of force will be
consistent with the goal of national self-defense. Second is jus in bello
proportionality, regulating operational and tactical conduct during an
armed conflict. Because proportionality turns out to mean very
different things at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of
war, it is essential to respect (as many pundits do not) this distinction
between ad bellum and in bello proportionality. This Article then
shows how each of the three positions in current debate accurately (or
at least more accurately than the other two) renders the
proportionality norm applicable to one (and only one) of the three
levels of military decision making in war.
Part III demonstrates how the place of force protection in
proportionality assessment is very different at each of these levels. To
illustrate these differences, this Article examines the choice made by
Western forces in recent years between aerial bombardment and
ground operations, indicating how this choice has distinct aspects and
implications when viewed from the strategic, operational, and tactical
standpoints. The decisions that commanders confront at these several
organizational echelons therefore vary greatly, in ways that the
international law of proportionality must respect and reflect.

II. CURRENT DEBATE ON FORCE PROTECTION

A. Safeguarding Soldiers Comes First:Asa Kasher and
Amos Yadlin on Israel's Code of Military Ethics
Asa Kasher and Amos Yadlin authored the military ethics code
that Israel was accused of adopting in Operation Cast Lead. Kasher is
a leading Israeli philosopher who has written on professional ethics
(including military ethics); Yadlin was a high-ranking military
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commander. Both have extensive relevant learning and experience."
They argue that all states have a duty,' 2 to the best of their abilities,
to limit civilian casualties.' 3 But civilians are not a uniform class.
Every state is obligated to protect its own citizens and other civilians
who are under its effective control (hereinafter the state's civilians).14
A state has no similar duty vis-A-vis civilians not within its territory
or otherwise under its control (hereinafter foreign civilians). The
state's duty to protect those under its control does not dissolve when a
person under its control becomes a soldier. Individuals' human rights
do not vanish into air once they enter military service. During war, to
be sure, a state may lawfully endanger the lives of its soldier-citizens.
Even so, consistent with the soldier's right to life, a state may risk
that life only insofar as necessary to advance the security of the state
and its civilians.15 A state's priorities-both moral and legal' 6 receive the following rank: first, the lives of a state's civilians; next,

11.
Asa Kasher is a leading Israeli expert on professional ethics who has aided
different Israeli governmental bodies, including the IDF, in the formulation of their
codes of professional ethics. See Prof. Asa Kosher, ISRAELI SPEAKERS,
http://www.israelispeakers.co.il/110277/Asa-Kasher (last visited Mar. 23, 2013) (Isr.)
(describing Kasher's educational background and expertise). In his personal life,
Kasher's son was killed during his military service-an experience that, by Kasher's
own admission, changed his worldview both in general and specifically with regard to
the issues related to the subject matter discussed herein. See Musa Budeiri, The IDF's
Ethical Code in Action-Asa Kasher: Yes, We're the Most Moral Army in the World,
COSMos
(Sept.
30,
2009),
http://cosmos.ucc.ie/cs1064/jabowen/IPSC/articles/
article0116765.html (translating an article by Shari Makover that appeared at M13 in
Ma'ariv on September 25, 2009). Major General Amos Yadlin wrote the code with
Kasher while serving as Israel's military attach6 to Washington. Prior to that position,
he served as the joint commander of all IDF's military schools and colleges, and in his
last position in the IDF, he served as the head of the IDF's Military Intelligence
Directorate. See Maj. Gen. (Ret.) Amos Yadlin: Directorof INSS, INST. NAT'L SECURITY
STUD., http://www.inss.org.illexperts.php?cat=0&incat=&staff-id=89 (last visited Mar.
23, 2013) (providing Yadlin's biography).
12.
Kasher and Yadlin do not clearly distinguish between legal and
morallethical duties. They focus on moral and ethical duties, but think that
international law can and should be interpreted/changed in order to dovetail with their
moral views. For a further discussion of this issue, see infra notes 142-143 and
accompanying text.
13.
E.g., Kasher & Yadlin, supra note 4, at 8-9, 16 (noting duties to protect
human dignity and civilians notwithstanding priority of citizens, those under the
state's effective control, and combatants).
14.
Id. at 8-9, 15-21 (discussing the duty of self-defense and the priority given
to certain protection-based duties).
15.
See id. at 11, 15-17 (providing priority over a state's combatants only to
noncombatant citizens and noncombatants under effective state control); see also, e.g.,
Asa Kasher, The Principle of Distinction, 6 J. MIL. ETHICS 152, 164 (2007) (rejecting
the doctrine of forfeiture of the right to life).
16.
Kasher and Yadlin do not clearly distinguish between legal and
morallethical duties. See supra note 12 and infra notes 142-143 and accompanying
text.
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the lives of its soldiers; and only thereafter the lives of foreign
civilians (beyond its territorial control).' 7
Kasher and Yadlin assume that their position applies to
everyone along the chain of command-from the state's top leaders to
the individual soldier on the battlefield.' 8 For state leaders, the duty
to proportionately employ force chiefly concerns the decision to enter
into warfare, a decision that should reflect their assessment of the
gravity of the attack their country has suffered.' 9 Kasher and
Yadlin's position is that, in determining whether (and in what
manner) to go to war in response to an enemy attack, a state legally
may (and morally must) assess risks to its soldiers by the same
standard it uses in assessing risks to its civilians. 20 This is because
the lives of a state's soldiers are worth no less than-and hence must
be weighed by the same metric as-those of its civilians. This way of
thinking could easily justify initial resort to force via air power,
rather than ground attack, notwithstanding the greater firepower
employed and the more numerous civilian casualties likely to result
on the other side.
The implications of their position are still more profound and
astonishing with respect to in bello proportionality, i.e., for military
decision making during an ensuing war. Here, the longstanding rule
is that civilian harm may not be excessive in relation to the benefits
anticipated from any given military action. In making this
assessment, the aim of protecting foreign civilians often clashes with
that of protecting one's own soldiers. 21 Kasher and Yadlin argue that,
when these two aims clash, a state's soldiers are duty bound to

17.
Kasher & Yadlin, supra note 4, at 15-17; see also Asa Kasher & Amos
Yadlin, Assassination and Preventive Killing, 25 SAIS REV. 41, 49-51 (2005)
[hereinafter Kasher & Yadlin, Assassination] (discussing the principle of distinction);
Asa Kasher & Amos Yadlin, 'Israel & the Rules of War'- An Exchange, 56 N.Y. REV.
BOOKS 77, 77 (2009) [hereinafter Kasher & Yadlin, Israel & the Rules of War]
(responding to Margalit and Walzer's criticisms); Kasher, supra note 15, at 166 (stating
the moral justification for risking soldiers' lives is the duty of their state to defend its
citizens, but this justification does not exist when a state prefers risking its soldiers
over risking foreign civilians in the close vicinity of the target).
18.
See Kasher & Yadlin, supra note 4, at 7-8 (noting that the proposed
principles apply at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels).
19.
The conditions of the ad bellum proportionality norm are discussed
extensively infra Part IID.
20.
See Asa Kasher, Operation Cast Lead and Just War Theory, 37 AZURE 43,
53 (2009) (implying this in the way he discusses how there are two national security
threats: one directed against civilians and the other against soldiers); see also Kasher
& Yadlin, supra note 4, at 7-8 (viewing their principles as equally applicable at the
strategic, operational, and tactical levels and accordingly only briefly discussing the
strategic level unique from the other two).
21.
The conditions of the in bello proportionality norm are discussed

extensively infra Part IIB-C.
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minimize the loss of foreign-civilian lives only when so doing would
not endanger their own lives, or the lives of fellow soldiers:22
Where the state does not have effective control of the vicinity, it does
not have to shoulder responsibility for the fact that persons who are
involved in terror operate in the vicinity of persons who are not. Injury
to bystanders is not intended. On the contrary, attempts are made to
minimize it. However, jeopardizing combatants rather than bystanders
during a military act against a terrorist would mean shouldering
23
responsibility for the mixed nature of the vicinity for no reason at all.

This approach would pertain not only to decisions by highranking commanders, choosing which kind of operation to conduct,
but also to small units in the field, to soldiers of the most humble
echelon. Kasher thus applies it to the following scenario: Terrorists
and foreign civilians both occupy a building. The state's army could
strike the building from the air, or seize it in a face-to-face combat.
The aerial option will kill many civilians but will not risk soldiers'
lives. Ground combat will kill fewer civilians but pose greater risk to
soldiers. Kasher contends that the state's commanders are duty
bound to select the aerial option:
It is important to emphasize that the state must come up with a
compelling justification for endangering the lives of its soldiers....
Therefore, in the dilemma at hand, the state should favor the lives
of its own soldiers over the lives of the neighbors of a terrorist when it
is operating in a territory that it does not effectively control, because in
such territories it does not bear the responsibility for properly
24
separating between dangerous individuals and harmless ones.

He adds that the soldier
would be justified in asking: Why does my state prefer an enemy citizen
over me, when it is not my state that put that citizen in the vicinity of
the terrorist, but rather the terrorist himself, who does so regularly and
deliberately? I don't see how the state can convince him that it
25
discharges its moral duties by thus risking him.

Thus, it is a moral wrong to increase risk to the state's soldiers
in order to reduce risk to foreign civilians. This position amounts to
prioritizing the former lives over the latter. Kasher and Yadlin do not
even entertain the possibility of a different conclusion when the
further risk to soldiers would be slight.
These authors defend their position in highly abstract terms,
broadly applicable to war in general, purporting to derive that
position from the logically necessary relationships they claim exist

22.
See Kasher & Yadlin, Assassination, supra note 17 (arguing that soldiers'
lives have priority over noncombatants not under effective state control); Kasher &
Yadlin, supranote 4, at 17-21 (same).
23.
Kasher & Yadlin, supra note 4, at 18.
24.
Kasher, supra note 20, at 66.
25.
Kasher, supra note 15, at 166.
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between a state and three categories of individuals: its civilians, its
soldiers, and foreign civilians. Yet these authors acknowledge that
their approach chiefly contemplates a particular kind of armed
conflict: between a state and a terrorist organization. "[T]he fight
against terror has to be. new," they argue, "because it cannot be
carried out in a pure, proper and effective way, within any of the
traditional paradigms of a state fighting familiar sources of public
danger, first and foremost the paradigms of warfare and of lawenforcement." 26
Kasher and Yadlin claim that two factors distinguish the fight
against terror from a paradigmatic interstate war. The first is the
broad strategy of terrorist organizations: "[P]remeditated killing or
otherwise injuring persons qua members of a population for the
purpose of terrorizing that population, in order to serve some given
goals."2 7 The second is the sort of tactic terrorist organizations
employ: intentionally blurring the distinction between combatants
and civilians, such as by refusing to wear uniforms and surrounding
themselves by civilians likely to suffer the brunt of any state
response. These tactics greatly enhance risks to both foreign civilians
and the state's soldiers. 28

B. All CivilianLives, Regardless of Nationality,Deserve Priority:
Avishai Margalitand Michael Walzer
Like Kasher and Yadlin, Margalit and Walzer assume that
everyone along the chain of command should assess proportionality in
essentially the same way. 2 9 But their reasoning is otherwise very
different from that of Kasher and Yadlin. Margalit and Walzer first
observe the disparity just mentioned, that Kasher and Yadlin, though
confessedly preoccupied with war against terrorist groups, derive
their approach from very general premises about the invariant duties
of states toward certain types of individuals-regardless of the kind
of conflict involved. This abstract reasoning fails to explain why war

26.
Kasher & Yadlin, supra note 4, at 6-7.
27.
Id. at 6.
28.
See id. at 7 (drawing crucial distinctions between the paradigm of fighting
terrorism and the paradigms of warfare and law enforcement).
29.
See Margalit & Walzer, Israel, supra note 5, at 22 (referring jointly to what
Israel should do as a state, how commanders should formulate the rules of engagement
for their subordinates, and how Israeli soldiers should behave on the battlefield); see
also Avishai Margalit & Michael Walzer, reply to Kasher & Yadlin, Israel & the Rules
of War, supra note 17 [hereinafter Margalit & Walzer, reply to Kasher & Yadlin]
(stating that soldiers "are acting on a battlefield; the risks they accept have to be
incorporated into the strategy and tactics of the battle").
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with terrorists uniquely warrants more lenient rules on
proportionality than suitable to other armed conflicts.30
Margalit and Walzer further reject Kasher and Yadlin's claim
that soldiers retain their right to life once embroiled in armed
conflict, arguing that this position is inconsistent with the legal
principle of "distinction."3 1 The principle of distinction provides that a
belligerent may intentionally target only the other side's combatants
(and military installations), not its civilians.3 2 The in bello
proportionality principle relies on this demarcation of combatant from
civilian when it demands that civilian loss may not be excessive vis-Avis anticipated military gain, which includes the gain a state obtains
by averting harm to its soldiers.
In allowing the intentional killing of soldiers, international law
not only discriminates between soldiers and other human beings. It
also treats soldiers in an extremely "consequentialist" manner, as
means to the end of victory.3 3 This understanding of the soldier of
course contradicts core deontological notions of how people may be
treated, requiring respect for their right to life.34 It is nonetheless

See Margalit & Walzer, Israel, supra note 5, at 21 (concluding that
30.
noncombatants should be treated the same regardless of citizenship).
Id. at 21-22; Margalit & Walzer, Not the Way, supra note 5 (rejecting the
31.
notion that soldiers are civilians in uniform and arguing that a distinction must be
made, and between combatant and civilian). Margalit and Walzer do not explicitly refer
to international law but instead focus on criticizing the morality of Kasher and Yadlin's
position. Others, however, have argued that international law supports their position.
See, e.g., Roy Confino & Mordechai Kremnitzer, The Legitimacy of Harming the
Innocent in the Last War in Gaza-A Comment on Moral Priority, Risk, and 'IDF's
Spirit,' ISR. DEMOCRACY INST. (July 27, 2009), http://www.idi.org.il/BreakingNews/
Pages/128.aspx (Isr.) (explicitly supporting Margalit and Walzer's position); see also
Eitan Diamond, Before the Abyss: ReshapingInternationalHumanitarianLaw To Suit
the Ends of Power, 43 ISR. L. REV. 414, 426 n.44 (2010) (citing Kasher and Yadlin's
doctrine as an attempt to subvert, reinterpret, and override international
humanitarian law (IHL) proportionality norms, and citing Margalit and Walzer, as
well as Ray Confino and Mordechai Kremnitzer, as attempts to respond to this doctrine
in the philosophical and legal debate instigated by it); Plaw, supra note 5, at 8, 15, 17
(stating that his article offers a defense of Walzer's position, and asserting that a
balance between states' external obligations (i.e., international law) and their internal
moral and constitutional duties leads to the conclusion that soldiers are under a duty
to act in a manner identical to the one supported by Margalit and Walzer); Statman,
supra note 5, at 8 (claiming that international law supports a position similar to that of
Margalit and Walzer without explicitly endorsing Margalit and Walzer's position). But
see infra note 47 and accompanying text.
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
32.
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), art.
48, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 17512 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I]; HENCKAERTS
& DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 1, at 3-8; see also Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court, art. 8(2)(a)(i), (b)(i), opened for signatureJuly 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S.
90 [hereinafter Rome Statute] (prohibiting intentionally targeting civilians).
Gabriella Blum, The Laws of War and the "Lesser Evil," 35 YALE J. INT'L L.
33.
1, 40 (2010).
34.
See IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDING FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 36
(James W. Ellington trans., 3d ed. 1993) (1785) (supplying the moral reasoning for the
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widely agreed that treating soldiers' lives as "dispensable"
instruments to collective ends is inescapable in war.35 If states could
not treat soldiers in this way, societies would be unable to defend
themselves, even when so doing was clearly justified, as when
adversaries seek to exterminate their entire populations. 36
International law would fail to limit the horrors of war,
moreover, if it did not insist upon discrimination between soldiers
and civilians-allowing intentional targeting of the latter as well,
when it proves militarily advantageous, or at least necessary to
legitimate operational goals.37 Margalit and Walzer reiterate this

deontological prohibition against treating individuals merely as means and not as ends
in and of themselves); Re'em Segev, Well-Being and Fairness, 131 PHIL. STUD. 369, 372
(2006) (discussing the consensus regarding the significance of the aim of protecting
human lives).
35.
See Gabriella Blum, The DispensableLives of Soldiers, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS
115, 118, 132-36 (2010) (discussing the extensive support among jurists and
philosophers for this legal state of affairs).
36.
See RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION 4-10, 21-28 (1982) (discussing
the collective-action problem and using the issue of forming and maintaining a military
as a prototypical example of this problem); ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE
AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF A NATION 314 (4th ed. 1786) (stating that the "natural
habits of the people [may] render them altogether incapable of defending themselves,"
and the "tolerable provision" a state should make in order to redress this problem is to
make it the duty of some or all citizens to become soldiers and fight when needed); see
also Josiah Ober, From Epistemic Diversity to Common Knowledge: Rational Rituals
and Publicity in Democratic Athens, 3 EPISTEME 214, 217 (2006). Ober shows (using
ancient Athens as an example) that members of a society are likely to have mixed
interests regarding military service. Each is likely to want the actions of defending her
society from enemy attacks to be successful (which will be the case only if a sufficient
amount of society members will join the military). Each is also likely, however, to
prefer not to risk her own life. As a result, each is likely to be ready to aid in the
defense of her society (and not flee or surrender), only if she knows that other society
members will similarly commit themselves to join the military and risk their lives. The
state, by way of its legal actions, is able to make sure that such joint commitment and
social knowledge of it will exist.
37.
Blum, supra note 35, at 132-36 (discussing the fact that there is a strong
consensus for justifying the principle of distinction, although Blum is critical of this
consensus). For further criticism of Kasher and Yadlin's position on that basis, see
Margalit & Walzer, Israel, supra note 5, at 21-22 (criticizing Kasher and Yadlin's
erosion of the principle of distinction); Margalit & Walzer, Not the Way, supra note 5
(criticizing Kasher and Yadlin's lack of distinction between combatants and
noncombatants); Iddo Porat, Preferring One's Own Civilians: Can Soldiers Endanger
Enemy Civilians More than They Would Endanger Their Own Civilians? 17-19 (Aug.
7, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1445509 (criticizing Margalit and
Walzer's interpretation of the principle of distinction); Statman, supra note 5, at 8.
Plaw makes a more comprehensive attempt to respond to Kasher and Yadlin's position
based on the commonly accepted moral justifications for the principle of distinction. See
Plaw, supra note 5, at 9-21 (justifying the distinction between soldiers and civilians).
But see Kasher, supra note 15, at 163-64 (criticizing the consensual bases of the
current interpretation of the principle of distinction). However, Ruvi Ziegler and Shai
Otzari suggest that the distinction principle is qualified:
IHL permits an enemy to attack soldiers intentionally; however, such
permission does not entail that military commanders have a duty to accept
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rationale for the distinction principle and infer from it that, in war,
soldiers do not retain any right to life. When people move from the
legal status of civilian to that of soldier, they necessarily assume
much greater risks to life and limb, as reflected in the permission law
affords them to target one another across the battle lines. The duties
of states to their citizens-now soldiers-diminish accordingly.3 8
Margalit and Walzer therefore reason that:
There is nothing [in Kasher and Yadlin's position] that hinges on the
word "terrorists." Replace that word with "enemy combatants" and the
argument remains the same. ... [Kasher and Yadlin's] claim, crudely
put, is that in such a war the safety of "our" soldiers takes precedence
over the safety of "their" civilians.
Our main contention is that this claim is wrong and dangerous. It
erodes the distinction between combatants and noncombatants . . . . No

good reasons are given for the erosion....
Wars between states should never be total wars between nations or
peoples. Whatever happens to the two armies involved, whichever one
wins or loses, whatever the nature of the battles or the extent of the
casualties, the two nations, the two peoples, must be functioning
communities at the war's end. The war cannot be a war of
extermination or ethnic cleansing....
The main attribute of a state is its monopoly on the legitimate use
of violence. Fighting against a state is fighting against the human
39
instruments of that monopoly-and not against anyone else.

Moreover, Margalit and Walzer's answer to the imaginary
soldier's question is very different from Kasher's:
By wearing a uniform, you take on yourself a risk that is borne
only by those who have been trained to injure others (and to protect
themselves). You should not shift this risk onto those who haven't been
trained, who lack the capacity to injure; whether they are brothers or
others. The moral justification for this requirement lies in the idea that
violence is evil, and that we should limit the scope of violence as much

risks imposed on their soldiers, or that they are always prohibited from shifting
some of these risks by choosing a method of attack that may cause
unintentional incidental damage to enemy civilians.
Reuven (Ruvi) Ziegler & Shai Otzari, Do Soldiers' Lives Matter? A View from
Proportionality,45 ISR. L. REV. 53, 64 (2012)
Margalit & Walzer, Israel, supra note 5, at 21-22; see also MICHAEL
38.
WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS 136 (4th ed. 2006) (arguing that "the soldiers who do

the fighting, though they can rarely be said to have chosen to fight, lose," "[s]imply by
fighting, ... their title to life and liberty"). Confino and Kremnitzer explain:
[T]he combatant endangers the combatants of the other side, and therefore he
carries the burden of accepting the risk that the combatants of the other side
confer on him. This is not the case for the civilian, who does not create a risk
for anyone, and therefore with regard to him the regular rule applies-the
elementary rule of human society-of the prohibition to harm him, due to the
sanctity of his life.
Confino & Kremnitzer, supra note 31 (Ziv Bohrer trans.).
Margalit & Walzer, Israel, supra note 5, at 21.
39.
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as is realistically possible. As a soldier, you are asked to take an extra
40
risk for the sake of limiting the scope of the war.

Like Kasher and Yadlin, 41 Margalit and Walzer 42 accept that (a)
a state has certain responsibilities to civilians on both sides of an
armed conflict, and (b) each state has more extensive responsibilities
to its own civilians than to foreigners not under the state's control;
these more extensive responsibilities include a duty to protect those
civilians against others' acts of violence. Margalit and Walzer further
argue that the first proposition implies a duty on a state to ensure
that its soldiers do not needlessly endanger the lives of civilians,
regardless of whether that state or its adversary exercises effective
control over them. 43 This conclusion reinforces their view that the
state's duty to protect its citizens' lives diminishes once they become
soldiers. 44 These conclusions combine to suggest that the principles of
distinction and proportionality oblige a state to prioritize civilian
lives-regardless of nationality-over those of its soldiers. 45
Margalit and Walzer then argue that killing civilians is truly
incidental, and thus legal and moral, only if soldiers actively seek to
avoid civilian deaths, "and that active intention can be made manifest
only through the risks soldiers themselves accept in order to reduce
the risks to civilians." 46 Margalit and Walzer do allow a limited role
for force protection, to the extent that soldiers need not take
transparently suicidal risks or risks that would make their mission
impossibly difficult to achieve. 4 7

40.
Id.
41.
E.g., Kasher & Yadlin, supranote 4, at 8-9, 16.
42.
E.g., Margalit & Walzer, reply to Kasher & Yadlin, supra note 29, at 77.
43.
Id.; Statman, supra note 5, at 5; see also Luban, supra note 6, at 8, 29-35
(discussing civilians in combat); Plaw, supra note 5, at 17 (discussing the state's
external obligation to uphold jus gentium and jus intergentes). Confino and Kremnitzer
describe this duty:
[Ihf the social contract does supply any privileges to citizens, as Kasher and
Yadlin claim, it seems that that is so mainly with regard to civil privileges,
such as the right to vote, and not basic privileges such as the right to life. In
other words, even if the duty of the state to afford rights to those who are not
its citizens is weaker than the duty of the state to afford rights to its citizens, it
is doubtful whether the duty of the state not to harm the right to life of those
who are not its citizens is weaker from its duty not to harm the right to life of
its citizens.
Confino & Kremnitzer, supra note 31 (Ziv Bohrer trans.).
See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
44.
Margalit & Walzer, Israel, supra note 5, at 21.
45.
46.
Id.; see also WALZER, supra note 38, at 155-56 (describing how soldiers
must take actions that may risk their own lives to prevent killing innocent civilians).
47.
Margalit & Walzer, Israel, supra note 5, at 22; see also Plaw, supra note 5,
at 15 (supporting an identical duty to that of Margalit and Walzer). Others, based on
similar reasoning to that of Margalit and Walzer, have suggested benchmarks that are
somewhat different, but an explanation for that variance is not given in any of these
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When applied to the scenario described above (a building
occupied by both terrorists and foreign civilians), this position
suggests that commanders must usually deploy ground troops rather
than air power:
When soldiers in Afghanistan, or Sri Lanka, or Gaza take fire from the
rooftop of a building, they should not pull back and call for artillery or
air strikes that may destroy most or all of the people in or near the
building; they should try to get close enough to the building to find out
48
who is inside or to aim directly at the fighters on the roof.

C.All Lives, Soldier and Civilian,Are of Equal Value: David Luban
David Luban reaches conclusions similar to Margalit and
Walzer, but on different grounds. 4 9 He accepts three possible bases
for giving significant weight to force protection when this goal clashes
with that of protecting civilians. He differs in this regard from
Margalit and Walzer, who believe that, as a matter of both morality
and international law, during an armed conflict, when civilians'
safety is at stake, soldiers' lives are virtually of no value. Luban
nonetheless concludes that, in practice, force protection must
generally give way, its claims overridden in the comparative calculus
of competing considerations.
1.

The Risk-Transfer
Soldiers

Ratio Between

Civilians

and a State's

Like the other two positions here assessed, Luban acknowledges
that states have greater duties to their own civilians than to foreign
civilians. He nevertheless argues, like Margalit and Walzer, that
these greater duties are irrelevant to the proportionality assessment
when force protection conflicts with civilian protection. He admits,
"[I]n practice we will treat our own people with extra care."50 This is
appropriate, he continues, "as long as we treat civilians on the other
side in a way that would be minimally acceptable even if they were
our own."5 1 He distinguishes the risks that soldiers impose on foreign
civilians from those created for those civilians by enemy forces, such
as those caused by the enemy attack to which the state's soldiers are

sources. See Statman, supra note 5, at 8 ("[Sloldiers [must] exert all efforts in order not
to harm civilians, even at the price of giving up certain missions . .. and even at the
price of a certain risk to our forces." (Ziv Bohrer trans.)); Confino & Kremnitzer, supra
note 31 ("[It is inappropriate to place civilians at an equal risk to that of soldiers, and
ipso facto not at a greater risk." (Ziv Bohrer trans.)).
48.
Margalit & Walzer, Israel,supra note 5, at 22.
49.
Luban, supra note 6, at 1 ("In this paper I shall defend a version of Walzer's
conclusion on grounds somewhat different than his own.").
50.
Id. at 11 n.14 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting an e-mail from
Tami Meisels).
51.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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responding.5 2 Soldiers have a special duty to protect only their own
civilians from risks created by the enemy. But they must protect all
civilians, regardless of nationality, from the dangers they themselves
inflict.53 This is why Luban, like Margalit and Walzer, does not view
citizens' nationality as pertinent to proportionality. 54
In finding all lives of equal value, Luban departs both from
Kasher and Yadlin's view that a state must weigh its soldiers' right to
life more heavily than that of foreign civilians and from Margalit and
Walzer's view that individuals all but abdicate their right to life upon
becoming soldiers engaged in combat.5 5 Luban's distinctive
contribution is to view proportionality in terms of a "transfer of risk"
between soldiers and civilians. 56 This stance does not invariably
prioritize one group over another, as do the other two approaches.
Like the other authors, he fixes his attention on the vexing choice
commanders face: between face-to-face combat ("close engagement"),
with its greater risk to their soldiers, and aerial bombardment
("distant engagement"), with its greater prospect of serious civilian
harm:
Each tactic involves risks to soldiers and to civilians . ...
Switching from one tactic to another affects both civilian and
military risk. . . . The difference between the risks to soldiers of Close
Engagement compared with Distant Engagement is the marginal risk
to soldiers; the difference between the risks to civilians of the two
tactics is the marginal risk to civilians. The ratio of civilian marginal
risk to military marginal risk is what I shall call the risk transfer ratio.
This ratio seems relevant to the choice between Close Engagement and
Distant Engagement.
If the risk transfer ratio is greater than one it means that picking
Distant Engagement transfers marginal risk to civilians at a greater
than one-to-one ratio: soldiers are offloading larger risks to civilians in
order to spare themselves smaller risks. And, conversely, a small risk
transfer ratio means that soldiers choosing Close Engagement are
57
braving extra risks in order to spare civilians lesser risks.

Because Luban stipulates that all lives are of equal value, it
follows that the transfer of risk may be no more than one, i.e., one life
at the cost of another. Thus, a soldier may never take steps that
would reduce risks to herself by increasing, in greater measure, risks
to a foreign civilian. In other words, the reduction of risk to the
soldier must be greater than the resulting increase in risk to the

52.
See id. at 32-33 (discussing the "two senses of 'protect': to protect civilians
against enemy violence, and to protect civilians from one's own violence").
53.
See id. (arguing the view that there is a greater obligation to avoid killing
co-nationals than foreigners is objectionable).
54.
Id. at 8.
55.
See id. at 27 (finding that "all lives are created equal").
56.
See id. at 19-24 (employing the notion of a risk-transfer ratio).
Id. at 19-21 (footnotes omitted).
57.
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civilian.5 8 That also means that, in a life or death situation, it would
be unlawful for the soldier to save the life of X fellow soldiers by
means foreseeably causing the deaths of more than that same X
amount of foreign civilians.5 9
Luban then describes two approaches to risk transfer that would
be legally acceptable. The first suggests that the vocation of
soldiering obligates its practitioners to protect others' lives by
assuming greater risk to their own. This does not mean, he hastens to
add, that the professional duty to safeguard civilians invariably
overrides concerns with force protection. 60 But there is at least a
baseline threshold of risk that any soldier must be willing to endure,
even if meeting that requirement would not significantly increase the
safety of foreign civilians, beyond what some lower level of risk might
yield. This approach, in other words, assumes that soldiers should, in
light of their professional duties, value their lives somewhat less than
they value the lives of civilians. Luban then suggests that a less
stringent standard might also be acceptable. International law, he
acknowledges, cannot compel soldiers to behave "heroically." And it
would require heroism to demand that the soldier assume greater
risk to herself than she imposes on someone else. This suggests a
second approach to risk transfer, more indulgent than the first.
Though the soldier cannot impose any greater risk on a foreign
civilian than she herself incurs (by use of a given tactic), neither can
she herself be required to accept any greater risk than she imposes on
the civilian. 61
Luban offers three examples of how this works. The first
concerns a soldier who must capture an occupied cellar possibly
housing civilians, enemy combatants, or both. She must tactically
decide whether to call out a warning before tossing in a grenade. A
warning would presumably save any civilians in the cellar, but might
also imperil the soldier and her mission by notifying enemy
combatants who may be present.6 2 The second example involves a
commander who must choose between close and distant engagement,
to gain control of a particular residential area where both foreign

58.
Id. at 20-21, 44.
59.
Id. at 24, 27, 35.
60.
Id. at 28 ("[T]he vocational core of soldiering ... suggests something
different: that, to protect a civilian from their own violence, soldiers must accept risk
transfer ratios less than one, perhaps significantly less than one. And that is as true for
enemy civilians as their own.").
Id. at 27; see also Thomas Hurka, Proportionalityin the Morality of War, 33
61.
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 34, 63-64 (2005) (discussing the weighing of risks of military tactics
against soldier and civilian safety); Ziegler & Otzari, supra note 37, at 68-69 ("One
possibility, as advocated by Hurka, is that this ratio is 1, namely that a compatriot
soldier's life and 'an enemy civilian's life are equal in worth.").
62.
See Luban, supra note 6, at 2-3, 22-24, 35 (discussing the precautions
soldiers must take to minimize civilian harm).

764

VANDERBILT/OURNAL

OF TRANSNATIONAL

LAW

[VOL. 46:747

civilians and enemy combatants reside. 63 The third scenario concerns
a top leader who must decide, as her state is about to enter armed
conflict, between a land and aerial campaign, a decision arising at the
strategic level of decision making. 64 In all three situations, Luban
argues that whenever the risk-transfer ratio between the two options
considered is greater than one, state actors must select the course of
action offering greater civilian protection. 6 5
Luban's theoretical perspective differs significantly from that of
Margalit and Walzer. The latter argue that soldiers forfeit their right
to life, 6 6 and therefore hold that there are very few circumstances in
which force protection can override safeguarding civilians, i.e., only
when prioritizing the latter requires suicidal risks from soldiers or
renders their mission virtually impossible.6 7 Luban's theory, on the
other hand, ascribes greater value to soldiers' lives. Yet, despite this
difference, Luban concludes that, in practice, his position ends up
demanding soldiers accept levels of risk similar to those Margalit and
Walzer require. 6 8 Luban argues that soldiers must accept this level of
risk (even though they do not forfeit their right to life) based on an
assumption he makes regarding the baseline levels of risk soldiers
and civilians experience during fighting; i.e., Luban assumes that in
war, soldiers are much better protected from risk than civilians:
[S]oldiers' risks are far less than those of non-combatants. Professional
soldiers are better armed and armored, better trained, better
disciplined, better conditioned, better able to function in coordinated
teams, and better supported... , including in the crucial matter 'of
medical care if they are wounded. Everyone in their units is pledged
never to leave them fallen on the field; their buddies have their backs.
In every respect, they are simply better able to protect themselves than
are non-combatants . . . . Almost certainly, the risk transfer ratio in

choosing Distant Engagement is greater than one, probably far greater,
because the systematic advantages of trained modern armies guarantee
that the marginal risk they assume by choosing Close Engagement is
69
small relative to the risk they spare civilians.

63.
See id. at 6, 8-10, 19-21, 25-29, 34-35 (explaining the requirements of
close and distant engagement).
64.
See id. at 39-41 (concluding that the applicability of this ratio at the
strategic level is more implicit, which becomes apparent when pages 39-41 are read in
light of the discussion at pages 42-47).
65.
Id. at 24, 27, 34-35, 42-47.
66.
See WALZER, supra note 38, at 136 (stating that soldiers, "[s]imply by
fighting, ... have lost their title to life and liberty"); Margalit & Walzer, Israel, supra
note 5, at 21 ("By wearing a uniform, [soldiers agree to take on themselves] a risk that
is borne only by those who have been trained to injure others (and to protect
themselves)."); supra note 38 and accompanying text.
67.
See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
68.
See Luban, supra note 6, at 1 (defending "Walzer's conclusion on grounds
somewhat different than his own").
Id. at 28-29.
69.
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Yet the putative advantages Luban delineates here are
misleading or nonexistent. First, his account is self-contradictory. It
is true that for soldiers, ideally, "[e]veryone in their units is pledged
never to leave them fallen on the field."70 Yet this could no longer be
the case if the law of proportionality is as Luban understands it.7 '
Soldiers could not lawfully rescue a fallen comrade whenever doing so
would transfer a risk of greater than one to nearby civilians-a
circumstance that could easily arise. 72
Second, it is mistaken to assume that combat generally imposes
greater risks on civilians than soldiers. Though soldiers are better
trained and equipped to defend themselves on the battlefield, they
may be intentionally targeted by the'other side's fighters. Civilians,
in contrast, may be harmed only incidentally.7 3 A civilian may
lawfully flee a battlefield without risk that soldiers may lawfully
pursue her. Any deliberate effort to kill her is criminal. 74 By contrast,
if a soldier seeks to elude the enemy, the other side's soldiers may
hunt her down and kill her. If she flees the conflict entirely, it is
likely her superiors will charge her with desertion or at least
dereliction of duty-crimes with serious penalties when committed in
the midst of combat. For both reasons, soldiers often face greater risk
than civilians.
While it is true that soldiers receive health care on the
battlefield from military medics, this is also true of civilians. Both
international law and codes of professional ethics mandate that
scarce medical resources be allocated according to the relative
severity of patient condition, irrespective of nationality or status as
combatant versus civilian. 75 Luban is therefore mistaken that a oneto-one risk-transfer ratio will require soldiers to behave as Margalit
and Walzer demand. Since Luban's position attributes a much higher
value to soldiers' lives, the net result is to allow greater weight to
force protection than advocated by Margalit and Walzer. This would
be especially so whenever the circumstances of combat do not permit
accurate prediction of likely civilian casualties, but do allow

70.
Id. at 29.
71.
See id. at 43-45 (explaining the proportionality formula).
72.
See id. at 27-28 (stating that "to protect a civilian from their own violence,
soldiers must accept risk transfer ratios less than one" or alternatively equal to one).
73.
See supra note 32, infra notes 94-95, and accompanying text.
74.
Rome Statute, supra note 32.
75.
See Additional Protocol I, supra note 32, art. 10(2) ("In all circumstances
they shall be treated humanely and shall receive, to the fullest extent practicable and
with the least possible delay, the medical care and attention required by their
condition. There shall be no distinction among them founded on any grounds other
than medical ones."); see also Luban, supra note 6, at 32 n.34 (citing a survey that
indicates that the majority of U.S. and Israeli military medics and physicians will
prioritize treatment based on the severity of the injury irrespective of the wounded's
identity).
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prediction of much greater harm to soldiers by adopting certain
combat methods over others.
2.

Assessing the Value of Soldiers' Lives

Luban rightly observes that there are two senses in which the
lives of soldiers may be said to have value. First, there is the moral
import of their human status and the measure of dignified treatment
this may entail. Second, soldiers are necessary to the conduct of
military missions.76 A state therefore secures significant military
advantage by preserving its soldiers' lives, which can enable them to
fight until the battle is won (as well as to fight again another day)."
Recall that Luban thinks that soldiers in combat do not entirely
forfeit their right to life, a right derived from their intrinsic human
dignity, i.e., the first of the two senses in which soldiers' lives have
significance. 8 But this proposition sits very uneasily, he observes,
with the second understanding of a soldier's significance. Luban
believes that, in determining the proportionality of any given use of
force, it is wrong to inject both types of significance into the balance,
for this
amounts to a kind of double counting: according to this objection, not
only is the soldier's life as valuable as the civilian's, the soldier
automatically gets extra credit for being an asset. But to precisely the
extent that a soldier is an "asset," that personal interest is set to one
side. As a military asset, the soldier can be required to die in the line of
duty if necessary. . . . That is precisely what it means to be an asset.
Conversely, to give full sway to the soldier's personal interest in
survival is to regard him or her as something different in kind from a
military asset. To borrow Kant's distinction: as a human being, soldiers
are ends in themselves, possessing a dignity not a price; they are
intrinsic sources of value. As an asset, a soldier is merely a means,

See Luban, supra note 6, at 35-37 ("[Nlot only does a soldier have the same
76.
fundamental personal interest as the civilian in surviving, the soldier's survival is also
crucial to the mission."); see also Ziegler & Otzari, supra note 37, at 60-62 (presuming
the existence of military necessity in protecting soldiers).
Due to this second kind of value, it cannot be denied that some element of
77.
force protection must be taken into account when making a jus in bello proportionality
assessment, as a consideration that allows putting the civilian population at some risk;
otherwise forces would be prohibited from responding to enemy fire if there was even a
chance that one civilian would be harmed. See Laurie R. Blank, The Application of IHL
in the Goldstone Report: A Critical Commentary, 12 Y.B. INT'L HUMANITARIAN L. 347,
370 (2009) ("Stopping mortar fire endangering one's own troops offers clear military
advantage. After all, no military force can engage in any military operations if the law
does not permit it to take defensive action.").
Compare text accompanying supra note 44 (Margalit and Walzer's
78.
position), with text accompanying supra note 60 (Luban's position).
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whose life could be the price paid for victory, and whose value is
79
instrumental, not intrinsic.

This is true, however, only if the matter is considered at so high
a level of abstraction, rather than as experienced in war by soldiers
and their commanders, when the asset value of particular soldiers
will differ from one mission to another. If not isolated from these
situation-specific variables, the notion of a one-to-one risk-transfer
ratio becomes a poor guide to decision making. To see how this is so,
imagine that a state at war has learned that the enemy plans to
assassinate the chief of staff of that state's military. The only way to
avert this assassination is to preemptively attack the enemy force.
Does anyone really think that a state should be prevented from doing
so if more than one foreign civilian will die in the anticipatory attack
(intended to save a single soldier, after all, albeit a chief of staff)?
Because the chief of staff is a major military asset, protecting her
should authorize the state to cause significant incidental harm to
civilians, when unavoidable.
The asset value of soldiers varies not only with their rank, but
also with the circumstances of combat they confront at a given time.
Thus, a particular platoon will differ in its asset value if, after its
immediate engagement with the enemy, it will shortly thereafter be
needed for a second operation. If no second engagement is anticipated
to require their services, then these soldiers are of less total value at
the time the first operation is decided upon and its proportionality
assessed. If the value of soldiers is to be assessed in two ways, this is
not "double counting," as Luban critically characterizes it. It is simply
that soldiers possess two distinct sources of value-deontological and
consequential-and their value in the latter sense must be assessed
on a case-by-case basis.
There are times when soldiers' lives will have to be accorded
greater value than foreign civilians, and there will be other times
when the reverse will be true, depending on the significance of the
mission in which the soldiers are to engage.80 The only way in which
the intrinsic value of soldiers' lives can be respected is if it is treated
separately from the advantage attained from protecting them for a
particular mission. If it is to acknowledge that their lives have any
inherent value at all, the law must, therefore, set a certain minimum
standard of protection owed to soldiers, irrespective of that mission.
This standard is necessarily a constant, since the intrinsic value of a
person's life does not vary from one situation to another.

79.
Luban, supra note 6, at 36; see also id. at 37 (arguing that when soldiers
are valued as military assets, adding them to the proportionality calculus as ends in
themselves amounts to double counting).
80.
See Ziegler & Otzari, supra note 37, at 61 (discussing different formulas for
determining the value of soldiers' lives in different situations).
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In short, it is not double counting, for purposes of proportionality
analysis, to consider the value of soldiers as military assets in
particular missions in addition to the value of their human right to
life. None of the authors here assayed reach this conclusion: Luban,
for reasons just delineated, and the others because they fail to
distinguish between the two distinct types of soldierly significance at
all.
3.

Force Protection as a Strategic Aim

Luban next examines a third basis for valorizing force protection
within proportionality assessment. The extent of a country's military
casualties often influences public support for a continuing war effort
and for the state's military and civilian leaders. 8 ' There is no dispute
that, as a matter of policy, this casualty concern may legitimately
influence the state's decision to continue the fight. The harder
question is whether, beyond political considerations, the demoralizing
effect of military casualties is relevant to legal assessment of
proportionality? Luban argues that it is not. He believes that it is
almost never clear enough, on the facts of a given conflict, whether
reducing troop casualties will, by sustaining public support for the
war, generate "clear and direct" military advantage.8 2 He therefore
concludes that a state may not take this possibility into account when
evaluating proportionality:8 3
Further difficult questions are whether the political need for force
protection can make it an independent strategic goal of military
operations, and whether that confers extra weight to the "concrete and
definite military advantage" of reducing your own side's casualties.
Governments sometimes face intense casualty-aversion in their
electorates. ...
... [A] classic argument [is] that political goals can be military goals as
well. From Clausewitz on, we have understood that military victory
means breaking the adversary's political will to fight, and losing your
own will to fight means military defeat. ...
However, this way of thinking ignores the other half of the
problem, namely that in order to keep up the public's own morale in a
just war, enemy civilians must die in greater numbers.... This is why
the legal test for proportionality weighs civilian damage against
"concrete and direct military advantage," not the indirect and
84
intangible military advantage grounded in civilian morale.

Luban here asks two distinct questions: (1) "whether the political
need for force protection can make it an independent strategic goal of

81.
agendas).
82.
83.
84.

See Luban, supra note 6, at 39-41, 44 (discussing military force protection
Id. at 40-41, 44.
Id.
Id. at 40-41.
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military operations,"85 and (2) whether that "confers extra weight to
the 'concrete and definite military advantage' of reducing your own
side's casualties." 86 A first problem is that Luban answers only the
latter query. Second, to reach his conclusion, he applies the standard
of "concrete and direct military advantage," which is, according to
international law, an element of in bello, but not ad bellum,
proportionality.8 7 His legal analysis therefore speaks only to the
former. Decisions about ad bellum proportionality concern strategic
issues, however, and are made by high-ranking officials, for they are
the only people authorized to establish those comprehensive goals.
The conflation of in bello with ad bellum considerations, further
discussed later, also plagues the other assayed authors'
understandings of proportionality. To establish that the political or
strategic rationale for force protection is irrelevant to in bello
proportionality is not to show that it is immaterial to ad bellum
proportionality, when it sometimes becomes highly pertinent and
weighty.

III. PROPORTIONALITY AT WAR'S MULTIPLE LEVELS

A. Disagreement on the Legal Elements of Proportionality
The three sides to the current debate differ greatly on how
proportionality should be assessed. The first disagreement concerns
the relative priority of civilians' and soldiers' lives. Does international
law entirely vitiate soldiers' right to life (Margalit and Walzer)? Or
does each soldier's life retain a value equal to that of any civilian
(Luban)? Conversely, may their lives be legitimately accorded priority
over the lives of foreign civilians (Kasher and Yadlin)?
The second disagreement concerns the minimum duty of care
soldiers owe to foreign civilians: does this entail an obligation to
assume major risks so as to reduce danger to those civilians (Luban,
Margalit, and Walzer) or does it not (Kasher and Yadlin)? If this
obligation exists, how extensive is it? Does it demand that soldiers
"minimize" risks to civilians (Margalit and Walzer)? Does it require
only that they accept more risk to themselves than they offload to
civilians (Luban's initial position)? Or does it demand, less
ambitiously, that they impose neither more nor less than a one-to-one
risk-transfer ratio to civilians (Luban's later and primary stance)?
The third disagreement is about the relative importance of the
two types of soldierly significance: the instrumental value of soldiers
as military assets and their intrinsic value as human beings with a

85.
86.
87.

Id. at 39.
Id.
See infra Part II.B and II.D.
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right to life. Does international law allow taking only one or both of
these into account when assessing proportionality?
Fourth, may the "political" concern with demoralizing effects
from military casualties be taken into account in assessing
proportionality, or is Luban correct that international law forbids
this?
Fifth, to what extent must military decision making about
proportionality consider factual subtleties specific to a given
situation, as required in particular by Luban's theory of relative risk
transfer? Or should international law acknowledge the need for a
simpler rule, applicable across the board, such as one that always
prioritizes civilians' lives over soldiers' lives (Margalit and Walzer) or
vice versa (Kasher and Yadlin)?
Finally, are Kasher and Yadlin correct about the necessity of a
special rule on proportionality for war against terrorist organizations,
a rule that accords greater weight to force protection than suitable to
other types of armed conflict?
The only question to which all sides in the debate offer the
identical answer-in the affirmative-is whether a single legal
standard should govern officials at all echelons along the chain of
command, when called upon to resolve the several disagreements just
delineated. This Article's discussion in the preceding section would
suggest that this is unlikely to be true. The type of decisions as well
as the practical capabilities and background knowledge of officials
vary along that chain in ways that international law would be unwise
to ignore. The chain is commonly demarcated by three categories: the
strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war.88 Though in practice
there can often be no precise boundary between them, each
nonetheless characteristically involves decision making of a different
sort, on distinct kinds of issues.89 These differences greatly affect the
proportionality assessment that international law should demand.
The present Part therefore aims to show how proportionality means
decidedly distinct things at these three levels. The Article concludes
that each of the three approaches examined in Part I prove more
appropriate than the other two in one of war's three levels of decision
making.

Dep't of the Army, Operations: FM 3-0, at 7-1 to -5 (2001).
88.
See Richard A. Chiloat, Strategic Art: The New Discipline for 21st Century
89.
Leaders, at iv (1995) (discussing the uniqueness of strategic-level decision making);
Dep't of the Army, The Operations Process: FM 5-0, at 2-2 (2010) (discussing
differences between operational- and tactical-level decision making); see also Gene C.
Kamena, Mission Orders: Is Intent the Answer? 5, 27-28 (June 5, 1992) (unpublished
M.M.A.Sc. thesis, U.S. Army Command & General Staff College) (on file with author)
(emphasizing the need for a decentralized and flexible command system).
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B. Jus in Bello Proportionalityand Force Protection:Operational
Issues
The operational level of war addresses questions about how the
broadest strategic goals should be concretized into more specific plans
for a delimited spatial and temporal domain.90 The lion's share of
war-related decision making occurs at the operational and tactical
levels. 9 ' These decisions must be consistent with international law,
which imposes a number of constraints.9 2 One of these is jus in bello
proportionality.93 This norm seeks to reduce harm to civilians in
combat zones. It allows that civilians may be harmed,94 but only
incidental to an attack on a military target, and the harm may not be
excessive in relation to the anticipated military advantage.9 5 Because
in bello proportionality governs war in its tactical and operational
respects, the military advantage must be concrete and direct, in this
way delimited in scope. Only at the strategic level may a wider set of
considerations enter into assessments of proportionality. 96 At the

90.
DEP'T OF THE ARMY, supra note 89; see also U.S. MARINE CORPS, DEP'T OF
THE NAVY, CAMPAIGNING: MCDP 1-2, at 4 (1997) (stating that "the operational level [is]
the link between strategy and tactics").
91.
See U.S. MARINE CORPS, supra note 90. This manual describes "[t]he
tactical level of war [as] the province of combat." Id. at 6. As for the operational level, it
states that "[iun its essence, the operational level involves deciding when, where, for
what purposes, and under what conditions to give battle-or to refuse battle-in order
to fulfill the strategic goal." Id. at 8. Furthermore, it states that, due to the nature of
operational tasks, strategic commanders must accord considerable discretion to
operational decision makers to the extent that "[tihe basic concept of a campaign plan
should be born in the mind of the man who has to direct that campaign." Id. (quoting
ERIC VON MANSTEIN, LOST VICTORIES 79 (1982)). Thus, as one may see, most warrelated decision making occurs at the operational and tactical levels.
92.
See id. at 11 (describing international law as a constant strategic constraint
on operational decisions).
93.
The jus in bello proportionality norm equally applies to both sides, since
once an armed conflict has begun, international law does not distinguish between
aggressors and aggressed. See Robert D. Sloane, The Cost of Conflation: Preservingthe
Dualism of Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello in the Contemporary Law of War, 34 YALE
J. INT'L L. 48, 49-50 (2009) (explaining jus in bello).
94.
See Additional Protocol I, supra note 32 ("[T]he parties to the conflict shall
at all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between
civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations
only against military objectives.").
95.
Rome Statute, supra note 32, art. 8(2)(a)(iv), (b)(iv); see also Additional
Protocol I, supra note 32, arts. 51(5)(b), 57(2) (discussing the types of indiscriminate
acts and the types of precautions taken regarding attacks); HENCKAERTS, supra note 1,
at 46-50 (discussing the jus in bello proportionality principle in customary
international law); Amichai Cohen & Yuval Shany, A Development of Modest
Proportions:The Application of the Principle of Proportionalityin the Targeted Killings
Case, 5 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 258, 311-12 (2007) (discussing the long pedigree in
customary international law of the jus in bello proportionality principle). The
prohibition against disproportional attack applies also to damage to civilian property.
96.
See COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE
GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, at 683-84 (Yves Sandoz et al. eds., 1987),
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lower two levels, the pressing question about force protection is how
much greater danger may civilians be exposed to so that soldiers do
not suffer death, serious injury, or enemy capture?
At first glance, in bello proportionality appears to resonate most
strongly with Margalit and Walzer's approach. This legal norm seems
to take into account only two factors: military advantage, on one
hand, and civilian harm, on the other. 97 For this reason, some
interpret the norm as do Margalit and Walzer:98 they allow no legal
consideration of soldiers' right to life" and do not recognize a
distinction between civilians belonging to the state in question and
those belonging to its adversary.100
Yet it is mistaken to rely entirely on the lack of explicit reference
to these latter two considerations (i.e., (a) soldiers' right to life and (b)
distinction between civilians belonging to the state in question and
other civilians) in most formulations of the in bello proportionality
norm as the basis for a conclusion that in bello proportionality does
not allow these considerations to be taken into account. This becomes

at
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsflWebART/470-750073?OpenDocument
available
[hereinafter COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS] (stating the in bello
proportionality norm "is not concerned with strategic objectives" since "[tihe expression
'concrete and direct' was intended to show that the advantage concerned should be
substantial and relatively close, and that advantages which are hardly perceptible and
those which would only appear in the long term should be disregarded").
97.
E.g., UNIVERSITY CTR. FOR INT'L HUMANITARIAN LAW [UCHL], REPORT:
EXPERT MEETING "TARGETING MILITARY OBJECTIVES" 17-19 (2005), available at
http://www.geneva-academy.ch/docs/expert-meetings/2005/lrapportobjectif-militaire.pdf
(arguing that only the value of soldiers as military assets can be taken into account);
Thomas W. Smith, Protecting Civilians... or Soldiers? Humanitarian Law and the
Economy of Risk in Iraq, 9 INT'L STUD. PERSP. 144, 146-47 (2008) (same).
See supra text accompanying notes 38-45.
98.
See Colm McKeogh, Civilian Immunity in War: From Augustine to Vattel,
99.
in CIVILIAN IMMUNITY IN WAR 62, 80 (Igor Primoraz ed., 2007) (interpreting the law of
armed conflict as if it completely forfeits soldiers' right to life); Adam Roberts, The
Principle of Equal Applications of the Laws of War, in JUST AND UNJUST WARRIORS:
THE MORAL AND LEGAL STATUS OF SOLDIERS 226, 250 (David Rodin & Henry Shue eds.,
2008) (same); see also Smith v. Sec'y of State for Def., [2010] UKSC 29, [142], (U.K.)
(ruling that during armed conflicts, soldiers' right to life should not be recognized, since
such recognition would reduce the protection afforded to civilians).
100.
E.g., Luban, supra note 6, at 8. Luban argues that "nothing in the laws of
war distinguishes non-combatant civilians into different classes based on nationality,
and to give the same legal words different meanings based on a nationality distinction
the law does not recognize is dishonest interpretation." Id. Luban's statement is,
however, misleading. There are some international norms that do only place duties on
a state with regard to civilians under its control. E.g., Additional Protocol I, supra note
32, art. 58(b) (refraining from locating military targets within densely populated
areas). There are also some international norms that only place duties on a state with
regard to civilians that are nationals of the belligerent. E.g., Rome Statute, supra note
32, art. 8(b)(xv) (compelling the nationals of the hostile party to take part in the
operations of war directed against their own country). The accurate statement is that
the general jus in bello proportionality norm does not explicitly distinguish between
these two kinds of civilians. Furthermore, the conclusion reached by Luban from this
lack of explicit reference, as discussed in the text, is inaccurate.
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apparent once one recalls Margalit and Walzer's claim that killing
civilians is truly incidental only if soldiers actively seek to avoid
killing them, "and that active intention can be made manifest only
through the risks soldiers themselves accept in order to reduce the
risks to civilians."1 01 It is necessary to ask, however, on what basis do
they defend this understanding of incidental harm? 102 Similarly, on
what grounds do these authors interpret the term excessive, to mean
that prioritizing a soldier's life over that of a given civilian would
invariably warrant classifying any ensuing civilian harm as
excessive, hence disproportionate?103
In addition to civilian harm and military advantage, a further
element is essential to in bello proportionality. One must identify the
minimum level of protection that soldiers owe to foreign civilians. 0 4
There is no doctrinal basis for the view that soldiers owe those
civilians duties as extensive as Margalit and Walzer wish to impose
(and they offer their stance as an interpretation of in bello
proportionality).10 5 Some leading authorities maintain precisely the
opposite position, that "[tihe proportionality principle does not itself
require the attacker to accept increased risk" in order to reduce
civilian danger.10 6 This more indulgent view of the minimum

101.
Margalit & Walzer, Israel, supra note 5, at 22; see also WALZER, supra note
38, at 155-56 (describing how soldiers are expected to take risks to protect civilian
lives).
102.
Walzer, in fact, has admitted, in the past, that his interpretation of the
proportionality norm is based on a proposal to "correct" the moral rationale behind it
(which is the Doctrine of Double Effect). WALZER, supra note 38, at 154-57.
103.
See UCHL, supra note 97, at 17-19 ("[Tlhe protection of one's own forces
must never be conducted at the cost of the civilian population.").
See Eyal Benvenisti, Human Dignity in Combat: The Duty To Spare Enemy
104.
Civilians, 39 ISR. L. REV. 81, 82 (2006) ("But what is the meaning of 'excessive'
damage? More concretely, is the army required to expose its combatants to lifethreatening risks in order to spare enemy civilians?").
Supposedly, two articles of Additional Protocol I, supra note 32, can be
105.
argued to support a position very similar to the one advanced by Margalit and Walzer.
Article 57(2)(a)(ii) states that "those who plan or decide upon an attack shall ... take
all feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of attack with a view to
avoiding, and in any event to minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to
civilians and damage to civilian objects." Id. art. 57(2)(a)(ii). Article 57(3) states that
"[w]hen a choice is possible between several military objectives for obtaining a similar
military advantage, the objective to be selected shall be that the attack on which may
be expected to cause the least danger to civilian lives and to civilian objects." Id. art.
57(3). Yet, the terms possible (used in Article 57(3)) and feasible (used in Article
57(2)(a)(ii)) are extremely vague and thus can be interpreted in a variety of ways.
Accordingly, some jurists interpret these terms in ways that far from lead to the
placing of soldiers under a duty as demanding as the one supported by Margalit and
Walzer. See, e.g., SANDOZ, supra note 96, at 681-82 (discussing different
interpretations of the term feasible); Benvenisti, supra note 104, at 88-89 (interpreting
the duty to do as much as "possible" in order to protect foreign civilians); see also infra
notes 182-183 and accompanying text.
The Joint Doctrine & Concepts Ctr. [JDCC], Ministry of Defence, The Joint
106.
Service Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict: JSP 383, at 25-26 (2004) (U.K.).
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standard for safeguarding civilians lets states accord significant
weight to their soldiers' right to life, a conclusion Margalit and
Walzer reject. And contrary to Luban, that conclusion is defensible
because, under this more indulgent interpretation of the law, the two
sources of soldiers' significance can simply play different roles within
the analysis of proportionality. The soldier's value as a military asset
bears on the military advantage anticipated by her deployment in a
given tactical situation. Her intrinsic value as a human being, in
contrast, may be taken into account to set a limit on the measure of
precaution she must take to safeguard civilians; it may establish, in
other words, a baseline "floor" of personal safety beneath which
soldiers need not descend.10 7
Consider now the question of whether the duty owed by soldiers
to foreign civilians is any less demanding or extensive than that owed
to the state's own civilians. International humanitarian law here
clearly embodies, in its very unsettledness, an unresolved struggle
between two visions of law's role in armed conflict.108 The first (or
statist) perspective views this law as "a compact between rival armies
to coordinate how they can 'conciliate the necessities of war with the
laws of humanity." 0 9 The second (or humanist) standpoint
understands this body of law as manifesting a commitment to

107.
See Benvenisti, supra note 104, at 88-90, 93 (stating that the open-ended
standard of the term excessive harm leaves room for different interpretations, and in
light of the need to take into account the soldiers' right to life, the proper interpretation
calls for a duty to reduce harm to enemy civilians that does not entail a soldierly
obligation to assume personal life-threatening risks); Dale Stephens & Michael W.
Lewis, The Law of Armed Conflict-A Contemporary Critique, 6 MELB. J. INT'L L. 55,
72 (2005) ("The law of armed conflict does not require that a nation needlessly sacrifice
its own military members in order to minimise incidental civilian injury.").
Furthermore, the position that the intrinsic value of a soldier's life is not fully
derogated during an armed conflict is in accordance with the original philosophical
basis for IHL's principle of distinction. This philosophical basis is known as the
Rousseau-Portalis Doctrine. See JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 1315 (Rose M. Harrington trans., 1893) (1761). According to this doctrine, war is not
between people but between states (i.e., corporate entities/"property"). The permission
to kill a person, when she serves as a soldier, is only a derivative of the conflict
between the states. Thus when she does not bear arms, e.g., when she surrenders, she
is a person and thus her life cannot be taken. Furthermore, Rousseau seems to hold the
view that soldiers retain at least some of their right to life even during the war. He
states, in the context of the permission to kill soldiers during war: "Sometimes a State
may be killed, without killing a single one of its members: war gives no rights which
are not necessary to its object." Id. at 15. For the influence of this doctrine on the
development of the modern law of war, see Toni Pfanner, Asymmetrical Warfare from
the Perspective of HumanitarianLaw and HumanitarianAction, 87 INT'L REV. RED
CROSS 149, 159 (2005).
108.
See Benvenisti, supra note 104, at 82-83 ("The evolving claims about the
law on the conduct of hostilities betray an apparent cleavage between two visions of the
law.").
109.
Id. at 82. Such a view is in line with the way most other parts of
international law are perceived. See MALCOLM SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 6 (5th ed.
2003).
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universal human dignity.1 0 In regard to force protection, the first
view-implicit in Kasher and Yadlin's position-stresses the
responsibility of states to their own citizens, both civilians and
soldiers,"'t whereas the latter stance-embraced by Margalit and
Walzer,112 as well as Luban"13-emphasizes the duty of belligerents
to protect civilians, regardless of nationality, from war's horrors.
The humanist stance does not invariably result in greater
civilian protection than the statist, notwithstanding first
appearances. A state continues to owe duties (under both
international and domestic constitutional law) to those under its
effective control-its own citizen civilians, in most cases-that it does
not owe to others.11 4 Even Margalit and Walzer, as well as Luban,
acknowledge that states have a responsibility to protect their own
civilians from risks imposed by others, a responsibility not owed to
foreign civilians." 5 Yet these authors fail to see how that duty
frequently conflicts with the minimum standard of care they insist
that soldiers accord foreign civilians. In many situations, civilians on
both sides of the battle lines will be put at risk by a military
engagement. Alternative methods of warfare would help or hinder
each civilian group. How to balance or adjudicate between those

110.
Benvenisti, supra note 104, at 82. Such perspective views IHL as being
based on a rationale that is different from that of most other parts of international law.
See generally Prosecutor v. KupreAki6 (Lasva Valley Case), Case No. IT-95-16,
Judgment, 518 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 14, 2000) (describing
the "progressive trend towards the so-called 'humanisation' of international legal
obligations" in IHL).
See Kasher, supra note 15 (criticizing the doctrine of forfeiture of the right
111.
to life); see also Benvenisti, supra note 104, at 82, 87-90 (arguing that soldiers have a
dominant duty to "ensure" the rights of their own nationals while under an obligation
only to "respect" the rights of enemy nationals); Hurka, supra note 61, at 59-63
(criticizing those who claim that states and their soldiers are morally obligated, during
war, to accord equal value to the lives of state civilians and the lives of foreign
civilians, and also criticizing the claim that the value a state must attribute to the life
of a foreign civilian is greater than the value it can attribute to the life of its own
soldier); Porat, supra note 37, at 18-20 (criticizing Margalit and Walzer's claim that
soldiers, during combat, must be equally altruistic in their treatment of all civilians
(foreign and co-national)).
112.
See supranote 43 and accompanying text.
See supranote 54 and accompanying text.
113.
See Benvenisti, supra note 104, at 87-88 (distinguishing between a duty to
114.
respect rights of civilians and a more extensive duty to ensure these rights, and arguing
that during warfare, as long as the attacking military lacks effective control over the
relevant territory, "there is no basis to impose on [it] an obligation to ensure enemy
civilians lives," but only the more limited duty of respecting their right to life); see also
Island of Palmas (U.S. v. Neth.), Hague Ct. Rep. 2d (Scott) 83 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928),
available at httpilweb.arhive.org/webt20080528174538/http-/vww.gwu.edu/-jaysmith/Island.html
(stating that international law "serves to divide between nations the space upon which
human activities are employed, in order to assure them at all points the minimum of
protection of which international law is the guardian").
See supra notes 42, 50 and accompanying text.
115.
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competing considerations is a question that cannot be ignored or
dismissed.
To flesh out the problem, consider the following scenario, which
has commonly arisen in Israel's conflicts with its neighbors."16 A
division commander receives an order to seize a suburban
neighborhood where both foreign civilians and enemy combatants are
present. -Violating international law, the enemy launches mortars
from the neighborhood toward a town in the commander's country.
The commander has the two options before mentioned: seek aerial
support to bombard the neighborhood, or order her subordinates to
take the neighborhood house by house. The advantage of the first
option is not only greater soldier safety-i.e., protection from risk of
capture, injury, or death-but also velocity-i.e., more rapidly
stopping the mortar attacks that the state's civilians otherwise
continue to suffer. In other words, the option best calculated to reduce
risks to the enemy's civilians (ground combat), by forcing the state's
soldier to adopt a more time-consuming and riskier option, ends up
increasing risks to the state's own civilians, who remain subject to
enemy mortar attacks for a longer period than if the mortar sites had
been immediately destroyed by aerial attack. This would be especially
true if mortar firings increase in frequency and intensity; a common
response to early stages of land operations.
The Israeli experience thus suggests that requiring soldiers to
accept greater risk in order to protect foreign civilians will often
greatly increase the risk to the state's own noncombatants and
therefore may turn out to implicitly prioritize the safety of foreign
noncombatants over the state's own. That result would be
inconsistent, in different ways, with the positions of Luban, Margalit,
and Walzer on the duties that states owe to each of these three
groups. For Luban, it would be incompatible with the duty to treat all
lives equally. For Margalit and Walzer, it would be inconsistent with
limiting the duty to safeguard foreign civilians so as not to ensure
failure of the mission-in this case, to protect domestic civilians from
the mortar attacks. One should acknowledge that, sometimes, the
result of choosing a ground operation would not lead to complete
mission failure, but only to a delay in the attainment of the mission's
goal-which places the state's civilians at risk for an extended period
of time. Yet, even that result often proves irreconcilable with the
7
views of those three authors; it clashes with their acknowledgment"
that a state owes greater responsibilities of protection to its own

See Porat, supra note 37, at 17-21 (discussing similar examples); Ziegler &
116.
Otzari, supra note 37 (same); cf. Blank, supra note 77, at 370 (criticizing the Goldstone
Report's analysis of a similar situation).
See supranotes 42-43, 50 and accompanying text.
117.
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civilians than to foreigners, and that these duties extend to protecting
its civilians from harm by others. 118
In other words, an avowedly "humanist" approach to the law of
operational proportionality would regularly preclude one belligerent,
on account of its duties to an adversary's civilians, from employing
methods of warfare that would block the latter belligerent from
inflicting still greater losses on its own civilians.." 9 In these ways,
prohibiting states from prizing force protection, through unduly
stringent interpretations of in bello proportionality, prevents them
from honoring their responsibility to protect their own civilians from
a violent attack. Fulfilling this duty to those dwelling within its
territory (and therefore subject to its authority) is generally the
state's chief strategic goal in responding to an unlawful enemy attack.
A state's ability to offer that protection, in exchange for the loyalty of
its citizens, acts as the centerpiece of any acceptable social
contract. 120
Thus, even if one rejects the view that citizens turned soldiers
retain any right to life, and instead understands their value in purely
instrumental terms, protecting their lives remains of central interest
to in bello proportionality. Soldiers should therefore continue to enjoy
some protection based on this legal norm, if one wishes them to be
able to properly protect the lives of the state's own civilians from the
threats posed to them by the enemy's actions. This interpretation
does not entirely deny protection to foreign civilians: when their harm
is likely to prove excessive in relation to any pertinent military
advantage from a given use of force, that exercise of force remains
inconsistent even with this interpretation of the requirements of in
bello proportionality. 121
Moreover, there are good reasons for international law to let
states acknowledge that their soldiers retain a right to life. For this is
a fundamental human right, one not easily devalued even when

118.
See Ziegler & Otzari, supra note 37; see also Hurka, supra note 61, at 60-61
(explaining that a government should afford greater weight to the lives of its own
citizens than the lives of foreign enemy civilians).
119.
Some further argue that the humanist approach to the law of war, due to
the limits it places on the conduct of states, may ultimately, in some situations, lead to
greater civilian loss than its interpretive alternative. See YORAM DINSTEIN, THE
CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAw OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 225-26
(2004) (arguing that a prohibition of belligerent reprisals does not accord with the
actual state practice and prevents significant deterrence of illegal attacks); see also
Kasher, supra note 15, at 166 ("Those who call for a ban on cluster bombs . . . tell the
belligerent party . . . that uses cluster bombs to use other means instead. Assuming
that those alternative means are less effective, a ban would result in
risking .. . civilians, against whom enemy combatants .. . continue to be a threat.").
See Benvenisti, supra note 104, at 89-90 ("The juxtaposition of these two
120.
obligations suggests that each of the armies has a dominant goal, even a duty, to
protect its civilians, their rights and interests in the pursuit of the war efforts.").
121.
JDCC, supranote 106, at 26.
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individuals voluntarily agree to forfeit itl 22-the argument Margalit
and Walzer advance with regard to soldiers. 2 3 Moreover, though it is
axiomatic that war, and the law of war, treats individual soldiers as
instruments to collective ends,124 this does not mean that, in
becoming soldiers, people abdicate or waive their right to life.' 2 5 For

122.
E.g., TERRANCE C. MCCONNELL, INALIENABLE RIGHTS: THE LIMITS OF
CONSENT IN MEDICINE AND THE LAW 12-13 (2000) (discussing the difficulty to morally
justify infringement of inalienable rights, such as the right to life, simply based on the
fact that the possessor of the right consented); see also Kasher, supra note 15, at 164
("There is, however, a conceptual gap between undertaking jeopardy and forfeiting
some of one's very basic rights."). Moreover, one must admit that this voluntaryacceptance argument is even less convincing where (as in Israel) the soldier is
conscripted, and generally does not voluntarily seek a military career. See Smith v.
Sec'y of State for Def. [2010] UKSC 29, [100] (U.K.) (implying that soldiers' right to life
should be recognized when the soldiers are conscripts); Plaw, supra note 5, at 12
(admitting the greater weakness of this argument in the context of conscripts); Porat,
supra note 37, at 16.
123.
See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text; see also Luban, supra note 6,
at 26-29 (arguing that soldiers have a professional duty to risk their lives in order to
reduce the risk for civilians).
124.
See Blum, supra note 35, at 118, 132-36 (discussing the extensive support
amongst jurists and philosophers for this legal state of affairs, although Blum is
critical of this consensus); Blum, supra note 33, at 40 (explaining the theory that
soldiers are tools of war "made to be killed"); see also supra notes 33-37 and
accompanying text.
125.
See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, arts. 4, 6, 8(3),
opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976)
(asserting all peoples' right to life). Different international tribunals, notably the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) in its advisory opinion regarding the legality of
nuclear weapons, ruled that human rights, such as the right not to be arbitrarily
deprived of one's life, apply during armed conflicts. The courts further ruled that what
should count as an arbitrary deprivation of life must be determined on the basis of the
relevant lex specialis-herethe law of armed conflict. See, e.g., Legality of the Threat or
Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 25 (July 8) (asserting the
continued validity of human rights during armed conflicts); see also, e.g., Isayeva v.
Russia, App. No. 57950/00, 41 Eur. H.R. Rep. 791, 832-38 (Eur. Ct. H.R) (2005)
(finding that the military was still bound to respect the right to life of the applicant
during the armed conflict by minimizing the risk to life posed by the military's actions).
The ICJ, and these other tribunals (such as the European Court of Human Rights),
most likely had in mind the right of civilians, not combatants. These courts
nevertheless did not expressly limit this right to the former category. Some have
interpreted the right to life, in light of the relevant lex specialis, so as to derogate this
right with regard to combatants. See, e.g., Noam Lubell, Challenges in Applying
Human Rights Law in Armed Conflict, 87 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 737, 745, 748-49
(2005) (arguing that the human rights law's right to life translates in light of the law of
war to the duty not to intentionally target civilians, while the permission to target
combatants, constitutes a case in which law of war as lex specialis, overrides the
obligation (which otherwise exists based on human rights law) to protect the right to
life). Others contend that, because the right to life pertains even in war, soldiers too
retain this right, to some extent. E.g., Benvenisti, supra note 104, at 83-84, 86, 90
(highlighting tensions between human rights law and jus in bello, while assuming that
the principles that inspire human rights law continue to apply during armed conflicts,
to an extent that even soldiers retain (at least to a certain degree) their right to life);
Ziegler & Otzari, supra note 37, at 63 (citing the core documents of human rights law
and stating, in light of these sources, that to adopt an interpretation of IHL norms that
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most of modern legal history, people were generally deemed to lose
most of their constitutional rights upon becoming soldiers.1 26 Today,
the "civilianization" of military law in many democracies reflects the
view that soldiers are simply "civilians in uniform," retaining all
rights that can be construed as compatible with the demands of their
new legal status.12 7 These rights may have to be interpreted more
narrowly when public policy so requires, as during armed conflict. 128
Even so, international law should be interpreted as to allow states to
acknowledge and respect their soldiers' right to life, to the extent

"assign[s] no intrinsic value to the lives of compatriot soldiers seems to be incompatible
with their universal rights to life and human dignity"). For example, Dale Stephens
and Michael Lewis indicate:
The law of armed conflict does not require that a nation needlessly sacrifice its
own military members in order to minimise incidental civilian injury. Indeed,
while the ICJ has expressly asserted the precedence of the law of armed conflict
as the lex specialis over human rights norms during a war, this still allows for
the application of human rights norms where the jus in bello is silent. One
obvious area of intersection concerns the rights of a nation's own military
members and the risks to which they must be exposed to preserve the lives of
civilians of the enemy nation.
Stephens & Lewis, supra note 107, at 72 (footnotes omitted). The British Supreme
Court had a recent opportunity to rule on this question. The court's majority chose to
resolve the case, however, entirely on a jurisdictional issue. This has led to the odd
result that British soldiers retain a right to life only in the unlikely event that war
occurs within Europe, where the European Convention on Human Rights applies, but
not when the conflict occurs elsewhere, where British troop engagement is more
probable. See Smith, [2010] UKSC 29 [56] (deciding whether British soldiers enjoy a
right to life under the European Convention of Human Rights).
126.
See G.R. Rubin, United Kingdom Military Law: Autonomy, Civilianization,
Juridification, 65 MODERN L. REV. 36, 36-42 (2002) (describing the increased
"civilianization" of UK military law); see also Edward F. Sherman, The Civilianization
of Military Law, 22 ME. L. REV. 3, 3-7 (1970) (describing the increased "civilianization"
of military law in the United States).
127.
See Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 304-05 (1983) (declining to hold that
military personnel are barred from bringing constitutional claims in civil court "simply
because they have doffed their civilian clothes"); HCJ 6055/95 Zemach v. Minister of
Def. 53(5) PD 241,
19, 22 [1999] (Isr.); Engel v. Netherlands, App. No. 5100/71, 22
Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 23, 1 54 (1976) (stating that the Convention applies to
members of the armed forces and not just civilians); Eur. Parl. Ass., Recommendation,
Doc. No. 1742 (2006), available at http://assembly.coe.int/ main.asp?Link=/documents/
adoptedtext/ta06/erecl742.htm ("[M]embers of the armed forces are citizens in uniform
who must enjoy the same fundamental freedoms . . . and the same protection of their
rights and dignity as any other citizen, within the limits imposed by the specific
exigencies of military duties."); DEP'T OF THE ARMY, ARMY LEADERSHIP: FM 6-22, at 2-9
(2006) ("[S]erving as a Soldier of the United States does not mean giving up being an
American citizen with its inherent rights and responsibilities."); OSCE, HANDBOOK ON
HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL
(2008).

FREEDOMS OF ARMED FORCES PERSONNEL 32

See, e.g., Scott v. R., [2004] C.M.A.R. 2 (Can.) (stating that soldiers'
128.
constitutional rights can be more greatly infringed during war); Peter Rowe, The
Soldier as a Citizen in Uniform: A Reprisal, 7 N.Z. ARMED FORCES L. REV. 1, 7, 10, 16
(2007) (discussing considerations which allow a greater infringement of soldier's rights,
most notably the existence of an emergency or armed conflict).
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consistent with those soldiers' duties to others.12 9 Whatever
international law may permit in this regard, many democratic states
also require as much through their constitutional law.13 0
A state that utterly ignored the human status of its soldiers
would also greatly reduce their motivation to fight-even when
national security genuinely so requires.' 3 ' Thus, even a
consequentialist standpoint would lead states to respect their
soldiers' right to life in a manner that limits the risks they impose on
these soldiers in the interests of safeguarding the enemy's civilian
population.
Weighty implications follow from allowing proportionality
assessment to consider both the instrumental value of the soldier's
life and its intrinsic deontological import. The positions of Margalit,
Walzer, and Luban become unsustainable. Their approaches treat the
value of soldiers' lives as a "constant," mathematically speaking,
according it a weight logically invariant from one empirical
circumstance to another. Yet, once the law of proportionality
acknowledges the significance of soldiers as military assets, it is no
longer possible to treat their value as invariant.
This is clear upon consideration of the second element of
Margalit and Walzer's test, their concession that international law
cannot require soldiers to accept a particular risk if so doing will
guarantee the failure of their mission. This standard is a
mathematical constant, because it is held to be equally applicable in
the same way at all times and places in war. For that reason, it
makes little sense. There are many potential missions that must be
aborted on account of the high risk they place on large numbers of
foreign civilians-the rationale being that the military advantage to
be gained from the contemplated mission simply could not remotely
approximate the likely extent of unintended civilian harm.
It is not the number of soldiers who will be put at risk (Luban's
concession) that is decisive here, nor the fact that such risk would be

129.
E.g., Stephens & Lewis, supra note 107, at 72 (explaining that
international law allows states to interpret the in bello proportionality norm in a
manner which permits them to take into account the right to life of their own soldiers).
Cf. Kasher, supra note 15, at 164 ("[W]ithin the framework of a democratic
130.
regime, a combatant has the right to be appropriately protected by the state . . . .").
131.

See LEONARD WONG ET AL., WHY THEY FIGHT: COMBAT MOTIVATION IN THE

IRAQ WAR 11 (2003), available at http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mill
pdffiles/publ79.pdf (explaining the effect of the protection of soldiers' right to life on
their motivation to fight). Wong and his partners suggest that a main motivator for
soldiers to fight is the reassurance that their comrades will "have their back," since
"[o]nce soldiers are convinced that their own personal safety will be assured by others,
they feel empowered to do their job without worry." Id. Adopting rules of engagement
that treat soldiers' lives as simply expendable means to war-related aims (i.e., as
having no intrinsic value) would weaken soldiers' belief that their superiors have their
safety at heart, which in turn is likely to diminish their motivation to follow those
superiors' orders that would put these soldiers in grave danger.
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virtually suicidal or lead the mission, however important, to fail of its
purposes (Margalit and Walzer), but rather the value of the military
objective to be secured or destroyed. And the measure of military
significance will differ greatly from one operational and tactical
context to the next.1 a2 As the military significance of a given objective
varies, so will the asset value of the particular soldiers (of different
experience levels and varieties of expertise) necessary to achieve it.133
Despite their grave debilities, the efforts of Margalit, Walzer,
and Luban to set an invariant risk-taking duty for soldiers reflect a
laudable, even essential, concern: the danger that commanders will
discount likely civilian losses if international law lets them include,
without limit, the asset value of their forces when assessing
proportionality. 134 Nevertheless, this legitimate concern must not be
allowed to banish from legal consideration the other side of the
perennial dilemma. After all, commanders must simultaneously
assess a number of relevant variables in the particular circumstances
before them, including often conflicting considerations on both sides
of the proportionality equation-both those that bear on civilian
losses and those that influence anticipated advantage from a given
exercise of force. The frequent complexity of this factual assessment
(and the ensuing weighing of competing normative considerations)
suggests a need for considerable decisional latitude and hence for a
legal test acknowledging this fact.' 35
International humanitarian law often strikes a compromise
between the opposing concerns, and this is certainly the case with
respect to in bello proportionality. 13 6 It steers a middle course,
allowing states considerable but not unlimited discretion in how
much weight they give to force protection within proportionality

132.
This point was acknowledged in WALZER, supra note 38, at 156 ("[T]he
degree of risk that is permissible is going to vary with the nature of the target, the
urgency of the moment, the available technology, and so on."). See also supra Part I.C.2
(discussing the fact that the asset value of soldiers is a context-dependent variable).
133.
See Ziegler & Otzari, supra note 37, at 61 (showing that the ratio between
the averted foreign-civilian loss and the expected loss of state soldiers' asset value
"cannot be a priori assumed to be linear").
134.
See, e.g., Gary D. Solis, The Law of Armed Conflict: International
Humanitarian Law in War 285 (2010).
135.
E.g., Stefan Oeter, Methods and Means of Combat, in THE HANDBOOK OF
HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICT 105,

173 (D.

Fleck ed.,

1999)

("[T]he

intellectual process of balancing the various elements is so complicated, needs to take
into account such a huge amount of data and so many factors, that any attempt to
design a formula which is both comprehensive and precise would be ridiculous."); see
also Stephens & Lewis, supra note 107, at 74 (describing proportionality assessment
factors).
136.
See Benvenisti, supra note 104, at 83 (acknowledging the internal tension
in jus in bello law). This is not to say, of course, that this law does not suffer from a
problem of uncertainty. See Blum, supra note 33, at 56 ("[T]he exact scope of the
protection accorded to civilians under IHL is unclear. In particular, the degree to which
state A must sacrifice some of its soldiers in order to minimize harm to state B's
civilians is debatable.").
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assessment made by their military commanders.1 37 The current
customary law on the subject can fairly be described as follows:
In taking care to protect civilians soldiers must accept some element of
risk to themselves. The rule [of proportionality] is unclear as to what
degree of care is required of a soldier and what degree of risk he must
take. Everything depends on the target, the urgency of the moment, the
38
available technology and so on.'

This approach strikes a compromise: requiring that soldiers
always accept some nontrivial risk in order to protect civilians, but
allowing the degree of that risk to vary in light of circumstances
(which no legal rule can fully cognize and codify). This approach also
implicitly grants discretion to states to valorize risk reduction more
heavily with respect to their own civilians than to foreign civilians. To
protect members of the latter group, states are not required to expose
their soldiers to risks beyond a certain level (i.e., beyond a duty to
always accept some nontrivial risk in order to protect civilians, even if
foreign). That standard is less demanding than placing soldiers under
a duty to always accept additional risk whenever so doing will
enhance civilian protection (Margalit and Walzer's standard). Thus,
leeway remains that allows states to place their soldiers under a more
demanding risk-taking duty, which would apply only with regard to
the protection of their own civilians.
By only demanding that soldiers accept some nontrivial level of
risk in order to protect civilians (even if they are foreigners),
international law also gives states leeway that allows each state to
set a morally acceptable "ceiling" of maximally acceptable risk that its
soldiers must take, even to protect that state's own civilians. Such a

137.
See Final Rep. to the Prosecutor by the Comm. Established To Review the
NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Fed. Republic of Yugoslavia, June 13, 2000,
49-50, available at http://www.icty.org/x/file/About/OTP/otp-report_ natobombing_
en.pdf [hereinafter NATO Bombing Report] (providing legal basis for proportionality
assessments); Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Questioning Civilian Immunity, 43 TEXAS INT'L
L.J. 453, 487 (2008) (explaining that the proportionality principle leaves much
discretion to belligerents); Stephens & Lewis, supra note 107, at 74 (describing how
soldiers' lives are considered in proportionality assessments and stating that
"[d]iscretions are broad and the factors which apply to determine [the] respective
values are a product of judgment"); see also SANDOZ, supra note 96, [ 1835 (explaining
that it was necessary to leave a margin of appreciation to those who have to apply the
proportionality norm, and therefore this norm's effectiveness will depend on the good
faith of the belligerents and their wish to conform to principles of humanity); Diamond,
supra note 31, at 428-29 (explaining that IHL has given belligerents a great amount of
discretion with regard to proportionality assessments).
138.
A.P.V. Rogers, Conduct of Combat and Risks Run by the Civilian
Population, 21 MIL. L. & L. WAR REV. 293, 310 (1982) (citation omitted). See also the
following sources, all citing Rogers's position as authoritative: IAN HENDERSON, THE
CONTEMPORARY LAW OF TARGETING 204-06 (2009); William J. Fenrick, The Law
Applicable to Targeting and ProportionalityAfter Operation Allied Force: A View from
the Outside, 3 Y.B. INTL HUMANITARIAN L. 53, 78 (2001); Alexandra Boivin, The Legal
Regime Applicable to Targeting Military Objectives in the Context of Contemporary
Warfare 45 (UCHL Research Paper Series No. 2/2006).
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ceiling remains essential if international law is to allow states to
accord any significance to the deontological value of their soldiers'
lives.
Yet, international law also explicitly sets a "floor" for the
minimally acceptable risk-taking duty that soldiers must shoulder in
order to protect even foreign civilians, no matter how significant the
military advantage of 'their mission. Commanders who invariably
prioritize the intrinsic value of their soldiers' lives over those of
foreign civilians (as Kasher and Yadlin argue they must do) therefore
violate international law, since they do not demand that, to protect
civilians, soldiers always accept nontrivial risk.1 39 Above this
acceptable floor of risk taking by soldiers, the level of protection
civilians enjoy will be considerably influenced by the expected
military advantage of the specific mission. As the significance of the
mission decreases, the risk-taking duty of the soldiers must increase,
beyond the above-mentioned floor, if their state still wishes the
mission to be performed. Yet, since this level of protection is
influenced by the expected military advantage of the specific mission
(above the acceptable floor of soldiers' risk-taking duty), it is strongly
influenced by the fact that international law lets national military
commanders give serious consideration to the mission-specific
advantages of protecting their forces. In deciding how much weight to
grant this variable, commanders have considerable legal discretion.
That discretion may be (and is likely to be) exercised in light of the
shifting value of particular soldiers as military assets in various
tactical and operational circumstances. Even so, when commanders
clearly exaggerate the value of protecting their troops and thereby
cause excessive civilian casualties, their conduct violates
international law and warrants sanction.140 Accordingly, commanders
who systematically prioritize their soldiers' lives over those of foreign
civilians-because they exaggerate the soldiers' value as assetsviolate the law of in bello proportionality.141
To what extent do the three positions in current debate respect
these legal standards?

139.
See also Blum, supra note 33, at 59 ("I am willing to expand the
humanitarian motivation to a mixed concern for the enemy as well as one's own
nationals but exclude a sole or overriding concern for one's own combatants or
civilians.").
140.
See NATO Bombing Report, supra note 137, IT 49-50 (stating that the
values of a "reasonable military commander" must be used in proportionality
assessments).
141.
See HENDERSON, supra note 138, at 204-05 (noting that an argument that
security of the attacking force takes priority over collateral damage amounts to the
weighing of military advantage more heavily than collateral damage); SOLIS, supra
note 134, at 27; Yves Sandoz, Commentary, 78 INT'L L. STUD. 273, 277 (2002); see also
Ziegler & Otzari, supra note 37, at 65 (assessing how to value soldiers' lives).
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Even Kasher and Yadlin sometimes acknowledge that their
stance is at odds with current international law: 142
[The Principle of Distinction] usually . . .introduces a crude distinction
between combatants and noncombatants... . The moral aspiration is
clear, but the distinction itself remains crude and morally problematic.
We propose to replace it, for circumstances of fighting terror, by the
14 3
cluster of distinctions and norms.

When specifically asked whether their position violates international
law, Kasher replied:
There is a lack of understanding in the media as to the nature of
international law. These are not strict traffic laws. Much of it is
customary law. The decisive question is how civilized states behave.
We, in Israel, have a central role in the development of this law, since
we are at the forefront of the fight against terror. . . . What we do
becomes the law. These are positions that are nor purely legal; a strong
1 44
moral element exists in them.

This is a serious mischaracterization. Most states, and certainly
most of those deeply affected by a change, must concur before an
existing norm of customary international law can be replaced by
another. 145 Israel is not the only state seriously threatened by
terrorism, and other states have not endorsed Kasher and Yadlin's
insistence on the invariable supremacy of force protection. The
United States, for instance, clearly disavows this view of current

142.
See Diamond, supra note 31, at 426-28. Diamond criticizes Kasher and
Yadlin with regard to this issue and generally discusses the tendency of those who wish
to reduce the restrictions legally placed on a state to advocate that considerations that
are only relevant in the context of jus ad bellum proportionality should also be allowed
to influence the jus in bello proportionality assessment.
143.
Kasher & Yadlin, supra note 4, at 15 (emphasis added). The "cluster" they
refer to mainly means the set of priorities previously presented.
144.
Amos Harel, 'Cast Lead' Operation, HAARETZ (Feb. 06, 2009, 1:17 PM),
http://www.haaretz.co.illnews/politics/1.1244279 (Ziv Bohrer trans.) (Isr.). A greater
respect for international law is claimed to be afforded in Kasher, supra note 20, but
that is not truly the case. There, Kasher attempts to assess and justify Israel's actions
during its operation in Gaza (Operation Cast Lead). He claims that a proper
examination needs to review the validity of these actions according to (a) moral
principles that a democratic state needs to uphold, (b) the ethical codes of Israel's
armed forces, and (c) international law. Id. at 45. With regard to the principle of
distinction, he states: "Even those-and I am among them-who hold that the
standards of conduct delineated by the principle of distinction do not offer an ideal
moral solution to the problem, will nevertheless respect them, and seek to replace them
with arrangements that are better in both theory and practice." Id. at 60. Yet, when he
reviews the appropriateness of his complete preference of force protection over the lives
of foreign civilians, he justifies his position based on moral and ethical norms without
reference to the lex lata of international law. Id. at 60-69.
145.

E.g.,

HELEN DUFFY,

THE "WAR ON TERROR" AND THE FRAMEWORK OF

INTERNATIONAL LAW 7-8 (2005) (stating further that "[i]n most cases, not even
consistent patterns of violations by a number of States imply that a rule has been
superseded").
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law.146 In fact, contrary to accusations by some, 147 Israel denies that
it adopted Kasher and Yadlin's standard during its 2008-2009 Gaza
operation.14 8 Israel's position, like that of the United States, is that
soldiers have a duty to accept some nontrivial risk to safeguard
foreign civilians. 149

146.
Paragraph 7-23 of the Army's Counterinsurgency Field Manual at first
glance seems to adopt a position similar to that of Margalit and Walzer, stating that
"[1]imiting the misery caused by war requires combatants to ... restrain the amount of
force they may apply," while "[a]t the same time, combatants are not required to take
so much risk that they fail in their mission or forfeit their lives." See DEP'T OF THE
ARMY, COUNTERINSURGENCY FIELD MANUAL: FM 3-24, 1 7-23 (2006); see also Plaw,
supra note 5, at 15 (interpreting that paragraph in the manual). Yet, other paragraphs
in that manual seem to allow soldiers to take less risk in order to protect civilian lives.
7-21, -30; see also, e.g., Charles Dunlap, Kosovo,
DEP'T OF THE ARMY, supra,
CausalityAversion, and the American Military Ethos: A Perspective, 10 U.S. AIR FORCE
ACAD. J. LEGAL STUD. 95, 99 (2000). Dunlap discusses the U.S. practice in Kosovo and
claims that the U.S. position views the lives of American soldiers as having an equal
value to the lives of foreign civilians. Smith, supra note 97, at 157-61. Smith argues
that, in practice, U.S. forces in the second war in Iraq adopted a policy of prioritizing
their soldiers' lives over the lives of local civilians. Such positions seem to be both in
violation of international law and of the U.S. manual, but they do indicate that the
U.S. position is less restrictive than Plaw's interpretation of it. See also Luban, supra
note 6, at 17-19 (citing views of American officers he interviewed).
Furthermore, military manuals and codes of many different countries explicitly
state that force protection can be taken into account as part of the jus in bello
proportionality assessment. See, e.g., 2 JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALDBECK, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW: PRACTICE 184-85 (2005) (citing the manuals

of the United States, Ecuador, Australia, and New Zealand). Yet, to our knowledge, the
only Western country that has explicitly adopted a position that is similar (but not
identical) to that of Kasher and Yadlin is the United Kingdom. For further discussion
on this issue, see infra Part III.
See supra note 5 and accompanying text; see also infra note 204 and
147.
accompanying text.
Israeli officials did not explicitly refer to Kasher and Yadlin's position. They
148.
did, however, assert that Israel's policy does not prioritize soldiers' lives over the lives
of Palestinians. See STATE OF ISR., THE OPERATION IN GAZA: 27 DECEMBER 2008-18
JANUARY 2009: FACTUAL AND LEGAL ASPECTS 32, 46 (2009) ("[T]he extensive

precautions adopted by Israel to protect civilians during this conflict-often at the
expense of military advantage and at the risk of Israeli soldiers-sought to meet the
most demanding standards of modern military operations."); Gabriela Shalev, Isr.
Ambassador to the United Nations, Statement to the U.N. Security Council (June 6,
transcript available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Foreign+Relations/
2008),
Israel+and+the+UN/Speeches+-+statements/StatementAmbShalevUNSecurity
Council 6-Jan-2009.htm ("In responding to terrorist attacks that show no respect for
human life-either Israeli or Palestinian-Israel takes steps to protect both. It takes
every possible measure to limit civilian casualties-even where these measures
endanger the lives of our soldiers or the effectiveness of their operations.").
See HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Gov't of Isr.
149.
f 40, 46 (Isr.), translated at http://elyon1.court.gov.ill
[2006](2) IsrLR 459,
files-eng/02/690/007/el6/02007690.el6.pdf ("A balance should be struck between the
duty of the state to protect the lives of its soldiers and civilians and its duty to protect
the lives of innocent civilians who are harmed when targeting terrorists."); Shalev,
supra note 148 (noting that Israel has often put its soldiers in increased risk as part of
taking measures to protect civilian lives, both Israeli and Palestinian). Furthermore,
the IDF's ethical code states that an IDF "soldier shall ... do all he can to avoid
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As rehearsed above, then, current international law conflicts
with Kasher and Yadlin's position both in declining to require any
significant risk taking by soldiers (to prevent incidental civilian
harm) and in denying the need for soldiers to exercise situational
judgment of the proportionality of their actions, on a case-by-case
basis. Similarly, neither Margalit and Walzer's15 0 nor Luban's
position 51 accords with the law of in bello proportionality, because it
fails to take proper account of the contingent value of soldiers as
military assets. 152
In bello proportionality also does not require, as Margalit and
Walzer would like it to, that states treat their soldiers as having
simply "waived" the human right to life. On the other hand, in
assuming the lives of soldiers and foreign civilians to be always of
equal value, Luban's notion of a one-to-one risk-transfer ratio
ascribes greater value to the soldiers' right to life than international
law allows.1 53 Placing soldiers under a duty to accept some nontrivial
level of risk in order to safeguard civilians differs from the notion of a
one-to-one risk ratio because it implies that the lives of civilians are
of greater deontological value than those of soldiers. As such, Luban's
initial position, just briefly entertained,1 54 is the only one compatible
with the law's acceptance that soldiers retain a right to life, even in
war, to the extent consonant with their bearing some nontrivial level
of risk to safeguard foreign civilians.

harming [non-combatants' and prisoners of war's] lives, bodies, honor and property."
See THE SPIRIT OF THE IDF (Isr.), translated at http://www.aka.idf.il/SIPSTORAGE/
FILES/4/47634.pdf. Kasher's current position has led to a dispute amongst different
members of the committees that have formulated this document for the IDF. On the
one hand, Kasher (who was a member of the first committee to formulate this
document) argued that his position is in accordance with this ethical code. Kasher,
supra note 20, at 68. On the other hand, three members of a second committee that
revised the code a few years after the first committee (Daniel Statman, Avi Sagi, and
Moshe Helbertal) argued that Kasher's position is in violation of this ethical code.
Statman, supra note 5, at 5-8; Avi Sagi & Moshe Helbertal, What Is the Ethical Code of
the IDF,YEDIOT AHARONOT, May 01, 2009 (Isr.). Their position was that, according to
this code, IDF soldiers are required to at least take some risk in order to reduce the
risk to civilians (even if these civilians are not under Israeli control).
150.
See supra note 31 and accompanying text (discussing claims by supporters
of their positions who argue that their position is the correct interpretation of the
relevant international law). But see supra note 47 (showing that some such supporters
advance a less harsh risk-taking duty than the one supported by Margalit and Walzer).
151.
Luban, supra note 6, at 45 (arguing explicitly that his position is the correct
application of international law).
152.
See text accompanying supra note 132.
153.
See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
154.
See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
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C. Proportionalityat the Tactical Level
Because war is littered with imponderables, it is often impossible
to predict either the civilian harm or military advantage.15 5 Even
when the facts are relatively clear, reasonable commanders will many
times differ in the relative weight they ascribe to the competing
considerations. 156 The international law of in bello proportionality
clearly opts for flexibility rather than invariant consistency-for a
standard allowing situational discretion over any bright-line rule,
whether stringent or indulgent.1 5 7 Choosing a discretionary standard
over a bright-line rule requires trust in the capabilities of the
relevant actors; it also implies that a more precise norm would fail to
capture the relevant situational complexities, leaving the rule either
over- or under-inclusive of its purpose. 15 8 In the case of in bello
proportionality, sweeping rules like those of Margalit and Walzer or
Kasher and Yadlin cannot conceptually accommodate the need for "all
things considered" judgment of the sort required by much military
decision making.159

155.
See Diamond, supra note 31, at 450-51 (discussing difficulties in making
exact proportionality assessments).
156.
See SOLIS, supra note 134, at 273 (acknowledging that "reasonable military
commanders" may vary in their proportionality assessments).
157.
Eitan Diamond has stated:
IHL has deliberately been designed to allow belligerents considerable leeway to
respond appropriately to the exigencies of battle. This is achieved by the
inclusion of many broad standards, using open ended terms like
"proportionality" .
Where it employs standards, as opposed to black and
white rules, the law creates . . . a grey area in which different courses of action
are tolerated.
Diamond, supra note 31, at 428-29 (footnotes omitted). In order to reduce the concerns
that exist from the application of the discretionary proportionality norm, however,
international law does impose certain sweeping, bright-line rules with no exceptionsnotably, the duty to never intentionally target civilians-even when so doing would
advance mission objectives or enhance force protection. See Benvenisti, supra note 104,
at 100-05 (describing the role of the absolute prohibitions of IHL); Blum, supra note
33, at 9 ("The intentional (as distinguished from foreseen-yet-unintended) killing of a
civilian is always prohibited."); Diamond, supra note 31, at 415, 429, 436-38, 451-52
(explaining the prohibition on targeting civilians).
158.

FREDERICK

SCHAUER,

PLAYING

BY

THE

RULES:

A

PHILOSOPHICAL

EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 152-55 (1991)
(discussing agents' capabilities and the manner in which they influence lawmakers'
choice between discretionary standards and bright-line rules); Oren Gross, Chaos and
Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be Constitutional?, 112 YALE L.J.
1011, 1127-31 (2003) (discussing the difficulty in regulating emergencies through the
ex ante legislation of legal rules due to the situational complexities and consequent
unpredictability of such situations).
159.
See Cohen & Shany, supra note 95, at 316 (stating that the "very nature of
the principle of proportionality" is of "an open-ended legal standard designed to
accommodate an indefinite number of changing circumstances"); see also NATO
Bombing Report, supra note 137, IT 49-50; Diamond, supra note 31, at 428-29, 450-
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Margalit and Walzer,160 as well as Kasher and Yadlin,16 doubt
whether, in the face of war's ineradicable uncertainties, complex
situational judgment by commanders can often be very accurate.
There is hence little need, in their view, for international law to
accord their judgment so wide a berth. Both approaches therefore
implicitly seek to replace complex balancing with a simpler
exhortation: always prefer the lives of your soldiers over foreign
civilians (Kasher and Yadlin), or almost always prefer the lives of
foreign civilians over your soldiers (1VIargalit and Walzer). Luban, too,
knows that precise numerical calculation of military gains and
civilian losses is usually impossible ex ante, but nonetheless thinks
that it is realistic to expect soldiers in combat, despite its stresses and
epistemic limits, to apply his theory, limiting the risk they transfer
onto civilians to a ratio of one-to-one. 62 Unlike the other authors,
Luban thus believes that soldiers can reliably assess risks to
themselves and others, i.e., they have the capacities that in bello
proportionality indeed requires of them.'6 3
This assumption, however, makes considerable sense only at the
operational level, as will now be demonstrated. At war's tactical level,
the pessimism of the other authors is, in fact, well warranted, and the
applicable law must be construed to accommodate this reality, as it in
fact seeks to do.
The law generally cannot expect low-echelon soldiers, making
tactical decisions in battle, to fully assess in bello proportionality.
That would require more expertise and knowledge than they possess.
It would demand, in particular, considerable familiarity with the
larger attack to which their particular battle, and their role within it,
was designed in small measure to contribute. Uses of force that may
appear indefensible from their local standpoint may be eminently
justified from a broader perspective and vice versa.164 The time

51; Fellmeth, supra note 137, at 487; Oeter, supra note 135, at 173-75; Stephens &
Lewis, supra note 107, at 74.
160.

See MICHAEL WALZER, ARGUING ABOUT WAR 89 (2006) ("[Plolitical and

military leaders [ought] to worry about costs and benefits. But they have to worry; they
can't calculate. . . ."); Margalit & Walzer, Israel, supra note 5, at 22 ("What degree of
risk

should . .. soldiers

assume . . . ?

We

can't

answer

that

question

with

any

precision.").
161.
Kasher & Yadlin, supra note 4, at 22 (referring to in bello proportionality);
Kasher, supra note 20, at 53 (stating, in the context of ad bellum proportionality, that
"no principle of proportionality entails a demand for numerical equivalence").
162.
See Luban, supra note 6, at 21 (arguing in favor of soldiers applying value
assessments in combat).
163.
Compare Luban, supra note 6, at 21 ("Sometimes, therefore, it may be
possible to quantify the risk troops face .... ), with supra notes 157-159 (discussing
the position of current in bello international law).
164.

See MARK J. OSIEL, OBEYING ORDERS: ATROCITY, MILITARY DISCIPLINE AND

THE LAW OF WAR 64 (1998) ("If the law requires [a soldier] to make an independent
legal judgment whenever he receives an order, it also risks eliciting his disobedience to
orders that appear wrongful from the soldier's restricted perspective but which are
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available for tactical decision making, moreover, is usually much
shorter than for an operational one. 165 Evidence also suggests that
soldiers tend not to be very good at accurately assessing benefits and
harms from their immediate actions. Low-ranking soldiers often get
caught up in and carried away by the momentum of events.1 66 This
frequently leads them to overvalue the military advantage likely to
result from their battlefield behavior-and hence also to undervalue
the moral significance of the civilian harm likely to ensue. 16 7 These
problems are much less acute at the operational level, where decision
makers enjoy a wider frame of reference, both temporally and
spatially.168

actually justified by larger operational circumstances."); Richard A. Wasserstrom,
Individual Responsibility in Warfare, in LAW AND RESPONSIBILITY IN WARFARE, 194,

195, 202 (Peter D. Trooboff & Arthur J. Goldberg eds., 1975) (arguing that the limited
perspective of soldiers on the battlefield makes it almost impossible for them to
determine whether an order is legal or not); see also Barak Medina, Political
Disobedience in the IDF, 36 ISR. L. REV. 73, 82 (2002) (Isr.) (making a similar argument
with regard to ad bellum issues).
Geoffrey S. Corn & Gary P. Corn, The Law of Operational Targeting:
165.
Viewing the LOAC Through an Operational Lens, 47 TEX. INT'L L.J. 337, 342 (2012)
(describing the decision-making process involved in selecting military targets and
stating that "[tlhis process can be extremely complex and time consuming at very high
levels of command, or very brief and ad hoc at low levels of command").
See Dave Grossman, Aggression and Violence, in THE OXFORD COMPANION
166.
TO AMERICAN MILITARY HISTORY

9, 9-10 (John Whiteclay Chambers

ed., 2000)

(describing the psychological effects of combat on field soldiers' decision-making
process); Dave Grossman & Barry Molloy, Why Can't Johnny Kill? The Psychology and
Physiology of Interpersonal Combat, in THE CUTTING EDGE: STUDIES IN ANCIENT AND
MEDIEVAL COMBAT 188, 193-201 (Barry Molloy ed., 2007) (same).
Mark S. Martins, Rules of Engagement for Land Forces: A Matter of
167.
Training,Not Lawyering, 142 MIL. L. REV. 1, 88 (1994). This military phenomenon is
not only the result of the stressful conditions of combat. At least to a certain degree, it
is an expression of a more general psychological process. Decision making that is made
by a person close to the event, especially when the event is temporal and small in scale,
often leads such a person to act not based on a "cold" assessment of all the costs and
benefits of the different alternatives for actions, including long-term effects. Instead,
individuals tend to act based on an incentive to prevent harm to a certain consideration
that they especially value, and they do so without assessing the relative probability of
the occurrence of the harm to this consideration in comparison to other harms. See
LARRY ALEXANDER & EMILY SHERWIN, THE RULE OF RULES: MORALITY, RULES, AND
THE DILEMMAS OF LAW 56, 155-56 (2001) (discussing errors of reasoning resulting from

the conflict between short- and long-term reasons for action); Emily Sherwin, RuleOriented Realism, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1578, 1593 (2005) (explaining the limits of human
reasoning and the distracting effects of salient and appealing facts); Tanya R. Ward,
Act-Consequentialism and Permitting Too Much, 3 PHIL. FRONTIERS 123, 126-30, 133
(2008) (arguing the moral demand to assess long-term effects of an action depends on
the extent in which we can reasonably expect the relevant agent to be able to assess
such effects with sufficient accuracy).
See DEP'T OF THE ARMY, supra note 89 (discussing differences between
168.
operational- and tactical-level decision making); see also Luban, supra note 6, at 6-7
n.10 (indicating that it makes more sense for an officer to be the decision maker
"because the officer in headquarters is in a calmer environment for reflection" and
because "[p]lacing the decision in the hands of a third party takes the structurally
built-in first personal reason out of the equation").
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At the same time, completely absolving low-ranking agents from
any duty to assess proportionality could lead to horrific results. 6 9
Under that legal arrangement, low-ranking soldiers would be duty
bound to obey any order no matter how clear and grave the
disproportionality of the harm expected from the action ordered.170
International law seeks to strike a balance between these competing
concerns and expresses recognition to capability differences between
those at various levels in a chain of command. Consistent with those
vagaries, the proportionality assessments required of lower ranking
soldiers, in practice, are much less comprehensive and precise than
those suited to the strategic and operational levels of warfare. To
date, however, doctrinal articulation of the distinct expectations
applicable to soldiers at each rung suffers from severe vagueness.
According to current international law, lower ranking soldiers are
only demanded to "be thoroughly aware, in carrying out [their] task,
of [their] basic obligation to spare the civilian population as much as
possible."1 71 Among the authors this Article surveys, Margalit and
Walzer best capture and defend this understanding of tactical-level,
in bello proportionality.
So imprecise a formulation of tactical-level proportionality
provides little effective guidance to even the most conscientious
soldier. Standing alone, the injunction to spare the civilian population
"as much as possible" could, for example, plausibly be interpreted as
authorizing soldiers to override decisions made at much higher
echelons, i.e., whenever they think fewer civilians might be harmed
by pursuing the designated mission in some other fashion. The law
must not be understood to authorize this.
Given the disorienting experience of tactical combat, low-ranking
soldiers inevitably make decisions that prove mistaken, and on many
matters besides how to apply the law of proportionality. National

169.
Some have argued that due to the limited capabilities of low-ranking
soldiers, the legal rule prohibiting disproportional attacks should be interpreted as
addressing only commanders of a sufficiently high rank. See HENCKAERTS & DOSWALDBECK, supra note 1, at 54 (describing the views of Switzerland, Austria, and the United
Kingdom); William J. Fenrick, The Rule of Proportionality and Protocol I in
Conventional Warfare, 98 MIL. L. REV. 91, 102, 109 (1982) (arguing that only those
with "sufficient information" and capabilities are obligated under Additional Protocol I
to make an in bello proportionality assessment). Yet, as discussed in the text, such a
position is likely to lead to horrific results.
170.
See JDCC, supra note 106, at 87 (stating that even though "[iun assessing
whether the proportionality rule has been violated, the effect of the whole attack must
be considered," it does not require "that an entirely gratuitous and unnecessary action
within the attack [should] be condoned").
171.
Frits Kalshoven & Liesbeth Zegveld, Constraints on the Waging of War: An
Introduction to International Humanitarian Law 109 (2001); see also JDCC, supra note
106, at 87 (viewing soldiers who commit actions that are only part of an "attack" as
criminally violating the proportionality norm only if their actions are "entirely
gratuitous and unnecessary").
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military law, rules of engagement, and "military doctrines"17 2 all seek
to cabin discretion and accord greater decision-making authority to
higher ranking personnel.' 7 3 Rules of engagement, for instance,
generally permit upper echelon soldiers to depart from their
particular strictures when circumstances reasonably seem to so
require; low-ranking soldiers may not.1 74 The need for differential
norms follows from concern both with fairness to soldiers, given their
limited knowledge or expertise, and with preventing decisional
blunders certain to result from imposing expectations inconsistent
with cognitive debilities.175

172.
A military doctrine consists of "[flundamental principles by which the
military forces guide their actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative but
requires judgment in application." NATO STANDARDIZATION AGENCY, NATO GLOSSARY
OF TERMS AND DEFINITIONS (ENGLISH AND FRENCH) 2-D-9 (2008).
173.
The levels-of-war doctrine, for example, explicitly demands affording a
soldier making operational decisions greater discretion than that afforded to a soldier
making tactical decisions. U.S. MARINE CORPS, supra note 90, at 8 ("The nature of
these tasks requires that the operational commander retain a certain amount of
latitude in the conception and execution of plans. . . . If higher authority overly
prescribes the concept of operations, then the commander becomes a mere executor of
tactical tasks . . . ."). See also, for example, the discussions in the sources cited
hereinafter in this footnote regarding the "Mission Orders Doctrine." This military
doctrine, which has been assimilated into the law and policies of many armed forces,
demands affording extensive discretion to the subordinate receiving a "mission order."
Yet, due to the harm that might be caused when discretion is delegated down the chain
of command, the use of mission orders is not common at the lower levels of the chain of
command; often, a division commander is the lowest level to commonly receive such
orders. David M. Cowan, Auftragstaktik: How Low Can You Go? 5-6, 17-20, 26-27,
32-37 (Dec. 1, 1986) (monograph, U.S. Army Command & General Staff College)
(discussing how low in the chain of command the use of mission orders may still be
beneficial to the military); see also Robert Egnell, Civil-Military Aspects of Effectiveness
in Peace Support Operations, in THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE WORLD OF WAR AND
PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS 122, 127 (K. Michael et al. eds., 2009) (discussing the
adoption of the Mission-Orders Doctrine in most armed forces). For the use of rules of
engagement in the context of low-ranking soldiers to displace most needs for immediate
soldierly assessment, including those of proportionality, with stricter clear-conduct
rules, see Kiron Reid & Clive Walker, Military Aid in Civil Emergencies: Lessons from
New Zealand, 27 ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 133, 163-65 (1998) (describing the purpose behind
the adoption of rules of engagement); Kurt Andrew Schlichter, Locked and Loaded:
Taking Aim at the Growing Use of the American Military in Civilian Law Enforcement
Operations, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1291, 1309-10, 1312 (1993) (same); Aziz Mohammed,
Military Culture, War Crimes, and the Defence of Superior Orders 80-81 (J.S.D. thesis,
Bond University) (explaining the adoption of specific rules of engagement).
174.
See, e.g., Corn & Corn, supra note 165, at 369 (discussing artillery-related
rules of engagement and stating that "almost all such [rule-of-engagement] controls
permit" upper echelon soldiers to act in ways otherwise prohibited by these rules of
engagement (but permitted according to IHL), when such actions have been
"authorized by a certain level of command").
175.
See id. at 354-57, 369 (noting that, ideally, rules of engagement allow the
implementation of the law of armed conflicts, while giving "operational and tactical
military leaders greater control over the execution of combat operations by subordinate
forces"); Kenneth Watkin, Warriors, Obedience and the Rule of Law, 3/4 ARMY
DOCTRINE & TRAINING BULL. 24, 27-29 (2000-2001) (discussing reasons for choosing
between bright-line rules and discretionary norms in the context of military rules of
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International law should not be interpreted as requiring
subordinates to override any superior's order on the basis of their own
judgment of in bello proportionality. The law is thus right to let
subordinates defer to their superior in most circumstances. 176 It
would be preposterous, in fact, to insist that low-ranking soldiers
make de novo proportionality assessments from each bullet to the
next, or to demand that they accurately assess the proportionally of
the attack as a whole. To be sure, the law rightly expects even the
lowliest subordinate to be able to identify and disobey orders that are
"manifestly illegal," which would in principle include an order to
inflict blatantly disproportionate civilian harm.1 77 But the law of
tactical proportionality can demand no more in efforts to safeguard
civilians than consistent with the measure of discretion that soldiers
of lower rank, in those circumstances, actually possess.
Even low-ranking soldiers generally have some discretion about
how to perform a given order, because virtually no order can possibly
specify every conceivable aspect of its possible implementation.1 7 8 At
the tactical level, ground troops have a natural inclination to
exaggerate the larger military advantage to be gained from saving
themselves (by minimizing their risks) at the expense of transferring
that risk onto the shoulders of others, notably the enemy's civilian
population. 79 This problem is exacerbated by the tendency for
grueling combat over a sustained period to sap soldiers' natural
human decency, making them indifferent to the civilian suffering
they unintentionally inflict.' 8 0 The tactical-level proportionality norm

engagement (that, among other things, implement IHL), as well as the difference in the
extent of discretion afforded to low-ranking and high-ranking soldiers).
176.
See Watkin, supra note 175, at 27-29 (stating that under IHL, "there is an
obligation to disobey manifestly unlawful orders"; yet, "[i]n assessing this issue it
should be noted that statements by senior officers regarding disobedience should be
viewed in the context of the greater degree of freedom that commanders often enjoy to
debate and influence the direction they are given" while "the lower the rank of soldier
the less likely that individual will enjoy moral choice to question orders"); see also R. v.
Finta, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 701, 777-78 (Can.) (noting that the defense of superior orders is
available under customary international law so long as the act is not manifestly
unlawful and stating that the subordinate's rank affects the question of culpability for
the crime committed under orders).
177.
Rome Statute, supra note 32, art. 33. The writers of this Article have made
in the past different attempts to further clarify the law regarding when illegal orders
should be disobeyed, while taking special notice to the issue of the rank of the
subordinate soldier, as well as the vagueness of the proportionality norm. OSIEL, supra
note 164, at 325, 346-47 n.19, 357-66; Ziv Bohrer, The Superior Orders Defense-A
Principal-AgentAnalysis, 41 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 4964) (on file with the author).
178.
Watkin, supra note 175, at 27-29 (discussing the fact that low-ranking
soldiers often have discretion, and that the discretion is usually narrower than that of
high-ranking soldiers).
179.
See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
180.
See Daniel Muiioz-Rojas & Jean-Jacques Fr6sard, The Roots of Behavior in
War: Understanding and Preventing IHL Violations, 86 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 189,
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therefore imposes (in addition to the duty to disobey manifestly
unlawful orders of the kind mentioned above) a hard-and-fast rule
aimed at counteracting these potent temptations. It instructs that
within the strict limits of the discretion you may possess, seek to
spare the civilian population as much as circumstances permit.' 81
This legal duty, however, as stated earlier, remains extremely
vague. That vagueness is what lets both Kasher and Yadlin, 182 as
well as Margalit and Walzer,1 83 suggest that their position provides
the proper interpretation of this duty, i.e., the duty to attempt to
spare the civilian population as much as possible. Margalit and
Walzer's stance in this regard is defensible. The admonition to
prioritize civilian life above all could certainly lead to situational
misjudgments that cause either mission failure or expose the soldier
to suicidal risks. 184 Yet, by allowing soldiers to take force protection
into account, when not doing so will lead to mission failure, Margalit
and Walzer's approach is, in fact, able to acknowledge that low-

197-99 (2004) (describing moral disengagement). To a certain degree, such a
countering message is needed at the strategic levels and the operational levels as well.
See Blum, supra note 33, at 55, 58 (noting that IHL "assign[s] different rights and
protections to different categories of individuals, in part to correct the biases that
fighting states have toward each other's nationals"); Plaw, supra note 5, at 18 (arguing
that because states have a strong interest in protecting soldiers, requiring careful
protection of the interests of foreign civilians is necessary to preserve an equilibrium).
However, the need is greater in the context of the soldiers on the field. See Luban,
supra note 6, at 6-7 n.10 (describing how combat stresses lead to strong "firstpersonal" reasons for self-preference, creating a need for third parties to correct this
structural problem through rules of engagement).
181.
For implied support for this interpretation of the law, see OFFICE OF THE
JUDGE ADVOCATE GEN., CODE OF CONDUCT FOR CF PERSONNEL 2-3 (2005) (Can.)

(limiting the soldier's permission to perform an independent proportionality
assessment by confining the assessment to the bounds of the discretion given to her by
her commanders who determine her personal orders, mission orders, and rules of
engagement); see also id. at 2-18 (discussing the duty of soldiers of all ranks to disobey
a manifestly unlawful order).
182.
This duty of international law has been enshrined in the IDF's ethical code,
which states: "[An IDF] soldier shall.. do all he can to avoid harming
[noncombatants' and prisoners of war's] lives, bodies, honor and property." THE SPIRIT
OF THE IDF, supra note 149. Kasher argued that his position is the proper
interpretation of this duty as it is set forth in the Spirit of the IDF. Kasher, supra note
20, at 68. For further discussion of this issue, see supra note 149.
183.
As discussed supra note 31, Margalit and Walzer do not explicitly refer to
international law. They do, however, claim that their position is based on a proper
interpretation of the moral duty to do as much as possible to protect civilians. Margalit
& Walzer, Israel, supra note 5, at 21; see also WALZER, supra note 38, at 155-57
(arguing that soldiers have a duty to go "as far as possible" to reduce the risk to
civilians, and stating that due to this duty, "[t]he limits of risk [soldiers must shoulder
in order to reduce civilian risk] are fixed, then, roughly at that point where any further
risk-taking would almost certainly doom the military venture or make it so costly that
it could not be repeated"); Plaw, supra note 5, at 6, 14-15, 17-18 (arguing that soldiers
have a duty to "assume some additional risk where possible to reduce harms to
noncombatants" and interpreting this duty as demanding from soldiers to act in a
manner similar to that supported by Margalit and Walzer).
184.
See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
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ranking soldiers can safeguard the enemy's civilian population only
within the scope of a discretion necessarily limited by their place at
the bottom rungs of a long chain of command. 8 5 Margalit and
Walzer's stance, properly understood, aids in clarifying the way in
which the duty set by the norm of tactical-level proportionality should
be interpreted. This duty (in cases in which the order given is not
manifestly unlawful) should be interpreted as requiring that soldiers
risk their lives as much as is needed in order to maximize protection
to civilians unless (1) their superiors' concern with either mission
goals or force protection (or both) demands otherwise, or (2) the risk
they need to take in order to further protect civilians is a suicidal
one. 186 In other words, their position transforms the flexible legal
standard for tactical-level proportionality into a bright-line rule
instructing low-ranking soldiers to maximize civilians' protection up
to the point of assuming suicidal risks or violating a superior's orders
(not manifestly illegal) and mission aims.
The defensibility of Margalit and Walzer's claim (that their
position is the correct interpretation of the duty to attempt to spare
civilians as much as possible) reveals the problems with the opposite
claim, posited by Kasher and Yadlin. In fact, the latter position
proves particularly ill suited to the tactical level, and especially in
armed conflicts against a nonstate actor-the very conflicts for which
Kasher and Yadlin think their position is most appropriate. 8 7
Proportionality at the tactical level, as just delineated, fits neatly
alongside the principle of distinction, which humanitarian law
equally embodies.' 8 8 The latter instructs soldiers to target only
combatants, not civilians.189 The former demands that when they fire
on combatants (and other military objectives), they must confine
incidental civilian harm insofar as circumstances (including their
limited discretion) reasonably permit.19 0 These legal duties, though
morally felicitous on their face and easy enough to formulate in
general terms, become extremely demanding, even insuperably
beyond reach, when it is virtually impossible to tell the enemy

185.
See supra notes 171, 181 and accompanying text.
186.
The fact that Margalit and Walzer's position is appropriate mainly at the
tactical level is in accordance with one of Walzer's main philosophical contributions to
the moral discourse regarding war-related proportionality. See Plaw, supra note 5, at
5-6 (explaining Walzer's philosophical contribution and its effect in extending the
applicability of the principle of proportionality-a principle traditionally considered
only applicable with regard to operational decisions-to tactical decisions).
187.
See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
188.
Kristen Dorman, Proportionality and Distinction in the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 12 AUSTL. INT'L L.J. 83, 84 (2005) ("[In
combat situations, the entire body of international humanitarian law can be reduced to
the obligation to observe the principle of distinction.").
189.
See supra notes 32, 95 and accompanying text.
190.
See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
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combatants apart from civilians. 191 The problem arises with a
vengeance when states must fight nonstate actors such as terrorist
groups.
In conflicts with nonstate actors, if soldiers wish to limit civilian
harm, they must incur great personal risk, because their adversary
makes no effort to separate its combatants from the surrounding
population. Nonstate belligerents often deliberately seek, for that
matter, to intersperse the two.192 The now-familiar practices of
"human shielding" and wearing no uniforms reflect this willful
refusal to respect the legal requirements of distinction. Both practices
aim to induce greater hesitation among soldiers about opening fire, by
creating situations in which they cannot be entirely confident that
they are successfully discriminating between combatants and others.
Some contend that only those involuntarily enlisted as shields should
count as civilians for proportionality purposes.19 3 Yet it is usually
impossible to distinguish those persons from voluntary participants.
This difficulty is especially acute in areas of high population density,
where there is simply no place to which civilians may safely flee if
they do not wish to function as shields for neighboring fighters. And
even if only those coerced into shielding service should matter for
legal purposes, they may well be numerous enough to render their
deaths disproportionate to the anticipated military gain, thereby
barring the targeting of enemy combatants in their midst in any way
other than fighting from house to house. Many have observed that
this intentional amalgamation of civilians and combatants increases
danger to the civilians among whom fighters conceal themselves.
Risks increase no less for soldiers whose state must then compel them
to fight from house to house.1 94

191.

E.g., Michael Newton, Unlawful Belligerency After September 11: History

Revisited and Law Revised, in NEW WARS, NEW LAWS? APPLYING LAWS OF WAR IN 21ST

CENTURY CONFLICTS 75, 82 (David Wippman & Matthew Evangelista eds., 2005)
(stating that September 11 "destroyed the naive notion that there is a bright legal line
that neatly divides a combat zone into innocent civilians (who of course are legally
protected from deliberate hostilities) and combatants who may lawfully be targeted
and killed").
See, e.g., Hilly Moodrick-Even Khen, Children as Direct Participants in
192.
Hostilities: New Challenges for International Humanitarian Law and International
Criminal Law, in NEW BATTLEFIELDS, OLD LAWS: CRITICAL DEBATES ON ASYMMETRIC

WARFARE 133, 136 (William C. Banks ed., 2011) (describing the intentional attempt of
terrorists to blur the distinction between civilians and combatants, which manifests in
the use of even children as human shields and active participants in conflict).
Matthew V. Ezzo & Amos N. Guiora, A Critical Decision Point on the
193.
Battlefield-Friend, Foe or Innocent Bystander, in SECURITY: A MULTIDISCIPLINARY
NORMATIVE APPROACH 91, 95-102 (Cecilia M. Bailliet ed., 2009).

See id. at 103, 108 (stating that the use of human shields by terrorists
194.
increases civilian casualties, as well as harms military efficiency when the military
attempts to reduce the amount of such civilian casualties); see also Int'l Comm. of the
Red Cross, 30th International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, Geneva,
Switz., Nov. 26-30, 2007, International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of
Contemporary Armed Conflicts, at 15, Doc. 30IC/07/8.4 (Oct. 2007) (indicating that as a
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Soldiers are understandably dissatisfied with, even incensed by,
the legal and factual uncertainties just described. They feel
victimized no less by the law itself than by the unscrupulous
adversaries who exploit its moral frailties in this regard. 9 5 It is an
understandable sympathy for their plight that prompts scholars like
Kasher and Yadlinl 96 to "clarify" the applicable law so as to
recalibrate its moral valence in ways more responsive to these
particularly vexing circumstances.197 The objective of these authors is
to find a defensible way for these soldiers to hold their unscrupulous
enemy entirely responsible for the increased risk to its civilians that
its methods create-risks that admittedly materialize only through
the gun barrels of those soldiers themselves. 9 8
The unwitting result, however, is effectively to eviscerate the
duties of both distinction and proportionality. For whenever it
becomes difficult and dangerous for soldiers to discriminate between
fighter and nonfighter, the choice to prioritize force protection can
only lead to many more civilian deaths. 9 9 Rather than counteracting
the temptation of ground troops to exaggerate their own military
value (and accordingly avert personal risk), Kasher and Yadlin's
approach ends up indulging these powerful tendencies.2 00 At the

result of "the increasingly blurred distinction between civilian and military functions,"
which is "aggravated wherever armed actors do not distinguish themselves from the
civilian population," "peaceful civilians are more likely to fall victim to erroneous,
unnecessary or arbitrary targeting, while members of the armed forces, unable to
properly identify their adversary, run an increased risk of being attacked by persons
they cannot distinguish from peaceful civilians").
195.
See Samy Cohen, Introduction: Dilemmas in the War Against Terrorism, in
DEMOCRACIES AT WAR AGAINST TERRORISM: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 1, 9 (Samy

Cohen ed., 2008) (describing the frustration with the legal situation and stating that
democracies must prevent their armed forces from acting based on this frustration);
Lisa Hultman, COIN and Civilian Collaterals: Patterns of Violence in Afghanistan
2004-2009, 23 SMALL WARS & INSURGENCIES 245, 258 (2012) (describing the
frustration with the factual situation); see also supra note 10 and accompanying text.
196.
See, e.g., Kasher, supra note 15, at 166 ("[T]he principle of distinction,
which is of great moral significance . . . , has to be reinterpreted in a way that respects
the human dignity of persons in military uniform in general, as well as combatants,
more than they have been respected .... ).
197.
See Noelle Qu6nivet, The "War on Terror"and the Principle of Distinction
in InternationalHumanitarianLaw, 3 (Especial) COLOM. Y.B. OF INT'L L. 155, 158-59
(2010) (describing the IHL principle of distinction as an example of an outdated
principle, in need of redefinition).
198.
See MARK J. OSIEL, THE END OF RECIPROCITY: TERROR, TORTURE, AND THE
LAW OF WAR 7-9, 23-25 (2009) (discussing this tendency); Smith, supra note 97, at
157-61 (discussing this issue in the context of the second war in Iraq); see also Hurka,
supra note 61, at 48 ("The question of whether others' wrongful choices can reduce our
responsibility for bad outcomes is vital for the analysis of just war proportionality, but
it is very difficult to answer decisively.").
199.
Cf. Hurka, supra note 61, at 49 ("One extreme view says another's wrong
choice always completely removes our responsibility for resulting evils, but this in
effect eliminates proportionality as an independent just war condition.").
200.
Confino and Kremnitzer state:
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tactical level, that approach to proportionality is therefore profoundly
perilous and must be rejected, especially in armed conflicts with
nonstate actors. It is misguided to let sympathy for soldiers' plight to
allow them to override their duties to assume risk when necessary to
protect weighty civilian interests.
Soldiers sometimes react to an enemy's refusal to separate its
fighters from its populace by responding in kind. This is a more
visceral, inarticulate response to their enemy's legal violations than
that of Kasher and Yadlin, but operates to much the same effect. 20 1
One incident became public through the WikiLeaks revelations. 202 In
Iraq, an American helicopter crew shot at civilians, mistaking a
civilian photographer for an irregular combatant. He appeared to be
holding a weapon, which proved to be only his camera. Two children
were seriously injured. The helicopter crew could not have seen the
children, for they were inside a car; the crewmembers shot at the car
because its driver was trying to rescue people whom the crew
mistakenly believed were combatants. After learning that they had
injured children, one crewmember responded (while still believing the
adult civilians were combatants): "[I]t's their fault for bringing kids in
to a battle." 203 That displacement of responsibility reflects the
indifference to civilian harm that easily develops among those
exposed to sustained combat. The crew's seeming indifference to

It is important also to ask what happens to the military system when it has
conveyed the message that there is an absolute priority to the lives of soldiers
over the lives of civilians. It seems that the natural tendency of the military
system is to minimize the harm to soldiers, even at the price of a
disproportional incidental harm to those not involved in the fighting. With this
taken into consideration there is a need to specifically try and stress to the
military the price paid by the other side, and not to supply it with moral
backing to its natural tendencies, a backing that may lead to an increased and
disastrous risk to civilians.
Confino & Kremnitzer, supra note 31 (Ziv Bohrer trans.).
201.
See SOLIS, supra note 134, at 276; Hultman, supra note 195, at 258
("Taking on higher losses may lead to ... compensat[ing] by more indiscriminate, or
less precise, attacks against the Taliban, which in turn causes higher levels of
collateral deaths. This might be a result of having a strong focus on force protection,
leading to frustration when failing to achieve this goal."); see also Rebecca J. Wolfe &
John M. Darley, Protracted Asymmetrical Conflict Erodes Standards for Avoiding
Civilian Casualties, 11 PEACE & CONFLICT: J. PEACE & PSYCHOL. 55, 56-57 (2005)
("Although the structure of these types of conflicts make it difficult to avoid collateral
casualties, there are also psychological processes that only exacerbate this problem.");
Richard R. Baxter, The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Wars of National Liberation,
57 RIVISTA DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE 193, 202 (1974) (noting that combatants passing
themselves off as civilians "can readily change the [other side's] presumption that a
person not in uniform is a peaceful non-participant to a presumption that such an
individual is or may be a combatant").
202.
Chris McGreal, Wikileaks Reveals Video Showing US Air Crew Shooting
Down Iraqi Civilians, GUARDIAN (Apr. 5, 2010, 3:52 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/
world/20I0/apr/05/wikileaks-us-army-iraq-attack (U.K.).
203.
Id.
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distinguishing combatants from civilians is reflected as well in its
decision to fire at all, for the images on its video screen were
decidedly ambiguous (as one may see from the video disclosed by
WikiLeaks). The actions of the perceived combatants did not
constitute any immediate danger to friendly forces, since no ground
forces were nearby. Therefore, were the soldiers not indifferent to
distinguishing combatants from civilians, they would have waited, in
light of the images' ambiguity, for further confirmation before
deciding to open fire.
Similar incidents arose during Israel's Cast Lead operation,
according to news reports. A few commanders apparently instructed
their soldiers to spend little time ascertaining whether those
encountered on the battlefield constituted combatants. Unless their
noncombatant status was immediately clear, soldiers were to open
fire. These instructions were admittedly somewhat vague in key
respects, as is frequently the case when subordinates claim that the
atrocities they committed were conducted pursuant to superior
orders. The orders stated:
Instead of using intelligence to identify a terrorist ... here you do the
opposite: first you take him down, then you look into it. . . . This doesn't
mean that you need to disrespect the lives of Palestinians but our first
priority is the lives of our soldiers. That's not something you're going to
204
compromise on.

Some claim that commanders issuing those orders drew direct
inspiration from Kasher and Yadlin's proffered code of military
ethics. 2 05 These incidents at least suggest what might ensue if that

204.
Anshel Pfeffer, IDF Officer: Gaza Civilians Risked To Protect Israel Troops
During War, HAARETZ (Feb. 3, 2010, 9:24 AM), http://www.haaretz.com/news/idfofficer-gaza-civilians-risked-to-protect-israel-troops-during-war-1.262686 (Isr.) (quoting
two soldiers).
205.
See supra note 5 and accompanying text. Subsequent to Operation Cast
Lead, due to strong international pressure, Israel has conducted extensive
administrative and criminal investigations into the actions of its soldiers. Among other
actions taken by Israel, forty-seven criminal investigations have been opened, and
several of them have resulted in trials. STATE OF ISR., GAZA OPERATION
INVESTIGATIONS: SECOND UPDATE 3 (2010). Based on this inquiry, Israel denied that
disproportional attacks occurred during this campaign due to a complete preference of
soldiers' lives over the lives of Palestinians. See STATE OF ISR., supra note 148, at 1-4,
32, 46 (discussing Israel's response and finding that the casualties were not caused by
a disrespect for civilians' lives). Furthermore, to the best of our knowledge, no evidence
was found of an explicit adoption of Kasher and Yadlin's position. Yet, some news
reports do seem to indicate that at least a few units have acted improperly during the
operation by adopting a position similar to that advanced by Kasher and Yadlin. Where
sufficient evidence of such abusive conduct can be found, Israel must prosecute or
otherwise discipline those responsible for it. Yet, one should acknowledge that this may
not be a simple task. First of all, it is generally difficult to collect evidence of war
crimes sufficient for criminal conviction. See generally Patricia M. Wald, To "Establish
Incredible Events by Credible Evidence" The Use of Affidavit Testimony in Yugoslavia
War Crimes Tribunal Proceedings, 42 HARV. INT'L L.J. 535 (2001) (illustrating this
difficulty). This difficulty is, many times, especially severe in the context of the crime of

PROPORTIONALITY IN MILITARY FORCE AT WAR'S MULTIPLE LEVELS

20131

799

approach to proportionality and discrimination were to govern
tactical decision making. Rather than countervailing soldiers'
impulses to become indifferent to civilian lives, Kasher and Yadlin's
position supplies that indifference with a convenient rationalization.
In sum, though Margalit and Walzer's position fares worse at
war's operational level than Luban's, it makes considerable sense at
the tactical level. Kasher and Yadlin's position, however, clearly
violates the law of proportionality when applied to war's operational
level, and its tactical application could lead to extremely dangerous
results.

D. Jus ad Bellum Proportionalityand Force Protectionas
a Strategic Concern
Strategy involves formulating general national security policies
at the highest levels, both military and civilian, 206 including the
decision to take up arms against a military adversary. These
decisions, which establish the state's overall goals in the armed
conflict it is about to enter, 207 are constrained by the international
law of ad bellum. 208 That body of law prohibits recourse to force

disproportionate attack. See Blank, supra note 77, at 373 (stating that "[m]erely adding
up the resulting civilian casualties and injuries and assessing the actual value gained
from a military operation" "does not do justice to the complexities inherent in combat");
Joseph Holland, Military Objective and Collateral Damage: Their Relationship and
Dynamics, 7 Y.B. INT'L HUMANITARIAN L. 35, 47 (2004) (discussing difficulties in
proportionality analysis). Second, that is also because the proportionality-related
norms dealing with the attribution of individual criminal liability are more demanding
than the norms that deal with the actions of states. Compare Additional Protocol I,
supra note 32, arts. 51(5)(b), 57(2) (defining an indiscriminate attack as one "expected
to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or
a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct
military advantage anticipated" and requiring precautionary measures for attacks),
with Rome Statute, supra note 32, art. 8(2)(a)(iv), (b)(iv) (stating that war crimes
include "[e]xtensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military
necessity and carried out unlawfully or wantonly" and that other serious violations of
the laws of armed conflict include "[iJntentionally launching an attack [knowing it] will
cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects or
widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment which would be
clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage
anticipated"). Lastly, one should acknowledge that there is some legal uncertainty with
regard to the issue of proportionality and force protection, and this can affect the
ability to convict. See Albin Eser, Mental Elements-Mistake of Fact and Mistake of
Law, in

1

THE ROME

STATUTE OF

THE

INTERNATIONAL

CRIMINAL

COURT: A

COMMENTARY 889, 924-25 (A. Cassese et al. eds., 2002) (discussing the mistake-of-law
defense that should be afforded in international criminal law when the relevant norm
is unclear).
See DEP'T OF THE ARMY, supra note 88, at 2-2 to -3 (discussing military and
206.
civilian coordination and goals with regard to strategy-related decision making).
207.
Id.
208.
See, e.g., JDCC, supra note 106, at 26 (stating that the legal basis on which
force is exercised in a specific armed conflict, which is determined by the overall legally
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except in self-defense against armed attack. 209 Ad bellum
proportionality also limits the scale of violence to that needed for
overcoming the threat posed by the attack. 210 This correspondence
between the scale of the counterattack and the threat posed by the
enemy attack is essential; states might otherwise use even a smallscale attack as an excuse to pursue aims unconnected with meeting
that attack, in which case jus ad bellum would fail to constrain the
escalation of violence. 211 How might force protection come into play,
at this level of decision making, in assessing proportionality?
The process involved is quite different from determining in bello
proportionality. The threat to be resisted by the victim state may be
defined in terms of dangers posed to both its soldiers and civilian
population.2 1 2 An attack against a state's soldiers might be
considered (sometimes) even more "serious" than against its civilians,
in that the violence challenges the victim state's very sovereignty
over its national territory, the first principle of public international
law; it is soldiers who are charged with protecting that sovereignty. 213

permitted objective of that armed conflict, "may impose ... constraints on the level of
force used").
209.
See U.N. Charter art. 2, paras. 3-4, art. 51 (requiring a peaceful resolution
of conflict unless in self-defense against an attack).
210.
See Paul Ducheine & Eric Pouw, Operation Change of Direction: A Short
Survey of the Legal Basis and the Applicable Legal Regimes, NETH. ANN. REV. MIL.
STUD. 51, 57 (2009); David Kretzmer, The Inherent Right to Self-Defence and
Proportionality in Jus ad Bellum, 24 EURO. J. INT'L L. 235, 239 (2013) (surveying the
different positions on the matter and reaching the conclusion that the majority opinion
is "that proportionality must be judged against the legitimate ends of using force or in
relation to the threat" (footnotes omitted)). Paul Ducheine and Eric Pouw propose:
[Ad bellum p]roportionality. . . is related to (1) the parity between the attack
and the defence measured in terms of the total scale and effects of both, and (2)
the purpose of the attack(er) and the defence. The parity between form and
scale of the attack and the defence can be assessed through a combination of
[these two kinds of] aspects.
Ducheine & Pouw, supra.
211.
See Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 1.C.J. 4, 35 (Apr. 9) ("The Court
can only regard the alleged right of intervention as the manifestation of a policy of
force, such as has, in the past, given rise to most serious abuses and such as cannot,
whatever be the present defects in international organization, find a place in
international law."); Kretzmer, supra note 210, at 264 (discussing the concern that
"[s]tates may use a fairly low level attack as an excuse to pursue aims that are
unconnected with that attack").
212.

See YoRAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 217 (5th ed.

2011) ("Unlike the jus in bello, the jus ad bellum does not recognize a difference
between attacks against lawful targets (combatants or military objectives) and
unlawful targets (civilians or civilian objects).").
213.

See NATALINO RONZITTI, RESCUING NATIONALS ABROAD THROUGH MILITARY

COERCION AND INTERVENTION ON GROUNDS OF HUMANITY 11 (1985) (stating that,
unlike in the case of an attack against a state's civilians abroad, there is no legal
dispute that an attack against a state's armed forces, even when committed abroad, is
according to jus ad bellum, an armed attack against the state because the armed forces
of a state are a symbol of its sovereignty).
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The law further accords state leaders considerable discretion to
assess the severity of the threat to which they are responding. This
discretion extends much further, many contend, than the law of in
bello proportionality affords military commanders when determining
the "anticipated military advantage" of their contemplated actions. 2 14
Significantly, the law of ad bellum proportionality does not
invite, much less require, state leaders to assess the civilian
casualties anticipated on the other side of their imminent conflict. 215
Because they insist on this calculation, both Luban's and Margalit
and Walzer's approaches offer an interpretation of proportionality
that is simply incorrect at this decisional echelon.2 16 Their analyses
demonstrate a common tendency to confuse ad bellum with in bello
proportionality; only the latter involves the estimation of foreign
civilian casualties. 2 17
In the formulation of high strategy especially, war is filled with
too many imponderables for the law governing it to require any
calculation of foreign-civilian casualties, on pain of liability for
getting the numbers wrong. Of necessity, any ex ante assessment of
far-ranging consequences would be highly speculative and almost
certainly inaccurate, beyond even the broadest parameters. 218 When
entering armed conflict, states and their leaders cannot foresee with
much precision how many civilians will be injured on the other side

214.
See, e.g., Judith Gail Gardam, Proportionalityand Force in International
Law, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 391, 412 (1993) (stating that assessment of ad bellum
proportionality "is a more demanding task than" the determination of in bello
proportionality, since the former "involve[s] much broader considerations" and
"consequently, opinions will legitimately differ").
215.
See Laurie R. Blank, A New Twist on an Old Story: Lawfare and the Mixing
of Proportionalities,43 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 707, 712 (2011) ("[J]us ad bellum
proportionality is unconcerned with the extent of civilian casualties, unlike jus in bello
proportionality, in which civilian casualties play a central role."); Michael N. Schmitt,
"Change Direction"2006: Israeli Operations in Lebanon and the International Law of
Self-Defense, 29 MICH. J. INT'L L. 127, 153-54 (2008) (stating that a "common
misapplication of the proportionality principle confuses the jus ad bellum criterion of
proportionality .. . with the jus in bello principle by the same name," while the fact of
the matter is that the latter is the one that regulates the issue of civilian collateral
damage and "considers the consequences of individual or related operations, not the
scope of a response to an armed attack").
216.
The mistaken claim made by these scholars is relatively common in legal
discourse. See, e.g., Gardam, supra note 214, at 404-05 (making such a claim).
217.
See Blank, supra note 215, at 712 (noting the irrelevance of civilian
casualties to jus ad bellum proportionality claims); Diamond, supra note 31, at 428
(describing several improper consequences of conflating jus ad bellum and jus in bello).
218.
See Hilly Moodrick- Even Khen, Having It Both Ways: The Question of Legal
Regimes in Gaza and the West Bank, 16 ISR. STUD. 55, 62 (2011) (describing the
consideration of competing interests for ad bellum proportionality as often difficult and
abstract, and noting that international law is of little aid in determining the scope of a
military action for which the proportionality calculation must be done); Kretzmer,
supra note 210, at 267 ("The point in time at which evaluation of proportionality is
supposed to be made by the state using force is far more complicated in jus ad bellum
than it is in jus in bello.").
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because the answer strongly depends on what enemy forces will do. 219
War has an interactive, reciprocal dimension, with each side often
escalating in response to the other's preceding escalation, until one of
them capitulates. 220 Leaders almost invariably underestimate the
duration of the conflict and the extent of ensuing casualties; this
reflects what cognitive psychologists call "optimism bias." 22 1
To be sure, international law does require that, before taking up
arms, states must assess whether their initial operational
engagement with the enemy will likely yield a concrete and direct
military advantage "not excessive" in relation to likely civilian harm
in that particular engagement. 222 This is in bello proportionality,
pure and simple, as now applied to operations that simply happen to
be the first 223 in a likely series of engagements with the enemy, which
jointly compose an armed conflict. Leaders must consider the matter
of in bello proportionality at the very beginning of armed conflict no
less than thereafter, in their first "move" just as in later ones. This
may sometimes, due to the expected harm to civilians, prohibit
methods of warfare permitted by ad bellum proportionality.
There remains the question, as Luban poses it, of whether "the
political need for force protection ... [may be] an independent
strategic goal of military operations." 224 In many armed conflicts, for
many countries, continuing the fight requires a measure of social

219.
See Daniel Byman & Matthew Waxman, Kosovo and the Great Air Power
Debate, 24 INT'L SECURITY, Spring 2000, at 9-10 (explaining that coercion is a
"dynamic, two-player (or more) contest" to "induce an adversary to behave differently
than it otherwise would"). See generally OSIEL, supra note 198, at 30-48 (discussing
different legal conceptions of reciprocity as a means of influencing an adversary's
behavior).
220.
See DAVID RODIN, WAR AND SELF-DEFENSE 115 (2002) (stating that once an
armed conflict begins, "the scale of force is intrinsically open-ended on both sides and
subject to escalation"); Kretzmer, supra note 210, at 267 ("Unless the armed attack is
limited and localized the situation is likely to be dynamic and could deteriorate rapidly
into a wider armed conflict.").
JOHN GEORGE STOESSINGER, WHY NATIONS GO TO WAR 403-04 (11th ed.
221.
2011); Daniel Kahneman & Jonathan Renshon, Why Hawks Win, 158 FOREIGN POL'Y
34, 37 (2007) (discussing the optimism bias and stating that "optimism is the order of
the day when it comes to assessing one's own chances in armed conflict" to the extent
that "almost every decision maker involved in what would become the most destructive
war in history up to that point predicted not only victory for his side, but a relatively
quick and easy victory").
222.
Many argue that jus ad bellum proportionality assessments continue
throughout the armed conflict. E.g., Gardam, supra note 214, at 404. In such a case,
the benefits of the dual (ad bellum and in bello) proportionality assessment continue
throughout the conflict.
223.
See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion,
1996 I.C.J. 226, [ 42 (July 8) (stating that "a use of force that is proportionate under
the law of self-defence, must, in order to be lawful, also meet the requirements of the
law applicable in armed conflict which comprise in particular the principles and rules
of humanitarian law"); see also Gardam, supra note 216, at 392-94 (discussing the
relation between in bello and ad bellum proportionality).
224.
Luban, supra note 6, at 40-41 (emphasis added); see also supra Part I.C.3.
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solidarity. 225 Force protection therefore becomes a major political
consideration for national leaders, especially when support for the
war effort is precarious. This is often due to intense public concern
with the number of military casualties sustained.22 6 Leaders of
democratic countries must remain especially attentive to public
opinion, which highly values the rights of soldier-citizens. Civil
society in those states is hence highly sensitive to the pain and
psychological stress caused by soldiers' deaths. 2 27 Accordingly,
continued public support for the war effort requires continued
confidence in national leadership, which can be sapped by high
soldier casualties sustained over a long period.2 28 This is especially so
when the immediate survival of the state and society are not
obviously at stake. 22 9 This demoralization of civil society is commonly
known as the "body bag effect."230 It gives rise to what Luban calls
"the political need for force protection."2 3'
The effect of military casualties on the national will to fight is
irrelevant to in bello proportionality, as Luban correctly asserts. To
that end, force protection can play no role in the legal assessment of
alternative operational plans or tactical maneuvers. 232 It is simply
impossible in these forms of decision making to anticipate the impact

225.
See JOHN M. COLLINS, MILITARY STRATEGY 13 (2002) (describing the
necessity of rooting national security interests in reality that will get public support).
226.
John A. Gentry, How Wars Are Won and Lost: Vulnerability and Military
Power 8-9 (2011).
227.
See NED DOBOS, INSURRECTION AND INTERVENTION: THE Two FACES OF
SOVEREIGNTY 52 (2012) (discussing the connection between the rise of a right-oriented
society and the increase in military casualty aversion).
228.
See Michael Horowitz & Dan Reiter, When Does Aerial Bombing Work?
Quantitative Empirical Tests: 1917-1999, 45 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 147, 150, 154 (2001)
(stating that "[t]he world continues to democratize, and democratic states are
especially sensitive to casualties," adding that "[tihe decreasing casualty tolerance
threshold in America and the West makes it crucial to formulate and execute military
strategies that involve the lowest possible risk to allied troops," and further describing
the role of public pressure on different types of regimes in bringing about policy
change); see also Leonard Wong, MaintainingPublic Support for Military Operations,
in DEFEATING TERRORISM: STRATEGIC ISSUE ANALYSES 65, 67-68 (John R. Martin ed.,
2002) (discussing the American society).
229.
See, e.g., JEFFREY RECORD, HOLLOW VICTORY: A CONTRARY VIEW OF THE
GULF WAR 137 (1993) (describing the negative public perception of the Vietnam and
Korean wars as, at least partially, related to the absence of a clear connection between
casualties and a just cause).
230.
Neil MacFarlane, Politics and Humanitarian Action 75 (The Thomas J.
Watson Jr. Inst. for Int'l Studies & U.N. University, Occasional Paper No. 41, 2000)
(defining the "body bag effect").
231.
Luban, supra note 6, at 39, 41.
232.
Id. at 40-41, 44. For an improper position that does allow the political need
for force protection to be factored into the in bello proportionality assessments, see W.
Michael Reisman, The Lessons of Qana, 22 YALE J. INT'L L. 381, 395-97 (1997).
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of any given number of casualties on national fortitude. 233 The
anticipated military advantage from maintaining collective cohesion
through force protection efforts at these levels is not concrete and
direct enough to count for purposes of in bello proportionality. 2 34 Yet,
can the political need for force protection be taken into account at the
strategic level, when making an ad bellum proportionality
assessment?
Luban fails to consider how these national morale concerns affect
the ad bellum proportionality of a state's action. Consider, in that
regard, the following situation, similar to the one he himself
presents. 235 It is one that, though "hypothetical," readily arises in real
armed conflicts. The enemy attacks and seizes territory from a
neighboring state. The victim state forcibly responds. It chooses to do
so by aerial campaign rather than ground attack, because this will
minimize casualties among its forces, thereby preserving greater
social solidarity in support of its decision to respond to the enemy's
attack with force of its own.2 36 This choice is suboptimal in a strictly
operational sense, for it is less likely to induce the enemy to withdraw
from the territory seized. Due to this suboptimal nature, the air
campaign will need to involve much greater violence against the
enemy-its military installations and armed forces-than would a
land campaign, to attain the same strategic aims. 237

233.
See Pierangelo Isernia, Conclusions: What Have We Learned and Where Do
We Go from Here, in PUBLIC OPINION AND THE INTERNATIONAL USE OF FORCE 253, 26263 (Philip Everts & Pierangelo Isernia eds., 2001).
234.
See Luban, supra note 6, at 40-41, 44 ("[T]he legal test for proportionality
weighs civilian damage against 'concrete and direct military advantage,' not the
indirect and intangible military advantage grounded in civilian morale."); Ziegler &
Otzari, supra note 37, at 67-68 (arguing that "it would be normatively unacceptable to
give weight" to issues of prevention of "the potentially detrimental effects of soldiers'
deaths on public opinion" and on military morale, when assessing military advantages
as part of an in bello proportionality assessment, among other reasons because it would
"increase uncertainty by adding ... imprecise parameter[s] to the equation").
235.
See Luban, supra note 6, at 39-41. The main difference between the
example discussed herein and the scenario discussed by Luban is that Luban chose not
to focus his analysis specifically on a case in which the enemy seizes a territory of the
victim state.
236.
See id. Luban discusses actual historical examples in which the form of the
armed conflict was chosen due to such a motivation. He further argues there that the
legal test for proportionality should ignore "the indirect and intangible military
advantage grounded in civilian morale." Id. However, as discussed in the text, he
reaches this conclusion based on the wrong proportionality test.
237.
See the examples discussed in John S. Brown, Historically Speaking: The
Not So New 'New Way of War,' 62 ARMY, Jan. 2012, at 69-70 (discussing historical
examples where an aerial campaign was chosen, due to a political force protection
concern, even though a ground campaign (or a combined air and ground campaign)
would have been much more effective in attaining the relevant strategic aim); Richard
A. Lacquement, Jr., The Casualty-Aversion Myth, 57 NAVAL WAR C. REV., Winter 2004,
at 43-49 (discussing American casualty avoidance and how it affected the use of air
strikes in recent history); Martin van Creveld, The Rise and Fall of Air Power, 156
RUSI J., July 2011, at 53-54 (describing limitations of air power and giving examples
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In assessing the measure of violence needed in order to defend
itself against the attack it has suffered, the victim state must address
the legal question of ad bellum proportionality: whether its response
will be compatible with the exclusive strategic aim of countering the
threat that attack represents.23 8 In the case at hand, the enemy will
have to suffer more as a result of the state's choice of a strategy that
will put the state's forces at lesser risk with a view to sustaining
political support for a resort to force in the first instance. As such, the
state's choice of a counterattack violates ad bellum proportionality
because it was possible for the victim state to regain its captured
territory through less violent means, inflicting a lesser measure of
harm upon its adversary. Moreover, the decision to do otherwise was
influenced by considerations immaterial to requirements of selfdefense against the threat proximately posed to its national security
by the particulars of the attack it had suffered (i.e., the need to induce
the enemy to withdraw from the territory seized).2 39
In rejecting the political rationale of force protection as a legal
consideration, Luban reaches the right conclusion, but for the wrong
reason and at the wrong level of warfare: he is applying the in bello
rule, when the ad bellum standard is truly at issue. Due to this flaw
in his reasoning, Luban fails to recognize the legitimate ways in
which this force protection aim may influence ad bellum
proportionality assessments made at the strategic level.
First, when an air campaign will not be greater in scale than a
land operation-even if the former might result in more civilian harm
than the latter-then it is perfectly lawful, according to the norm of
ad bellum proportionality, to select the former on the grounds that it
will better safeguard the state's forces and thereby reduce the

where it was chosen, despite it being less effective than ground forces, due to
considerations of force protection). See also Michael Bothe, Targeting, 78 INT'L L. STUD.
173, 179-80 (2002); Gardam, supra note 214, at 404 (discussing casualty avoidance
motives for aerial bombardment during the First Gulf War and noting the limits to this
justification under proportionality analysis). Bothe discusses NATO's choice, in its
Kosovo campaign, to "restrict military action to an air campaign." Bothe, supra, at 179.
This choice forced NATO to attempt to attain the strategic aim of the operation (i.e.,
stopping the Serbian attacks against the Kosovars) by way of bombing Serbia from the
air, in the hope that that will terrorize the Serbian public and lead it to pressure
Serbian leaders to accept NATO's demands. Such a course of action, Bothe argues,
violates in bello law, because "softening the adversary's will to resist" and harming the
"the morale of the entire population and, thus [the] political and military decisionmakers" is a not a "military advantage," but a political one. Bothe, supra.Yet, the point
that is of importance to our current discussion is that there would not have been a need
to attempt to attain the strategic goal of the campaign in such a problematic manner
had the option of a ground campaign, to drive the Serbian forces out of Kosovo, been
chosen by NATO.
238.
See sources cited supra note 210.
239.
See JDCC, supra note 106, at 26 (stating that according to jus ad bellum
proportionality, a state's "defined and limited [legal] goals" in a conflict impose
constraints on the scale and form of that state's use of force); see also infra note 266
and accompanying text.
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likelihood for a body-bag effect (as long as each operation within this
aerial campaign will not violate the demands of in bello
proportionality). 240
Second, political concern with force protection may legitimately
influence how the victim state assesses ad bellum proportionality in a
common situation Luban does not consider. The victim state may
confront enemies who do not seek to confine the measure of force they
employ to what would be needed in order to achieve the strictly
military goal of disabling its armed forces. Its enemies may seek,
through maximizing soldier casualties, to demoralize its civil society
with a view to inducing its surrender, capitalizing to this end on the
society's intense aversion to sustaining them. 241 This strategy is most
commonly employed by nonstate belligerents fighting democratic
states. 242 Nonstate belligerents adopt this strategy not only due to
the strong sensitivity of democratic states to military casualties;
many nonstate belligerents also lack the resources for any large-scale,
comprehensive campaign that can disable the military of their enemy
state. They therefore often employ recurrent, smaller scale attacks,
leading to the gradual accumulation of high casualties on the state's
side. 243 Certain nonstate belligerents also uphold ideologies viewing
the annihilation of their enemy as their chief strategic aim. At this
point, force protection is no longer merely a political consideration,
but becomes a legal one as well, because demoralization of the

240.
Cf. Gardam, supra note 214, at 404-05 (stating that the issue of force
protection can be taken into account in a limited way when making a jus ad bellum
proportionality assessment, yet mistakenly assuming that civilian harm is a
consideration that is part of the jus ad bellum proportionality assessment). See
generally THE ECONOMIST, MODERN WARFARE, INTELLIGENCE AND DETERRENCE: THE
TECHNOLOGIES THAT ARE TRANSFORMING THEM 93, 154 (Benjamin Sutherland ed.,
2011) (discussing the precision of new air power-related technologies).
241.
See KRISTA E. WIEGAND, BOMBS AND BALLOTS: GOVERNANCE BY ISLAMIST
TERRORIST AND GUERRILLA GROUPS 42, 108 (2010) (showing that nonstate belligerents
adopt strategies, such as intentionally targeting citizens of their enemy state, or
causing extensive or illegal harm to the soldiers of that state, in order to undermine
public support in that state's leadership, and thus pressure that leadership to accept
their demands); Daniel Byman & Matthew Waxman, Defeating US Coercion, 41
SURVIVAL, Summer 1999, at 114-16 (discussing the American aversion to sustaining
large casualties, and the ways in which this aversion has been taken advantage of by
enemies of the United States in recent history).
242.
Byman & Waxman, supra note 241 (discussing the employment of this
strategy even by some states); Mark T. Damiano, Employing Aerial Coercion To
Combat Terrorism: Recommendations for the Theater CINC 11-12 (Feb. 4, 2002)
(research paper, Naval War College), available at http://www.au.af.millaulawc/
awcgate/navy/nwcdamiano.pdf (discussing the adoption of this strategy by terrorist
groups).
243.
See CHRISTOPHER C. HARMON, TERRORISM TODAY 55 (2d ed. 2007) ("[B]oth
terrorist[s] and guerrilla[s] ... work to refine the strategy of exhaustion, by which
stealth, intelligence, and swiftness make them ineradicable and a continuous drain on
the strengths of the government."); see also Damiano, supra note 242 (explaining that
terrorists can try to increase casualties beyond acceptable levels to defeat U.S.
coercion).
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opposing society through maximal harm to its soldiers has become a
central, independent strategic aspiration of the enemy. Therefore, it
becomes a main strategic threat directly posed by that enemy's
attacks. 244
Under those circumstances, the victim state faces a security
threat surpassing any effort merely to disable its soldiers on the
battlefield. The law of ad bellum proportionality is clear that the
scope of the relevant threat determines the measure of force that will
count as lawful in resisting it. 24 5 When the victim state must take
account of force protection in order to resist an enemy strategy
directed against civic solidarity, force protection becomes legally
relevant in assessing the ad bellum proportionality of its rejoinder. 246
Luban's analysis fails to recognize that certain enemies hold those
ambitious strategic aims and how those aims affect the
proportionality of the state's strategic response. If an air campaign
would more effectively protect its forces in that type of conflict, the
victim state may lawfully prefer this course of action to a ground
campaign, even if it will necessitate the use of greater firepower.
Though this Article's reasoning in this respect differs from that
of Kasher and Yadlin, it reaches similar conclusions. First, force
protection may strongly affect (ad bellum) proportionality
determinations when fighting a terrorist organization. Second,
soldiers' lives can be accorded greater consideration than the lives of
of
understanding
and Yadlin's
civilians. Kasher
foreign
proportionality is thus suitable to strategic decision making, as it is
consonant with existing ad bellum law. There, force protection plays a
legitimate role-sometimes weighty-in whether a state may counter
an armed attack with force and in determining the acceptable scale,
and sometimes also the form, of that response. To this end, even the
demoralizing political effect of mounting military casualties may
legitimately influence those grave decisions. The permissible extent of

244.
See Assaf Moghadam, The Globalization of Martyrdom: Al Qaeda, Salafi
Jihad, and the Diffusion of Suicide Attacks 69-76 (2011) (discussing al-Qaeda's
strategic aims).
See supra text accompanying note 210.
245.
See Byman & Waxman, supra note 219, at 62 (discussing the reciprocal
246.
nature of coercive threats during an armed conflict, as well as their dynamic nature);
Gerhart Husserl, Interpersonaland InternationalReality: Some Facts To Remember for
the Remaking of InternationalLaw, 52 ETHICS 127, 127-28 (1942) (stating that "[e]ver
since nations have waged war against each other, the importance of weakening the
enemy's morale has been realized," and further stating that "undermin[ing] and
break[ing] the national spirit of the enemy" and "actual combat" are "two equally
important avenues to the desired goal of victory"); cf. Robert F. Teplitz, Taking
Assassination Attempts Seriously: Did the United States Violate International Law in
Forcefully Responding to the Iraq Plot To Kill George Bush?, 28 CORNELL INT'L L.J.
569, 609 (1995) (explaining why an assassination of a head of state constitutes an
imminent threat to the state's security).
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that influence will vary with the nature and purpose of the armed
attack the victim state has endured.

IV. AIR

POWER AND THE FORCE PROTECTION POLICIES
OF WESTERN STATES

It is true that the dispute this Article examines arose in response
to accusations that Israel had implicitly adopted Kasher and Yadlin's
code of military ethics during its Operation Cast Lead. Yet the
underlying questions are faced by modern military forces more
generally. 24 7 Israel is not unique in confronting enhanced public
concern with soldier casualties as a constraint on military decision
making. 248 This Part examines the effect casualty aversion has on the
actions of Western states at all three levels of war, using the common
resort to aerial power to demonstrate this effect. This examination
aids in further demonstrating and clarifying the differences between
the proportionality analyses that need to be made at each of the
levels of war.
Western societies today experience acute public fatigue with the
horrors of war, of which they have seen much over the last hundred
years. 249 Explaining their increased aversion to further casualties
among their soldier-citizens also requires acknowledgment of the rise
of strong individualism, the spread of "rights consciousness," and the
decline of public trust in political leadership. 250 Until very recently,
the United States had been considered a society more sensitive to the
issue of force protection than even other democracies, mainly on
account of its traumatic experience in Vietnam. 251 For many years

247.
See DOBOS, supra note 227, at 51 (discussing the growing reluctance of the
Western public to make sacrifices leading to commitment shortfall and casualty
aversion); ROBERT MANDEL, SECURITY, STRATEGY, AND THE QUEST FOR BLOODLESS WAR

27-29 (2004) (arguing that the bloody record of the twentieth century has led to a
gradual change in public attitude toward casualties in war (including military
casualties), which led policymakers to seek ways to reduce such casualties and resulted
in a change in military strategies).
248.
See supra note 6 (citing all three groups of scholars discussed in the current
Article as holding the view that this debate has universal significance and
applicability).
249.
See MANDEL, supra note 247 (describing how twentieth century wars
generated significant casualty aversion).
250.
See DOBOS, supra note 227, at 52 (describing the effects of changing
attitudes toward life and war on the public will to risk soldiers' lives). With regard to
the issue of public trust, see RAGNAR LOFSTEDT, RISK MANAGEMENT IN POST-TRUST

SOCIETIES 4 (2005) (discussing the phenomenon of declining public trust in Western
societies); 1V1ANDEL, supra note 247, at 30 (discussing how declining public trust has
affected military casualty aversion in the United States).
251.
See DOBOS, supra note 227, at 51 (stating that since World War II, Western
societies have gradually become more averse to military casualties, and that in the
United States, following the Vietnam War, this aversion has further developed into
what has been described by many as a "casualty phobia"); PETER D. FEAVER &
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following that war, casualty aversion was a significant source of
American reluctance to engage in armed conflict. 252 Only in the 1990s
did this disinclination begin to diminish, as reflected in the First Gulf
War.25 3 National leaders remained concerned, however, that public
support for martial engagements would wane if U.S. casualties
became numerous. They consequently adopted policies designed to
minimize them. 254 Force protection has in this way strongly
influenced the military decision making of the United States and its
allies at all the levels of war: strategic, operational, and tactical.2 55
Some contend that casualty aversion all but disappeared as a
significant restraint on military force after September 11, 2001.256
That is mistaken. The increasing reliance on drone warfare, in lieu of
special operations forces, reflects the continuing fear that a strong
body-bag effect will undermine public support for foreign wars. 257 Key

CHRISTOPHER GELPI, CHOOSING YOUR BATTLES: AMERICAN CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

AND THE USE OF FORCE 96, 98 (2005) (describing the thesis that the American public is
strongly afflicted by a casualty phobia as "one of the most important strategic claims in
the contemporary world," which strongly affects the actions of both U.S. leadership and
the actions of the United States' enemies, and further arguing that the popular belief
in the existence of such a phobia is based on what they argue is a misinterpretation of
several historical events, especially the wars in Korea and Vietnam); MANDEL, supra
note 247, at 33 (contrasting post-Vietnam attitudes about casualties in the United
States with those after World War II); see also Bernard Boane, Postmodern Armed
Forces and Civil-Military Relations?, in HANDBOOK OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF THE
MILITARY, 167, 178 (Giuseppe Caforio ed., 2006) (comparing American casualty
intolerance to that of other Western democracies).
252.
See John Mueller, Vietnam and Iraq: Strategies, Exit and Syndrome, in
VIETNAM IN IRAQ: TACTICS, LESSONS, LEGACIES AND GHOSTS 179, 184 (John Dumbrell &

David Ryan eds., 2007) (describing the public's desire to avoid another Vietnam, which
led, for many years, to an American reluctance to engage in armed conflict).
253.
See RICHARD ALAN SCHWARTZ, THE 1990S, 88-89 (2006) (describing how the
specter of the Vietnam War was gradually overcome leading up to Operation Desert
Storm).
254.
See id. at 88 (describing the Joint Chiefs' desire to conduct a "swift, decisive
offensive characterized by overwhelming American force"); see also Jeffrey Record,
Force-ProtectionFetishism: Sources, Consequences, and (?) Solutions, 14 AEROSPACE
POWER J., Summer 2000, at 4, 6 (critically assessing this American policy, known as
the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine, which was developed in the early 1990s).
255.
See MANDEL, supra note 247, at 34-36 (describing the role of force
protection in shaping national strategies and operational objectives of Western
countries-i.e., its role in affecting both the aims of armed conflicts and the ways in
which they are conducted); Vincent Desportes, Editorial, 15 DOCTRINE, Nov. 2008, at 4,
4-5 (contributing to a volume dedicated to a comparative examination of force
protection policies in different militaries); cf. Horowitz & Reiter, supra note 228, at 150.
(noting that increased democratization has led to lower casualty tolerance and,
consequently, to greater reliance on aerial strikes).
256.
See MANDEL, supra note 247, at 36-37 (noting that many observers who
held this view attributed reduced casualty aversion to the concern of the American
public with its own personal safety); Wong, supra note 228, at 66 (stating that
"casualty aversion is currently not a major factor in public support of the war on
terrorism").
257.
See MANDEL, supra note 247, at 39 (discussing views that downplay the
change in American perspective regarding casualty aversion and stress the strong
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U.S. allies share these concerns, leading some of them to withdraw
from common troop commitments to Afghanistan, in particular. 258
The effects of casualty aversion at all three levels of war are best
evidenced in the increased reliance of Western armed forces on air
power (including drones), rather than on ground forces. 259
Dependence on aerial bombardment is clear from Western conduct in
the first and second Iraq wars, NATO's 1999 Kosovo campaign, the
war in Afghanistan, and most recently the NATO campaign in
Libya.2 60
In these conflicts, Western states were widely criticized for
consistently preferring aerial force over deployment of ground troops.
That preference presents an ad bellum issue, as mentioned, when
aerial warfare will be more violent and destructive than a
contemplated land campaign in attaining the same objectives. 261
When the enemy seizes another state's territory (as in the First Gulf
War) or commits international crimes against a civilian population
(as in Kosovo and Libya), a land operation generally will be more
effective than one from the air. Western strategists nonetheless
preferred an aerial campaign in the initial stage of all these conflicts,
due largely to concerns with safeguarding their soldiers and
preserving public support for wars in which Western interests were
often only tangentially at stake. 262 These leaders drew guidance as

efforts made by U.S. forces to reduce casualties during the post-9/11 wars); see also
ALASTAIR FINLAN, SPECIAL FORCES, STRATEGY AND THE WAR ON TERROR: WARFARE BY

OTHER MEANS 9 (2008) (discussing the reasons for the use of Special Forces on the
battlefield); Kenneth Anderson, Efficiency in Bello and ad Bellum-Making the Use of
Force Too Easy?, in TARGETED KILLINGS: LAw AND MORALITY IN AN ASYMMETRICAL

WORLD 374, 381 (Claire Finkelstein, Jens David Ohlin & Andrew Altman eds., 2012)
(discussing the connection between drone warfare and force protection).
258.
Tom Lansford, 9/11 and the Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq: A Chronology
and Reference Guide 130-31 (2012); see also James A. Swanson, The Bush League of
Nations 134 (2008) (providing statistics illustrating British troop withdrawals and
showing that these withdrawals were affected by British military casualties); supra
notes 9-10 and accompanying text; cf. Nigel D. White, Democracy Goes to War: British
Military Deployments Under International Law 295 (2009) (discussing the role popular
support should play in determining when the lives of soldiers should be placed in
jeopardy).
259.
Horowitz & Reiter, supra note 228, at 150 ("The decreasing casualty
tolerance threshold in America and the West makes it crucial to formulate and execute
military strategies that involve the lowest possible risk to allied troops.... This
sensitivity to casualties makes air power quite attractive . . . ." (citations omitted)).
260.
Brown, supra note 237, at 69-70 (criticizing the affectivity of the extensive
reliance on aerial power in these armed conflicts); van Creveld, supra note 237, at 48,
52 (same).
261.
See supra notes 237-239 and accompanying text.
262.
See Luban, supra note 6, at 39-41 (noting reliance on aerial campaigns in
Kosovo due to the public's low casualty tolerance but arguing, based on the wrong legal
basis, that civilian morale should be irrelevant to the morality and legality of a war);
see also, e.g., ELIZABETH POND, THE REBIRTH OF EUROPE 200 (2d ed. 2002) (discussing
President Bill Clinton's insistence on an aerial campaign in Kosovo so that no
American soldier would die).
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well from the acknowledged duty of democratic states to honor their
soldiers' rights to life insofar as it is consistent with essential military
goals. 263 This is, of course, the consideration emphasized by Kasher
and Yadlin, and rightly so. To compensate for the lesser efficacy of air
power, these campaigns involved both much greater violence against
enemy combatants (and installations) and greater incidental civilian
harm than a land operation likely would have produced. 2 64
Yet, as explained hereinafter, considerable concern exists that
Western leaders have allowed themselves to be guided by the aim of
force protection beyond what the law of ad bellum proportionality
permits. 265 There is reason to believe that ad bellum proportionality
has been breached: force protection is so highly prized that no pilot
faces significant risk, and much greater firepower is used than that
which would have been used in a ground campaign (which could have
achieved the strategic goal of the relevant war). 26 6 This concern

263.
See POND, supra note 262, at 200 (noting the derivative interest of the
United States in Kosovo and the fortunate lack of casualties or commitment of ground
troops that would have undermined U.S. involvement); Martin L. Cook, "Immaculate
War" Constraintson HumanitarianIntervention, 14 ETHICS & INT'L AFF. 55, 65 (2000);
Dunlap, supra note 146, at 99 (noting that "the American military ethos is largely built
on the sanctity of all human life, combatant and noncombatant alike"). Cook states
that the "[p]rotection of innocent foreign nationals will be a priority as well ... because
of the moral concern with protection of innocent life. But even the concern with
protection of innocents will probably be secondary to protection of our own forces, for
the weighty moral reasons I have indicated." Cook, supra, at 63. One main reason,
among these moral reasons, as he explains earlier in his article, is that the core moral
and political justification for risking soldiers' lives is one of social contract (i.e., soldiers'
commitment to their state). Therefore it is more difficult to offer a moral justification
for instructing soldiers to risk their lives when that instruction is given due to reasons
unrelated to the social-contract rationale. Id. at 61-62. Cook discusses this issue in the
context of the humanitarian intervention in Kosovo, but notice that nothing in his
reasoning distinguishes between humanitarian interventions and other armed
conflicts. The jus ad bellum justification often given to these operations in general, and
sometimes even specifically to the priority given to aerial campaigns, is one of lex
specialis-mainly, claiming to rely on Security Council Resolutions dealing with the
relevant conflict as authorizing Western forces to act in a manner otherwise prohibited
by jus ad bellum. See Christian Henderson, InternationalMeasures for the Protectionof
Civilians in Libya and C6te d'Ivoire, 60 INT'L & COM. L.Q. 769, 770-73, 778 (2011)
(discussing the extensive (disputed) reliance of Western countries on Security Council
Resolutions as the ad bellum legal basis for their actions); Victor Kattan, The Use and
Abuse of Self-Defence in InternationalLaw: The Israel-Hezbollah Conflict as a Case
Study, 12 Y.B. OF ISLAMIC & MIDDLE E. L. 31, 33-34, 41 (2005-2006) (claiming that the
ad bellum legality of such a choice of an aerial option is solely due to the authorization
given by the Security Council).
264.
See sources cited supra note 237.
265.
E.g., JUDITH GAIL GARDAM, NECESSITY, PROPORTIONALITY AND THE USE OF
FORCE BY STATES 24-25 (2004) (stating that it is debatable whether the choice to
heavily rely on air power in Kosovo and in the First Gulf War can be justified according
to jus ad bellum proportionality, as it was overly influenced by the concern for force
protection).
266.
See WILLIAM JOSEPH BUCKLEY, Kosovo: CONTENDING VOICES ON BALKAN
INTERVENTIONS 392 (2000) (noting that there are serious morality concerns regarding
NATO's decision to restrict its engagement in Kosovo to airstrikes under the principle
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should be especially acute where there is no clear indication that the
enemy's strategy was actually to cause a body-bag effect, but Western
leaders nonetheless chose the aerial option, fearing that a body-bag
effect would be the inevitable result, in any event, of continued armed
conflict. 267 In light of the actions of Western states in the last two
decades, there is considerable danger that air power has become the
default option in considering strategic options, no matter if it
comports with ad bellum proportionality or not. 268

of ad bellum); GARDAM, supra note 265, at 24-25 (arguing that high-altitude aerial
bombardment was more likely to worsen the humanitarian problem in Kosovo than end
human rights abuses, thus violating ad bellum proportionality); Gardam, supra note
214, at 404-05 (criticizing the ad bellum legality of the aerial campaign at the
beginning of the First Gulf War); James Turner Johnson, The Just War Idea: The State
of The Question, in 1 JUSTICE AND GLOBAL POLITICS 167, 189-92 (Ellen Frankel Paul,
Fred D. Miller, Jr. & Jeffrey Paul eds., 2006) (discussing the reliance, due to a force
protection motivation, on air power in Kosovo and in the initial stages of the 2000s
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and further stating that "[the] calculation of
proportionality also requires us to ask whether a particular means is the best way to a
desired end" and that "[t]he air campaign against Serbia did nothing directly to protect
the ethnic Albanian Kosovars, and it may, as some have argued, have triggered worse
violence against them by the Serb troops and paramilitaries in Kosovo"); Julian M.
Lehmann, All Necessary Means To Protect Civilians: What the Intervention in Libya
Says About the Relationship Between the Jus in Bello and the Jus ad Bellum, 17 J.
CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 117, 140 (2012) (criticizing the ad bellum legality of the
reliance on aerial power in the campaign in Libya); Frederick Naert, The Impact of the
Fight Against Terrorism on the lus ad Bellum, 11 ETHICAL PERSP. 144, 148 (2004)
(criticizing the ad bellum legality of the aerial attacks in Afghanistan after the fall of
the Taliban). Some accounts suggest that the threat posed by an enemy's attack
determines not only the scale, but also the form of lawful counterattack, i.e., the choice
between a land or air campaign. For such authors, the mere fact that force protection
has influenced the decision to fight from the air in itself counts as strong evidence that
ad bellum proportionality has been violated. Also, criticisms of these Western actions
are often motivated not only by an ad bellum concern, but also an in bello concern
regarding the increase in civilian casualties that the choice of an aerial campaign over
a land operation often entails. Thus, such criticisms often do not appear in a pure ad
bellum form; instead, issues of ad bellum and in bello proportionality are conflated.
That is, often, the criticisms are made in ways resembling the way in which these
issues are conflated by Luban, as well as Margalit and Walzer. See Jasmine Moussa,
Can Jus ad Bellum Override Jus in Bello? Reaffirming the Separation of the Two
Bodies of Law, 90 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 963, 977-79 (2008) (discussing this common
flaw in such criticism). For an example of such a flaw, see Gardam, supra note 214, at
404-05.
As discussed supra Part IID, the body-bag effect becomes legally relevant
267.
to the determination of the scale of the conflict only when the enemy is intentionally
seeking to cause it. In some of the recent aerial campaigns of Western forces, however,
a counterargument might be made that the enemy did, in fact, had such intentions. See
Lacquement, supra note 237, at 47-48 (discussing the wars in Iraq, Kosovo, and
Afghanistan).
268.
Some have even argued that Western leaders have acted reflexively,
influenced by such an aim even when there was no actual concern that a body-bag
effect would develop. See Lacquement, supra note 237, at 41-42. Lacquement points to
the influence of this concern on the actions of American leaders: "The tremendous
efforts by civilian and military leaders to minimize casualties in . . . the Persian Gulf
War (1991), Haiti (1994), Bosnia (1995), and Kosovo (1999) . . . can be read as a
reaction to the public's purported low tolerance for casualties." Id. at 41. He then
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Three legal institutions have evaluated the choice of air over
land operations in the recent military operations of Western states.26 9
The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) prosecutor appointed a committee to assess the legality of
NATO's actions relating to its Kosovo intervention. 270 Several antiwar protestors, who committed illegal acts as part of their protest
against British participation in the Second Gulf War, petitioned
against their prosecution to the British House of Lords. They argued
their illegal acts were justified, because they were performed in an
attempt to impede the commission of a crime of aggression by the
British Government. As such, they have, in fact, petitioned the House
of Lords to examine whether British Prime Minister Tony Blair and
other government leaders committed the crime of aggression in
invading Iraq. 271 Finally, the prosecutor of the International Criminal
Court (ICC) examined whether a criminal investigation should be
opened against the leaders and soldiers of several countries
participating in that invasion. 272
These legal bodies were asked to evaluate the ad bellum
proportionality of the choice of air power over land operations in the
recent interventions of Western states, but concluded that they
lacked jurisdiction over the relevant international crime, i.e.,
jurisdiction to examine whether recourse to force had entailed

criticizes these leaders, because "[t]here is in fact no evidence that the public is
intrinsically casualty averse. Several studies . . . demonstrate that . .. [the] readiness

[to accept casualties] is not restricted to issues of vital national interests or selfdefense. The public takes its lead from how national leaders characterize and justify
the mission." Id. at 42.
269.
To be clear, additional judicial bodies reviewed, or were asked to review,
the legality according to international law of these armed conflicts andlor of the actions
committed during these conflicts, yet the decisions discussed in the text are considered
the leading decisions with regard to these conflicts. For decisions of additional judicial
bodies, see Bankovi6 v. Belgium, App. No. 52207/99, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 333
(holding a claim inadmissible that was brought by citizens of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia against seventeen European countries that are members of NATO and
participated in the Kosovo campaign); Jianming Shen, The ICJ's Jurisdiction in the
Legality of Use of Force Cases, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD:
ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF LI HAOPEI 480 (Sienho Yee & Tieya Wang eds., 2001) (describing
and criticizing how the ICJ rejected the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's proceedings
against ten NATO member states, accusing them of violating jus ad bellum); Afua
Hirsch, Iraq War Was Illegal, Dutch Panel Rules, GUARDIAN (Jan. 12, 2010, 2:05 PM),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jan/12/iraq-war-illegal-dutch-tribunal
(U.K.)
(reporting on an independent commission of inquiry, set up by the Netherlands'
government, that ruled that the 2003 invasion of Iraq violated jus ad bellum).
270.
NATO Bombing Report, supra note 137, f 30-34.
271.
R v. Jones [2006] UKHL 16, [2006] All Eng. Rep. (H.L.) 741 (appeal taken
from Eng. and Wales).
272.
Letter from Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Chief Prosecutor, Int'l Criminal Court,
to Senders Re Iraq (Feb. 9, 2006), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/
NR/rdonlyres/04D143C8-19FB-466C-AB77-4CDB2FDEBEF7/143682/OTPletterto_
senders-reIraq_9_February_2006.pdf.
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aggression. 273 It is widely believed that the reviewing bodies could
nonetheless have found a legal basis to comment on ad bellum
matters. 274 These decisions reflect reluctance to encroach upon the
discretion that international law affords to states on ad bellum
issues.2 75 That result ensured, however, that the law would remain
unclear regarding the place of force protection within ad bellum
proportionality assessments.
The practice of Western states raises concern that they are
attempting to change the customary law of ad bellum proportionality
by prioritizing casualty aversion to a degree beyond what
international law permits. They have apparently done so by opting
for the aerial option (despite its inevitable larger scale) even when no
clear evidence existed that their enemy deliberately sought a bodybag effect. This attempt to change customary international law might
succeed, if legal bodies prefer to dodge opportunities to critically
review it.2 7 6 Two prominent organs will soon have the opportunity to

273.
Jones, [2006] UKHL 16,
19 (Lord Bingham); NATO Bombing Report,
supra note 137, TT 30-34; Letter from Luis Moreno-Ocampo, supra note 272, at 4.
274.

See, e.g., WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL

CRIMINAL COURT 18G 91 (3d ed. 2008). Had these legal bodies been prepared to assess
ad bellum proportionality, they might have performed the valuable service of clarifying
that states are not free to make air power their default method for responding to any
armed attack, regardless of whether their enemy's strategy has chiefly been to seek a
body-bag effect. There are nonetheless defensible reasons why these legal bodies
declined to undertake such an analysis. See, e.g., Jones, [2006] UKHL 16, 30 (Lord
Bingham) (noting that recognizing a judicial authority to determine culpability for the
crime of aggression would require the courts to review the government's policies in
matters of security and international relations, and there are "well-established rules
that the courts will be very slow to review the exercise of prerogative powers in relation
to the conduct of foreign affairs and the deployment of the armed services"); NATO
Bombing Report, supra note 137, 4 (explaining that the ICTY has no jurisdiction over
a crime against peace).
275.
In fact, this motivation was explicitly admitted by the House of Lords.
Jones, [2006] UKHL 16, 1 30 (Lord Bingham).
276. See Alexander Orakhelashvili, Legal Stability and Claims of Change: The
International Court's Treatment of Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello, 75 NORDIC J. INT'L
L. 371, 371-72 (2006) (showing that, in recent history, claims of a legal change in both
jus in bello and jus ad bellum have been commonly raised by states during armed
conflicts in order to legitimize their actions, and asserting that "[tihe claims of legal
change attendant to such developments contradict the idea that the legal framework
must be viewed as coherent and predictable, not liable to change at each and every
instance of the exercise of power," and further asserting that "reflecting and applying
the principles and standards that meet the requirements of predictability, stability and
transparency, the judicial context of the International Court is most suitable"). Some
argue that a custom cannot develop from this practice because the justification for the
actions of Western states is not the conventional jus ad bellum, but in each case, a
specific authorization of the Security Council. E.g., Kattan, supra note 263, at 31, 41.
Yet this argument is problematic in light of the fact that, in at least some of these
conflicts, the legal claim of the United States and its allies that Security Council
Resolutions authorized the action is extremely contested. See Henderson, supra note
263, at 770-73, 778 (discussing the dispute as to whether UN Security Council
resolutions truly authorized the military actions in Libya and in the Second Gulf War,
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take a position on the extent to which force protection can shape the
form and scale of a military campaign. The first is the British
government's Chilcot Inquiry, reviewing the legality of the United
Kingdom's participation in the Second Gulf War.27 7 The second is the
ICC's investigation of the armed conflict in Libya.2 78 Much would be
gained if these two bodies resolved to clarify the law in a way that
restrained the growing inclination of Western states to excessively
prioritize force protection.
Choosing to perform a tactical or operational mission by aerial
bombardment instead of close, ground engagement presents an in
bello issue. Casualty aversion has been the chief rationale for
interpreting international law to authorize the former method in lieu
of the latter, as aerial operations require pilots to accept almost no
risk at all. This legal position has gained some official support;27 9 the
United Kingdom now formally adopts as its opinio juris that "[t]he
proportionality principle does not itself require the attacker to accept
increased risk" in order to reduce civilian risks.2 80 This reverses the
United Kingdom's longstanding stance that soldiers are legally bound
to accept some nontrivial level of risk to themselves in order to
protect civilians.2 81

and stating that "the problem of ambiguity, intentional or otherwise, in the mandates
of Chapter VII resolutions of the UNSC, along with the possibilities for unilateral and
potentially controversial interpretations that this provides, is one that still persists").
277.
For the official website of this commission, see IRAQ INQUIRY,
http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/ (last visited Apr. 2, 2013) (U.K.).
278.
See S.C. Res. 1970, $T 4-8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1970 (Feb. 26, 2011) (referring
the situation in Libya to the Prosecutor of the ICC). The ICC's jurisdiction over the
crime of aggression has not yet come into effect. The difference between this case and
the Iraq case, however, is that, to the surprise of most experts, in 2010, member states
agreed on a definition of the crime of aggression and set a date to the coming into force
of ICC jurisdiction with regard to this crime. R.C. Res. 6, Annex I, U.N. Doc. RC/6
(June 11, 2010). Until recently, the expectation was that such an agreement was not
likely to ever be reached. See Sarah B. Sewall et al., The United States and the
International Criminal Court: An Overview, in THE UNITED STATES AND THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: NATIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 1625 (Sarah B. Sewall & Carl Kaysen eds., 2000) (describing an agreement on the issue of
aggression as something that is not likely to occur in the foreseeable future). Thus, the
ICC prosecutor can be expected to exhibit less restraint in voicing opinions on ad
bellum issues.
279.
See, e.g., Smith, supra note 97, at 157-61 (arguing that such a position was
incorporated into different rules of engagement adopted by U.S. forces during the
second war in Iraq).
280.
JDCC, supra note 106, at 25-26.
For the British position prior to the publication of the Manual of the Law of
281.
Armed Conflict, see A.P.V. Rogers, Zero-Casualty Warfare, 82 INT'L REV. RED CROSS
165, 180 (2000). Rogers is a former UK Director of Army Legal Services and he cites
there MINISTRY OF DEF., BRITISH DEFENCE DOCTRINE: JWP 0-01 (2d ed. 1996). The

current British Defence Doctrine, on the other hand, does not address this issue. See
generally MINISTRY OF DEF., BRITISH DEFENCE DOCTRINE: JDP 0-01 (4th ed. 2011). But
cf. Rogers, supra note 138, at 310 (supporting the former position).
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Neither the ICTY committee nor the ICC prosecutor chose to
evaluate this legal interpretation of in bello proportionality. Both
simply concluded that the scale of civilian damage, in the military
actions examined, provided no clear indication of disproportionate
acts. 282 In reaching that conclusion, both inquiries stressed that the
states in question (including the United Kingdom) had followed
procedures designed to limit civilian losses. 283 This attention to
procedure, rather than result, reflects doctrinal accommodation to the
fact of great disagreement over when civilian casualties become so
numerous as to be disproportionate in relation to combat goals. 284
International agreement is more likely to be reached over desirable
processes for decision making on uses of force than on the
acceptability of consequences. 285
This is not an entirely satisfactory solution, however. It does
nothing to address the possibility that given procedures, adequate in
their design, do not preclude commanders from employing
substantive standards that continue to overvalue soldiers' lives over
those of the enemy's civilians. The current British Manual, like the
code proposed by Kasher and Yadlin, adopts a position highly

48-56 (analyzing how to
282.
See NATO Bombing Report, supra note 137,
apply the principle of proportionality); Letter from Luis Moreno-Ocampo, supra note
272, at 6-7 (discussing the method by which the Office of the Prosecutor analyzed the
evidence).
283.
See NATO Bombing Report, supra note 137, if 48-56 (describing how the
relatively low number of casualties relative to the high number of munitions released
during the aerial bombing campaign undermines claims of intentional targeting of
civilians); Letter from Luis Moreno-Ocampo, supra note 272, at 6-7. The Chief
Prosecutor of the ICC reported:
Publicly available information from the UK states that: lists of potential
targets were identified in advance; commanders had legal advice available to
them at all times and were aware of the need to comply with international
humanitarian law, including the principles of proportionality; detailed
computer modeling was used in assessing targets; political, legal and military
oversight was established for target approval; and real-time targeting
information, including collateral damage assessment, was passed back to
headquarters. This information was taken into consideration by the Office, in
accordance with the standards of critical evaluation. ...
According to the UK Ministry of Defence, nearly 85% of weapons released
by UK aircraft were precision-guided, a figure which would tend to corroborate
effort to minimize casualties.
Letter from Luis Moreno-Ocampo, supra note 272, at 6-7.
284.
See supra notes 155-156, 205 and accompanying text.
285.
See Benvenisti, supra note 104, at 100 (highlighting the emphasis that will
likely be placed on procedural protections when analyzing whether civilian casualties
are disproportionate); Cohen & Shany, supra note 95, at 320 ("Robust institutional
requirements could compensate for the inevitable ambiguity of the substantive
contents of the proportionality tests and provide courts with objective criteria for
judicial review.").
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vulnerable to this danger. 2 86 Even the most punctilious procedures
for implementing those standards would often do little to limit
civilian harm within acceptable bounds. It is regrettable that neither
the ICC nor ICTY investigators saw fit to assess the legal
defensibility of the British standard (as applied by Royal forces in the
Second Gulf War and perhaps also the Kosovo campaign).28 7
The question of whether to prefer aerial methods to ground
deployment generally arises at war's operational level. But once
aerial bombardment has been chosen, the relation of force protection
to in bello proportionality moves into tactical modalities.28 8 That
relation finds vivid illustration when pilots must decide how to attack
ground targets. Does their duty to prevent unnecessary civilian harm
require them to fly at an altitude that would put them and their
aircrafts at much greater peril by exposing them to anti-aircraft fire
incapable of reaching higher altitudes? 2 89 The ICTY committee faced

286.
See Confino & Kremnitzer, supra note 31 (warning, while referring to
Kasher and Yadlin's position, that in a military system that conveys the message that
strong priority should be given to the lives of soldiers over the lives of civilians, an
increased and disastrous risk to civilians is likely to occur). See more generally, with
regard to the relationship between substantive norms and procedure, Thomas 0. Main,
The Procedural Foundation of Substantive Law, 87 WASH U. L. REV. 801, 802, 840-41
(2010). Main shows that procedural norms and substantive norms are inherently
intertwined to the extent that the end substantive result of a legal decision-making
process is always the result of an interaction between the two kinds of norms.
If international law obligates soldiers to accept at least some nontrivial
287.
level of risk, then the British officials who incorporated a less restrictive interpretation
into this manual may have committed the international crime of soliciting
disproportional attacks. See Rome Statute, supra note 32, art. 25(3)(b) (making the
solicitation of such attacks a crime if the attacks in fact occur or are attempted).
288.
See supraPart II.C.
289.
A dispute exists over the duty of pilots to perform an independent
proportionality assessment. In addition to the position discussed in the text, which
views the matter as simply another case in which the proportionality norm for tactical
actions applies, two other positions have been suggested. Some argue that pilots cannot
make a proportionality assessment of any kind, since they may be unaware of facts
determining the military advantage to be anticipated from their actions when it is
examined in the context of the attack as a whole. Others argue that pilots should have
a duty not to drop a bomb where they themselves can anticipate no proportionate
advantage relative to likely civilian loss. This second position affords pilots greater
tactical discretion not only from the first position, but also from the position discussed
in the text (that simply sees it as another case in which the proportionality norm set
for tactical actions applies). That is because this position wishes to see each dropping of
a bomb as an "attack." Thus, it sets the reference point for a fully developed
proportionality assessment at a much lower level on the levels-of-war continuum than
current international law. See Hamutal E. Shamash, How Much Is Too Much? An
Examination of the Principleof Jus in Bello Proportionality,2 IDF L. REV. 103, 116-27
(2005-2006) (discussing this dispute briefly and implicitly). The Israeli Air Force
voluntarily adopted (i.e., as a restriction not obligated by the prohibitions of
international law) a position that comes close to the approach that places extensive
discretion and responsibility on the pilots. A military regulation provides that the final
decision whether to abort a mission, due to reasons of excessive harm to the civilian
population, may be made by the lead pilot in a formation of planes. The higher ranking
commanders, who are usually found at a command post on the ground, watching the
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this question in a case involving a pilot who twice inadvertently
bombed a civilian train. 29 0 On his first pass, his missile was already
programmed to fire before he noticed that it had not targeted the
bridge but instead a nearby civilian train. Since his first attempt did
not destroy the bridge, the pilot returned for a second try. Though
hitting the bridge, he also again hit the train. 291
The committee did not assess whether the military advantage
anticipated in destroying the bridge was excessive in relation to
foreseeable civilian casualties.2 9 2 Answering that question would
have been essential to a full assessment of in bello proportionality.
The committee instead summarily found that the pilot had aimed
only at the bridge and that it constituted a legitimate military
objective, 293 then asked whether the pilot, in "endeavoring to keep the
aircraft in the air and safe from surrounding threats in a combat
environment," 294 had been reckless in his efforts to avoid hitting the
train.29 5
How should one understand the committee's resort to this form
of "concise" proportionality assessment? Some have claimed that it
suggests a greater concern with the principle of distinction than with
proportionality.2 96 Others have attempted to explain the committee's
reasoning as being based on the demand of international criminal law
for the existence of mens rea-which does not exist when
responsibility of a state for a violation of the principle of
proportionality is examined. 2 97 Still, a different explanation should be
given. The committee, in this case, simply applied correctly the
proportionality requirement as it pertains to tactical decisions-

actions through a video screen, are prohibited to order the lead pilot (or any other pilot
in the formation) to perform the bombing when the lead pilot has decided otherwise.
Such ground-situated, higher ranking commanders can, however, order the pilots to
abort the mission if they think that the bombing is disproportional, even if the leading
pilot thinks otherwise. HCJ 5757/04 Hus v. Deputy Chief of Staff 59(6) PD 97, para. 7
(Isr.) (discussing this classified military regulation).
290.
NATO Bombing Report, supra note 137,
58-62.
291.
Id.
292.
The committee only defined that event as one of the most problematic
events it examined. Id.
57.
Id. 62.
293.
Id. 61.
294.
Id.
61-62 (dividing on the issue with regard to the second bombing).
295.
296.
See William J. Fenrick, Targeting and ProportionalityDuring the NATO
Bombing Campaign Against Yugoslavia, 12 EUR. J. INT'L L. 489, 500-01 (2001)
(analyzing the NATO Bombing Report examination of this event and stating, with
regard to the aircraft crew, that they clearly failed to distinguish between military and
civilian personnel, and discussing, with regard to their commanders, whether these
high-ranking superiors violated in bello proportionality). Such a position is
understandable in light of the almost complete convergence, at the tactical level,
between the conduct rule set by in bello proportionality and the one set by the principle
of distinction. See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
297.
Andreas Laursen, NATO, the War over Kosovo, and the ICTY Investigation,
17 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 765, 809 (2002).
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examining whether the pilot had done as much as reasonably possible
to protect civilians without jeopardizing his mission or rendering it
suicidal.29 8
In sum, one should understand the three positions here
examined in light of a larger sociohistorical context, one in which
military casualty aversion has become the overriding preoccupation of
Western societies and the armed forces serving them. If international
law does not check this powerful trend, the legal rules on
proportionality at both the ad bellum and in bello stages of military
decision making will fail to significantly restrain war's violence in
general and civilian suffering in particular. That said, international
law cannot remain indifferent to the changing nature of security
threats faced by Western democracies, threats much broader than
those confronted in classic interstate wars. Judicial bodies have
shown themselves increasingly willing in recent years to address
legal aspects of armed conflicts,29 9 including matters of
proportionality.30 0 Those efforts today require enhanced attention to
how decisions on proportionality in the use of force differ significantly
at various levels in a military chain of command.

298.
See supra Part II.C.
299.
For an example of this increased readiness by international tribunals, see
Yuval Shany, No Longer a Weak Department of Power? Reflections on the Emergence of
a New InternationalJudiciary,20 EUR. J. INT'L L. 73, 79-80 (2009). For an example of
this increased readiness of domestic courts, see Victor V. Ramraj, The Impossibility of
Global Anti-Terrorism Law?, in GLOBAL ANTI-TERRORISM LAW AND POLICY 44, 49-50

(Victor V. Ramraj et al. eds., 2d ed. 2012) [hereinafter GLOBAL ANTI-TERRORISM].
300.
While it is likely that domestic courts will still be hesitant to review issues
of ad bellum proportionality, it is clear that, in certain democratic states, courts are
increasingly reviewing in bello proportionality assessments made by commanders. See,
e.g., Nicola McGarrity & Edward Santow, Anti-Terrorism Laws: Balancing National
Security and a Fair Hearing, in GLOBAL ANTI-TERRORISM, supra note 299, at 122, 126-30 (discussing the increasing use of in bello proportionality analysis in Australia,
Canada, and the United Kingdom). President Barak of the Israeli Supreme Court, in
reviewing the legality of the "separation fence" built by Israel on the West Bank, went
so far as to state:
The question is whether the route of the separation fence, according to the
approach of the military commander, is proportionate. The standard for this
question is not the subjective standard of the military commander. The
question is not whether the military commander believed, in good faith, that
the injury is proportionate. The standard is objective. The question is whether,
by legal standards, the route of the separation fence passes the tests of
proportionality. This is a legal question, the expertise for which is held by the
Court.
HCJ 2056/Q4 Beit Sourik Vill. Council v. Gov't of Isr. [2004] IsrLR 264, 303-04 (Isr.),
available at http://elyonl.court.gov.illfiles-eng/04/560/020/a28/04020560.a28.pdf. The
ICJ (i.e., an international tribunal), in its recent rulings, showed considerable
readiness to review even states' ad bellum proportionality assessments. See Thomas M.
Franck, On Proportionalityof Countermeasures in InternationalLaw, 102 AM. J. INT'L
L. 715, 719-21 (2008). Franck shows that, after many years in which the ICJ avoided
ruling on issues of ad bellum proportionality, in recent cases it has done so.
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V. CONCLUSION

The three positions in the current debate on the place of force
protection within proportionality call to mind a famous fable. It tells
of three people describing an elephant in the dark: one touches the
tail, the second the tusk, and the third the trunk; thus, each portrays
"an elephant" quite differently. As allegory, the story intimates, of
course, that one can only fully understand a complex issue by
examining its multiple dimensions at once. Like the three people in
this story, the three positions here examined fail to recognize that
any thorough, satisfactory appreciation of proportionality requires
attending to all its dimensions, i.e., to how military decision making
is decidedly different at various levels in a chain of command.
Margalit and Walzer are deeply dissatisfied with the capacious
discretion that the law of proportionality now affords to military
decision makers, and they seek to replace it with a clear and simple
rule prioritizing civilian's lives. Yet they fail to recognize the
impracticality of regulating proportionality assessment at the higher
rungs of a chain of command through any bright-line rule. Luban's
position suffers the opposite flaw. He has high expectations that
soldiers will be able to accurately measure risks both to themselves
and to civilians. These hopes are unrealistic with respect to lowranking soldiers on the field charged with tactical decisions. Insisting
that those soldiers make nuanced proportionality assessments can
only lead to greater civilian carnage and unwarranted secondguessing of operational matters beyond their ken.
These three authors contemplate a deliberative process in which
soldiers must regularly incur serious risk of death to save not merely
comrades in arms or fellow citizens at home but also civilians on the
other side of the battle lines. Yet their focus on the duty to protect the
lives of foreign civilians leads them to adopt positions that would
prevent states from honoring their moral and constitutional duties to
safeguard the lives of their own citizens, including those who happen
for the moment to be soldiers. Notably, these legal stances would
keep a victim state from satisfactorily addressing the strategic threat
posed by nonstate adversaries seeking to maximize its military
casualties.
Kasher and Yadlin, in contrast, defend a decision-making
process and legal interpretation that lets states honor their moral
and constitutional duties to citizens. These duties, they argue, require
that soldiers' lives receive greater consideration in military
deliberations than those of foreign civilians. Yet, this one-sided
position would yield catastrophic results if adopted at the operations
level and even more so at the tactical level-results incompatible with
in bello proportionality, as generally and properly understood.
Like the three fictitious people, however, each of the legal
positions here examined also captures a salient element of truth
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about proportionality in war. Each is therefore helpful in resolving
the state of irresolution from which the applicable legal doctrine has
long suffered. If applied to the operational level, Luban is right to
demand that soldiers undertake careful assessments of relative risk
(to themselves) and harm (to the enemy's civilians). Yet it is also true
that the particular uncertainties of operational warfare render more
than very rough measurement of those factors impossible.
International law is therefore right to demand proportionality
assessment at this level to involve applying general standards (not
bright-line rules) to the shifting facts of specific circumstances.
At the tactical level of armed conflict, there is generally much
less leeway for nuanced, time-consuming deliberation. Bright-line
rules are therefore more appropriate than flexible standards. The law
of proportionality still applies. But its requirements must be
interpreted in light of the acute constraints that soldiers face when
laboring at the proverbial "pointy end of the spear." International
humanitarian law has thus been wise to impose liability on lowranking field soldiers acting under orders only when the
disproportionality of civilian harm, ordered by their superiors, is truly
egregious, and transparently so to any disinterested observer. In all
other circumstances, the law rightly expects no more of low-ranking
soldiers than that they exercise their admittedly limited discretion to
spare civilians as much as possible. This instruction aims to
counteract impulses, to which low-echelon soldiers are most
susceptible, to invariably prioritize one's own life (and the lives of
combat buddies) over civilians who find themselves in harm's way.
Yet, this current rule is vague, which leaves it susceptible to
manipulation and skewed, self-interested interpretation. Margalit
and Walzer's approach suggests a rule quite congenial to warfare at
the tactical level, one that aids in clarifying what proportionality
would really mean for soldiers there. The relative clarity and
simplicity of that rule is more likely than the alternatives here
discussed to counter soldiers' impulses to depreciate the duty to
safeguard foreign civilians.
At war's strategic level, by contrast, a proper understanding of
the law and how it bears on military decision making accords lesser
weight to possible foreign civilian harm. This is because war's
reciprocal dynamics-the attendant imponderables of one side's serial
responses to the other's-render prediction of civilian harm virtually
impossible at the outset of conflict. These inescapable vagaries, as
well as the moral and constitutional obligations of states to their
soldier-citizens, demand that international law afford states
considerable discretion to consider their soldiers' right to life in
choosing between alternative strategies of response to enemy attack.
The law of ad bellum proportionality, rightly understood, continues to
limit their discretion-and the harm it might otherwise cause-by
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confining a state's armed response to the threat posed by the enemy's
specific attack.
Kasher and Yadlin's approach to proportionality is helpful at this
strategic level, for it enables states attacked by terrorist groups, in
particular, to construe the requirements of self-defense with sufficient
breadth to accommodate the fact that their enemies bypass
traditional territorial goals for more amorphous but capacious ones.
After all, terrorist groups often seek, as their strategic objective, to
influence the foreign policy of their adversary across a wide range of
issues (when they do not simply seek its complete annihilation). Their
preferred means to those far-reaching ends typically involve direct
targeting of civilian populations-as well as efforts to kill many more
soldiers than strictly territorial goals would require-with a view to
demoralize civil society, inducing its members to press for policy
change. When formulating its strategic response, the victim state
may apply the doctrine of ad bellum proportionality with those
circumstances in mind. Thus, in its attention to the unique contours
of anti-terrorist conflict, Kasher and Yadlin's approach wisely
endorses this path.
One must therefore interpret international law both to accept
each described approach and confine it to the level of warfare at
which it makes sense. The competing views of the several authors
discussed, apparently contradictory at first, then become
complementary. Granting too wide a berth to any of these views
would be to misunderstand the nature of war itself and the structure
of the complex organizations that conduct it. In these momentous
matters, misunderstandings of this sort can easily have profoundly
lethal consequences for the lives of both soldiers and civilians, each
reluctantly caught in war's unforgiving maelstrom.

